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AUTONOMOUS DIRIGIBLE AIRSHIPS: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS AND OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY EVALUATION 






The fiscal year 2012 budget resolution forced many agencies to significantly reduce their 
budget spending and adhere to stricter budgetary policies. The one agency that was hit 
the hardest was the Department of Defense—it was forced to reduce its budget by 
$10 trillion over a span of 10 years. With the ongoing War on Terror, the Department of 
Defense estimated in 2010 that the cost of maintaining a single soldier in a wartime 
environment grew exponentially to well over $1 million per soldier.  
 The U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan started a major shift, from using 
manned vehicles to using unmanned vehicles, also known as autonomous vehicles. These 
autonomous vehicles can be controlled remotely via satellite or radio signals. Currently, 
the majority of unmanned vehicle usage is in autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) that provide air surveillance, reconnaissance, and assault purposes across all 
services. This major shift to autonomous vehicles has kept a large number of troops out 
of dangerous environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan, has reduced the risk of losing 
soldiers’ lives, and, at the same time, has reduced the costs of keeping soldiers in these 
dangerous environments for long periods of time. 
The purpose of this project is to provide a comparative analysis and operational 
efficiency evaluation of current and in-development airships, or dirigibles, to expand the 
UAV’s capability as a viable logistic support platform. This project demonstrates that 
airships, manned or unmanned, can reduce costs, particularly important with the current 
budgetary concerns throughout the Department of Defense. The expanded use of airships 
for logistics could benefit all services due to their flexibility, lift capability, 
interoperability, and lower cost. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
In this research project, we examine the possible use of airships as a viable alternative 
to current United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) heavy-lift logistics 
platforms. We compare the estimated operating times of each platform within a given 
scenario, the number of platforms required to complete a mission, the sorties required to 
complete a mission, the hourly operating costs, the cost per nautical-ton mile, the overall 
mission costs, the manning costs, and the cost savings that could be achieved with improved 
speed and cargo capacity associated with airships. We compare these characteristics against 
current USTRANSCOM airlift and sealift platform costs.   
Our main objective in this project is to establish an operating cost baseline for 
airships against other platforms. Our second objective is to show the relationship between the 
number of platforms required with respect to varying mission duration and variable tonnage 
to transport. In addition, we examine the potential cost savings of using autonomous airships 
versus manned variants. Our analysis in this project could provide helpful data to allow the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and USTRANSCOM to evaluate airships currently being 
designed for potential acquisition. 
In this project, we outline the past achievements of airships and the current direction 
of airship design, and we compare the cost and capabilities of airships against some of the 
current heavy-lift platforms in use today. Our main belief is that, with proper design and 
technical capabilities, airships could provide the DoD and USTRANSCOM with a vital asset 
for accomplishing cost efficient and timely heavy-lift capabilities. 
Our first goal in this paper is to examine the history of airships—their successes and 
failures—and to provide insight on why airships were not used for military purposes 
following the early 20th century. In addition, we examine the myths that precluded the use of 
airships in future military operations and the eventual decline of airship use in general.  
Our project’s second goal is to examine the recent developments and capabilities of 
modern-day airships and their potential uses in a wide variety of missions. This review 
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provides a better understanding of modern airships and the technological advances that have 
enabled them to become a viable alternative to current heavy-lift platforms.   
Our third goal in this project is to analyze the current costs and operational 
characteristics of heavy-lift platforms. Using the data obtained from various sources on 
heavy-lift platforms, we derive cost and operational characteristics that establish a baseline 
that airships need to achieve, meet, or exceed in order to become a viable alternative to 
current heavy-lift platforms.   
Finally, our project examines whether airships could provide the same operational 
capabilities while providing the DoD with minimal time and cost characteristics compared to 
current heavy-lift platforms.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In fiscal year (FY) 2011, the USTRANSCOM conducted over 35,000 airlift missions, 
transferred over 19 million tons of cargo through sealift, and operated in 75% of the world’s 
countries in support of its mission of delivering and distributing logistics and cargo globally 
(“About USTRANSCOM,” 2012). The DoD relies on USTRANSCOM’s ability to provide a 
global network of critical surface, sea, and air transportation infrastructure to carry out its 
global missions. Any disruption or incapacitation of these assets may have devastating 
effects on the DoD’s ability to resupply, equip, and project forces globally (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2008). 
The recent budget crisis provided continuing pressure on the DoD and various other 
departments to cut costs and offer the same level of readiness. The nation’s inability to 
balance budgets and provide an effective long-term budgetary strategy has triggered 
automatic clauses that will constrain the DoD’s budget over the next 10 years. The result of 
these funding shortfalls will require the DoD to provide tighter controls on the management 
of operational and acquisition funds. With that in mind, the USTRANSCOM has investigated 
various new technologies in alternative modes of heavy-lift transportation to ensure the 
availability of mission-critical infrastructure, including surface, sea, and air transportation 
assets.   
Other considerations, such as aging platforms and maintenance and modernization 
costs, must be taken into account when discussing new forms of technology used for heavy-
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lift transportation. Aged equipment in the current fleet of airlift platforms will reach its 
planned life cycle in coming years. In addition, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding report does 
not call for the construction of new strategic sealift platforms. Without a defined, long-term 
replacement program for these platforms, increasing maintenance costs, parts unavailability, 
and planned modernization costs will hamper USTRANSCOM’s ability to sustain its entire 
mission.   
Airships could provide the DoD with a viable, operationally efficient alternative to 
current heavy-lift platforms being used by the USTRANSCOM. Airships could also provide 
better cost efficiency when transporting logistics to the various military theaters in which our 
armed forces operate. Additionally, if logistics airships could be designed to provide 
autonomous point-to-point lift operations, the DoD could potentially save millions of dollars 
in manning and personnel costs. 
C. METHODOLOGY/SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 
This project is designed to investigate the cost effectiveness of airships as viable 
alternatives to current heavy-lift platforms given varying mission duration time intervals and 
total tonnage. We formulated two scenarios to analyze each airship in a one-to-one 
comparison, in a break-even analysis and in a manned versus unmanned comparison in order 
to assess the potential cost savings airships could provide.   
The scenarios in this project are designed to present realistic situations where all 
platforms can be compared against each other. Scenario 1 consists of a hypothetical re-supply 
route from Europe to Afghanistan. It is primarily an airlift scenario overland. Sealift is 
included in this scenario in order to show cost differences in case time is not a critical factor. 
Scenario 2 consists of a hypothetical re-supply route from Hawaii to Guam. Scenario 2 uses 
both airlift and sealift, and is constructed to show cost and time calculations of a traditional 
sea route.   
Each scenario provides cost analyses using distance between point of embarkation 
and point of debarkation, the total cargo movement in short tons, the platform providing 
support, the number of personnel and manning costs, and overall time to complete a mission.   
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D. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
We list specific assumptions and limitations in Chapter V, Methodology, and Chapter 
VI, Analysis. The project’s scope is limited to the variables provided; however, the models 
are constructed to accommodate any input required for planning purposes. Airships have not 
yet been procured through the DoD; however, airships in the design or development stages 
are used in this analysis. All information regarding airships came from the airship 
manufacturers though various corporate websites or brochures. Data does not yet exist for the 
cost of maintaining a fleet of airships, but airship hourly operating costs, manning 
requirements, and maintenance costs are derived, or are factored into our assumptions.    
Limitations are not specifically analyzed in this project; however, airships in general 
are prone to many of the same limitations as conventional logistics aircraft. Specific threats 
may include other air combatants, surface-to-air missiles, and small arms fire. For the 
purpose of this paper, we assume the time period for these operations is after the initial 
mobilization, when air superiority and proper air defense mechanisms are in place, and the 
missions of each platform are not jeopardized from hostile attack.   
E. CURRENT LOGISTICS PLATFORMS 
The USTRANSCOM utilizes numerous types of platforms to complete its mission of 
delivering and distributing logistics and cargo globally. This analysis focuses on two 
methods of heavy-lift logistics delivery, airlift and sealift. Other forms of transportation, such 
as rail and trucking, are crucial to USTRANSCOM’s mission; however, airlift and sealift 
fulfill the bulk of transportation needs for the armed forces’ heavy machinery and equipment. 
Three types of airlift platforms are used in this study for comparison against airships. 
We chose the C-130J, C-17, and C-5M due to their ability to provide the Air Mobility 
Command (AMC) with heavy-lift capabilities through numerous types of missions. We chose 
these aircraft variants to simplify our research scenarios, although most variants are close in 
specifications—endurance, range, and payload capacities. We did not analyze other forms of 
fixed-wing aircraft because their missions did not necessarily constitute heavy-lift missions. 
Rotary-wing aircraft are also not analyzed because of their smaller payload capacity, their 
maximum range and endurance, and their inability to refuel in the air. Other specific 
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assumptions and limitations are discussed in Chapter V, Methodology, and Chapter VI, 
Analysis. 
Two types of sealift platforms are used in this project for comparison against airships. 
We selected the large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) and fast sealift ship (FSS) due 
to their ability to transfer large amounts of cargo to any deep draft harbor around the world. 
Numerous other classes of ships provide Military Sealift Command (MSC) with similar 
capabilities; however, many of these are commercial assets that are contracted for use and 
obtaining the cost information for these vessels was infeasible. Sealift platforms will always 
compare favorably against any airlift platform on a cost-per-ton-mile basis, but if hourly 
operating and manning costs are reduced, airships can provide better cost efficiencies when 
time criticality is a driving factor.  
F. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
This project’s primary purpose is to analyze the costs and capabilities of airships 
against today’s current heavy-lift logistical platforms. Our analysis examines the operational 
capabilities of airships that are currently in design. It determines the hourly costs needed for 
airships to be a viable alternative to today’s heavy-lift platforms and explores if airships can 
be used to produce a cost-effective method of delivering logistics in manned or unmanned 
variants. 
The project is organized into eight chapters: Chapter I—Introduction, Chapter II—
Background, Chapter III—Modern Airship Developments, Chapter IV—Current Logistics 
Platforms, Chapter V—Methodology, Chapter VI—Analysis of Scenario 1, Chapter VII—
Analysis of Scenario 2, Chapter VIII—Additional Airship Analysis, and Chapter IX—
Conclusions and Recommendations. The findings are not all-encompassing and additional 
research is needed to further evaluate life cycle costs, research and development costs, as 
well as myriad other relevant costs associated with making the technological development of 
airships a reality. Once airships have been fully developed and data can be collected, 
additional research will be needed to validate whether airships could be a viable alternative to 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES 
 The 20th century brought about the modernization of air transportation through the 
use of commercial airships, fixed-wing airplanes, and the development of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs). The golden era of airships occurred in the early 20th century; however, 
airships quickly met their decline following several catastrophic accidents, such as the 
Hindenburg, the U.S. Navy’s ZR2, and the British R101 airships. With new technological 
advances in systems and materials, airships have seen a resurgence—they now provide not 
only passenger transport, but also other commercial and strategic capabilities. 
 In recent history, technological advances in aerial systems have allowed a person 
stationed in the United States to remotely control platforms in other countries, in real time. 
This step forward has allowed the development of multi-mission platforms that are able to 
carry out numerous operations with speed, precision, and flexibility. The combination of 
airships and the possibilities to use them autonomously could provide the DoD a cost-
efficient alternative to current logistics transportation platforms. 
 To understand the future capabilities of autonomous airships, we first need to look at 
the history of airships and UAVs. In this chapter, we explore the various usages of airships 
and UAVs in the past, major accomplishments, major disasters, and challenges that lie ahead.            
B. THE HISTORY OF AIRSHIPS 
A dirigible or airship is a lighter-than-air aircraft that is propelled through the use of 
lifting gas, rudders, and a thrusting mechanism. Airships differ from aerodynamic aircraft, 
such as fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, in that airships have large cavities or balloon-like 
structures that are filled with noble gases that are “lighter than air.” Past airships have used 
hydrogen as the primary lifting gas, but the majority of modern airships now use helium 
(Gillett, 1999). Airships have been used since the 1890s, primarily by developed countries—
for example, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States—in both commercial 
applications, such as passenger liners, and military applications, such as reconnaissance and 
intelligence gathering. Airships were attractive at the beginning of the 20th century primarily 
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due to the inexpensiveness of hydrogen gas needed for lift and the relatively low-power 
engines required for propulsion (Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 2005). 
There are three categories of the envelope type or “balloon” used: rigid, semi-rigid, 
and non-rigid. Rigid envelope airships have an outside frame that keeps the shape of the 
balloon—for example, the Zeppelins used by Germany. Semi-rigid envelope airships use 
keel-like structures to distribute the weight of the frame and allow the vessel to maneuver 
better through the air (CBO, 2005). The airship Norge is an example of a semi-rigid airship 
that was used to travel across the North Pole in 1926. The non-rigid- envelope airships, 
unlike the previous two categories, lack a frame and use only gas to keep their shape. The 
Goodyear blimp and various other airships used in sporting events are common examples of 
non-rigid airships (Toland, 1957).    
1. Early Airships and Major Accomplishments 
 The development of airships was hampered in the late 1890s due to three basic 
phenomena: the public response to airships, the lack of awareness of airships, and the 
intrusion of politics into business ventures. These three basic reasons kept many businessmen 
from investing in and developing airships at the end of the 19th century (Meyer, 2001). The 
first commercially successful type of airship, called the Zeppelin, or the LZ1, was designed 
by the German Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin and successfully launched on July 2, 1900. It 
was the first airship that overcame the three basic phenomena that had previously hampered 
development of airships by offering promises of speed and luxury for all their passengers 
(Meyer, 2001). Later, Count von Zeppelin took on a new business associate named Dr. Hugo 
Eckener and formed the world’s first passenger-transport luxury airships. They called their 
new company Deutsche Luftschiffahrts Aktien Gesellschaft (DELAG) and built air harbors 
all over Germany, including in Frankfort, Berlin, Hamburg, and Dresden (Toland, 1957).       
Unlike luxury cruise liners, locomotives, and sports cars, Zeppelins could maneuver 
freely without the constraints of roads, rails, or sea routes; this freedom allowed airships to 
travel anywhere that might have seemed impossible by conventional standards. The greatest 
achievements of airships happened mainly after the end of World War I (WWI) in 1918. 
Great Britain and the United States developed military airships of their own from either 
confiscated, captured, or repatriated German airship designs (Meyer, 2001). 
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The airship’s first major accomplishment happened when the British naval airship 
R34 left Great Britain on July 2, 1919, and traveled to Mineola, Long Island, United States, 
on July 6, 1919, crossing the Atlantic Ocean; it also made a successful return trip. Two 
British corporations manufactured airships during this period. Armstrong-Whitworth 
manufactured the R33, while William Beardmore & Company Ltd manufactured R34 
airships. Both the R33 and R34 were based on the captured German Zeppelin, L33, which 
was brought down in Great Britain during WWI with its engines intact. Another milestone 
was achieved when the Germans built and operated the passenger-carrier airship Graf 
Zeppelin (LZ 127), which, in October 1929, was the first commercially operated airship to 
circumnavigate the globe. The Graf Zeppelin included flights to Europe, the United States, 
and the Middle East, and provided freight, mail, and passenger services to Brazil (Meyer, 
2001).   
2. Use of Airships in Military 
After successful use in the commercial sector, airships were eventually designed for 
military use. Germany again led the way in the development of airships to be used in various 
military applications—troop transportation, air surveillance, and reconnaissance. The 
German army and navy purchased various types of airships from developers such as Gross-
Bassenach, Parseval, and Schutte-Lanz. These developers were all competitors of the 
Zeppelin models (Aeroscraft Corporation, n.d.). The first experimental airship, the LZ3 
Zeppelin, was sold to the German army as a school ship and was re-designated as the Z1. The 
LZ3 was part of a contractual agreement with the German army for the development and 
later purchase of the LZ4. In August of 1908, the LZ4 broke free from its anchor during a 
storm and crashed into a tree, creating a large fire in one of the airship’s engines.  
During WWI, the Germans, the French, and the Italians used airships as a platform 
for not only reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, but also for tactical bombing. From 
1914–1918, Germany used airships to provide stealth night bombings of the British Isles to 
counteract British naval superiority. The use of airships cost the Germans dearly, as the 
Zeppelins and various other airships were inaccurate when dropping bombs on targets, due to 
poor navigation and the difficulty of operating at night (Toland, 1957). In 1918, Germany 
discontinued the use of airships as bombers due to their vulnerability to the incendiary bullets 
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that the British air defense forces used against them. The British began strategically bombing 
German airship production lines and hangars in Cologne and Dusseldorf, making airships 
their primary target. At the end of WWI, and after Germany’s defeat in 1919, the Allies 
demanded that Germany discontinue its airship production for war, and Germany divided 
amongst the Allies its remaining airships as reparations (Toland, 1957). 
Later, the United States and Great Britain used dirigibles for military reconnaissance 
and intelligence gathering, but discontinued their use due to major disasters. After WWI, 
Germany continued to produce airships, but rather than producing them for military use, the 
Zeppelin company believed that airships should be used for peace and created a series of 
passenger airships that provided services to various cities and other countries (Toland, 1957).     
3. Major Catastrophes With Airships 
 There have been many catastrophes involving airships since their inception in the late 
1890s, but three major incidents in airship history limited the usage of airships: the American 
airship ZR2 in 1921, the British airship R101 in 1930, and the German airship Hindenburg 
(LZ129) in 1937. All three disasters involved heavy loss of the lives of the passengers and 
crewmembers due to the major fires that erupted from the heat of the engines that ignited the 
hydrogen gas in the airships’ envelopes. 
a. The United States Navy ZR2 Airship Disaster, Hull, England, 1921  
The United States purchased the ZR2 airship from Great Britain in 1921 to be 
commissioned by the U.S. Navy as a reconnaissance and troop transport airship. The ZR2 
was the largest airship during the post-WWI era. During a test flight in Hull, England, on 
August 24, 1921, the ZR2 was performing high-speed maneuvers at low altitudes when the 
hull snapped into two pieces, due to structural strains caused by its maneuvering. The rear 
tail section detached and fell into the Humber River, while the front section caught fire and 
exploded due to the pockets of hydrogen that ignited because of heat created from the 
engines. Of the 49 passengers and crewmembers on board, only six passengers survived by 
parachuting out of the falling airship (Toland, 1957). This disaster marked the first post-
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b. The British R101 Airship Tragedy, Beauvais, France, 1930 
The research and development of the R101 commenced in 1924 before the 
British started construction of the airship. The initial design and construction of the R101 
was completed in October 1929, but due to design flaws and performance inabilities, the 
R101 went through three phases before it was completed in 1930. The R101 moved away 
from the traditional design of airships during that time and became the largest airship built up 
to that time (Airship Heritage Trust, 2012). On October 4, 1930, the R101 completed a transit 
of the English straits, traveling to France to refuel and pick up passengers. The ultimate 
destination of this trip was India; providing regular service to India was considered 
monumental to the passenger service and transportation industry. After a series of erroneous 
weather reports from the meteorological center in Cardington, England, the R101 traveled to 
Beauvais, France, which had a weather front that the crew did not anticipate. Upon arriving 
at Beauvais, the R101 began to roll heavily, due to the high winds, and started a steep dive. 
The R101 continued to dive time and time again until the nose of the airship impacted the 
ground, causing the starboard engine to wrap around the forward hydrogen gasbag and cause 
a major explosion. In minutes, the R101 was a raging inferno, killing 48 passengers on board 
with only eight crewmembers able to flee to safety (Airship Heritage Trust, 2012). 
c. The German Airship Hindenburg, “Titanic of the Skies,” Lakehurst 
Naval Station, New Jersey, 1937 
Germany lost its fleet of military airships to Allied forces at the end of WWI; 
however, post-WWI Germany allowed companies to continue the use of airships as 
passenger transport. One of the famous airships that met a disastrous fate was the 
Hindenburg. Between May 3 and May 6, 1937, the Hindenburg made its first voyage to the 
United States. It was business as usual for the passenger airship that made over 10 successful 
trips between the United States and Germany in 1936 (Toland, 1957). A flame appeared on 
the upper fin as the Hindenburg was landing in Lakehurst Naval Station, NJ, on May 6, 1937, 
during a stormy evening. Immediately, the Hindenburg burst into a raging ball of flame. 
Luckily, only 35 of the 97 passengers and one ground crewmember were killed in the 
incident. This major incident had many people calling the Hindenburg the “Titanic of the 
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Skies” and marked the abrupt end of the age of airships after 30 years of service (Toland, 
1957).      
C. HINDENBURG MYSTERY 
 The ZR2, the R101, and the Hindenburg disasters marked the end of not only the era 
of the airship, but also the use of hydrogen gas as the primary lifting mechanism. The 
Hindenburg disaster led to the discontinued use of airships as a means of air transport for 
over six decades. A professor at the UCLA School of Engineering and Applied Science, 
William Van Vorst, and former NASA researcher Addison Bain proved in a paper titled 
“Hydrogen and the Hindenburg” that hydrogen was not the cause of the explosion on that 
frightful day on May 6, 1937 (Brown, 1998). Two boards of inquiry were conducted after the 
incident, and both concluded that “some hydrogen had, in a manner never explained, become 
free, was ignited electrostatically and exploded” (Brown, 1998).   
Using old photos, videos of the incident, passenger accounts, and old records of the 
German firm that produced the Hindenburg, Van Vorst and Bain conducted thorough 
research on the real culprit of the fire that started on the fin of the airship. The most 
compelling evidence that sparked Van Vorst and Bain’s curiosity in the Hindenburg incident 
was the eyewitness reports that mentioned the explosion as if it were a fireworks display. 
These first-hand accounts went against any previous first-hand accounts for other hydrogen 
airship explosions (Brown, 1998). In addition to photos and videos, the amount of time it 
took the Hindenburg to burst into flames and the amount of debris created after the explosion 
suggested hydrogen was not the main cause. Van Vorst and Bain concluded that the real 
culprit in the explosion was not hydrogen or the fuel, but, instead, the material and process, 
called doping, that were used to coat the cotton skin of the airship. Doping is the process of 
using “a combination of iron oxide, cellulose acetate, and aluminum powder” to make fabrics 
taut and durable (Brown, 1998). This process made the skin extremely flammable, needing 
only a small spark to ignite the substance. The high flashpoint of doping is on par with 
modern rocket propellant used to send shuttles and satellites into space (Brown, 1998).        
D. MODERN AIRSHIPS  
 Technological developments over the last three decades have sparked new interest in 
using airships. New developments include helium recovery, composite materials science, 
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vectoring engines, satellite weather forecasting, fly-by-light avionics, and computer-assisted 
design. Increasing congestion at airports and roads, and long lead times for maritime 
transport have increased the cost of transportation, making the airship a viable economic 
option. In addition, the more advanced engines used to propel modern airships burn fuel 
more efficiently, making it less costly and more economically sound than traditional air 
transport (Brown, 1998).   
 In 2004, the DoD, through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), requested various companies to provide designs for a modern airship that could be 
used for heavy airlift capabilities and personnel transport, while at the same time providing a 
cost-efficient and energy-efficient mode of transportation. This resurgence in the demand for 
airships has led the Journal of the Transportation Research Forum (Prentice, 2005) to 
believe that new modern airships can “improve service and lower transportation costs 
[which] can stimulate new commodity flows, diversify industrial activity, and forge new 
trades routes” (p. 173). Modernized airships could provide lift to various locations on the 
globe that cannot be reached by car, truck, rail, ship, or fixed-wing aircraft (Prentice, 2005).  
 Modern conventional airships come in all different categories, but one major 
modernization of airships is the combination of helium and vector-thrust capabilities, 
resulting in a new type of airship called a hybrid. According to the CBO (2011),  
The combination of three different forms of lift allows hybrid airships to carry 
heavier loads for a given volume of helium and also provides a greater ability 
to control upward forces on the aircraft than is the case with conventional 
airships that rely on buoyancy alone. This new development in hybrid airships 
eliminated the various problems that plagued earlier models of airships and 
eventually led to their downfall. (pp. 9–10)   
 E. THE ROLE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE UAV 
 The use of UAVs began almost a century ago according to Unmanned Aviation: A 
Brief History of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Newcome, 2004). Advancements in 
technologies, such as satellite navigation, computer processors, and digital cameras, 
tremendously increased UAVs’ capabilities. The next generation of UAVs has been recently 
deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan to collect intelligence and provide strike capabilities. 
Countries around the world are continuously developing UAVs and expanding their roles in 
multiple areas of warfare. 
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 The use of unmanned vehicles began taking shape during both world wars. UAVs, 
when combined with control stations and data links, are commonly referred to as unmanned 
aircraft systems (UASs). The United States began developing these remote-guided vehicles 
to deliver bombs into enemy territories during WWI. The U.S. Army developed drones to 
provide training for anti-aircraft gunners during WWII. The role of UAVs continued to 
expand throughout the Cold War as the United States expanded mission requirements for 
intelligence gathering and reconnaissance purposes. 
 The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have greatly accelerated the use of unmanned 
vehicles for combat purposes. The continued development of UAVs and UASs will continue 
to offer the United States flexibility and the benefits of accomplishing numerous types of 
missions in a multitude of environments. 
F. UAV’S EARLY YEARS 
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Robotic Air Warfare 1917–2007 describes the early 
origins of the UAVs used in military applications (Zaloga, 2008). The first attempts with 
unmanned vehicles for military use can be traced back to an automatic flight control system 
used in the Curtis flying seaplane developed in 1916 by American inventor Elmer Sperry. 
The U.S. Navy, after entering WWI, looked into the development of “flying bombs.” 
However, the U.S. Navy’s endeavors proved unsuccessful, and the idea of unmanned flight 
was soon abandoned. The U.S. Army began developing its own “flying bomb” in 1918 when 
the Army awarded a contract to Charles Kettering for development of the Kettering Bug. The 
Kettering Bug was an unmanned aircraft that operated as an aerial torpedo. It was designed to 
hit targets from a range of 40 miles and was, in essence, a forerunner to modern-day cruise 
missiles and UAVs. The program met with both success and failure, but the Kettering Bug 
never flew operationally. 
 The Royal British Navy, along with the U.S. Army, was an early proponent of target 
drones during WWII. Throughout WWII, Reginald Denny and his company—Radioplane—
built over 15,000 various Radioplane drones for target use. The Germans led in the 
development of UAVs as offensive weapons, essentially providing the first cruise missile, 
called buzzbombs. These UAVs had the capability of flying at almost 400 mph at an altitude 
of up to 1,000 feet. Buzzbombs had devastating effects, causing fear and panic among 
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soldiers and the general public. Germany successfully landed over 9,000 buzzbombs 
throughout the United Kingdom, causing great death, destruction, and physical and 
psychological injuries.   
 The U.S. Army continued to develop target drones in the 1950s and expanded their 
use by adding cameras to carry out battlefield reconnaissance. The first target drones were 
designated as SD-1 (Surveillance Drone-1) and were based on earlier versions of the 
Radioplanes that were used during WWII. A pilot launched and controlled the SD-1 drone 
using a rocket-assisted takeoff before bringing it back to base where it was recovered using a 
parachute. The SD-1 drone and associated equipment were designated as the AN/USD-1, 
producing the world’s first successful surveillance UAV (Zaloga, 2008). The USD-1 
program was followed with more sophisticated drones, but the program was cancelled in the 
early 1960s due to excessive costs. 
G. THE MODERN ERA 
The modern era of UAVs began in the early 1960s. The impetus for use of UAVs 
occurred when two U-2 spy planes were downed in Russia and Cuba. During the Cuban 
Missile Crisis the DoD did not have the capability to effectively use UAVs. This lack of 
resources provided the necessary momentum to ensure that the UAV program would gain 
approval. The programs lacked adequate funding, but provided the U.S. military an 
alternative to the traditional manned airframes that flew over enemy territory (Cook, 2007). 
The continued improvement of UAVs consisted of placing cameras and 
communications equipment aboard target drones. The first substantial use of UAVs occurred 
during the Vietnam War, where the 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing flew more than 
3,400 combat UAV sorties over North Vietnam, China, Laos, and other locations throughout 
Southeast Asia from 1964–1972 (Cook, 2007). During this time, the two main types of 
UAVs that flew aerial missions were the Lightning Bug and the Buffalo Hunter. Of all the 
sorties flown during the war, the Lightning Bug and Buffalo Hunter suffered only a 10% 
attrition rate while providing photographic reconnaissance, battle damage assessments, and 
electronic intelligence (Cook, 2007). 
The development of UAVs continued throughout the 1970s, with the United States 
and Great Britain developing advanced drones with real-time intelligence, surveillance, and 
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reconnaissance (ISR) and tactical capabilities. The British initiated the Marconi Avionics 
Phoenix program, while Lockheed proposed a new UAV called Aquila to the U.S. Army. 
The Aquila UAV provided the Army with real-time intelligence and was fitted with a laser 
designator meant to illuminate targets with a laser beam and guide artillery rounds that could 
be used against enemy targets. Although the program was cancelled in 1987 due to cost 
overruns, the Aquila showed the breadth and scope of UAVs that could be used in future 
conflicts. 
During the Israeli and Lebanese Conflict from 1981–1982, tactical UAVs showed 
how valuable they could be in combat environments. The Israelis used unmanned vehicles to 
saturate Lebanese air defense systems, deplete their missile supplies, and screen Israeli 
fighters from surface-to- air missiles (SAMs). When the Israelis demonstrated tactical UAVs 
in action in Lebanon in 1982, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman pushed the services into 
acquiring new off-the-shelf UAVs rather than waiting for the futuristic Aquila (Zaloga, 
2008). In 1985, the Navy chose the Pioneer UAV, which was based on an Israeli design. 
The Pioneer program proved successful and was used in service for over two decades. 
The Persian Gulf War saw extensive use of UAVs; the Pioneer flew over 523 combat sorties 
(Zaloga, 2008). Additionally, the Pioneer provided reconnaissance for U.S. Army Apache 
attack helicopters. The Persian Gulf War provided the U.S. an opportunity to use UAVs for 
aerial reconnaissance and to target Iraqi defenses with naval gunfire support.   
The development of satellite uplinks and global positioning system (GPS) satellite 
technology greatly enhanced the use of UAVs in the 1990s. Satellite uplinks provided greater 
control to UAVs and circumvented the problem of command guidance by using radio signals 
that limited the range and conditions in which UAVs could fly. The second advancement was 
in GPS satellite navigation, which provided greater reliability to UAVs, automatically 
returning the UAV to its forward operating base if the command link was disrupted. These 
technologies allowed a new generation of long-range UAVs to be developed, such as the 
Predator. An armed version of the Predator had been in development since 2000 and was first 
used tactically in November 2002 when a Predator controlled by a Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA)/Air Force team in Djibouti destroyed a car carrying Qaed Salin Sinan, an Al 
Qaeda terrorist, in a remote desert in Yemen using a single Hellfire missile (Zaloga, 2008). 
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Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom expanded the use of 
UAVs, which performed multifaceted roles over many types of combat environments. The 
RQ-4 Global Hawk provided continuous surveillance data using state-of-the-art electro 
optical/infra-red (EO/IR) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensors. Global Hawk provided 
the Air Force and joint warfighting commanders near–real-time, high-resolution ISR images, 
along with the ability to loiter for 24 hours at speeds of 400 mph and at an altitude of 65,000 
feet without needing to refuel (Newcome, 2004). The Air Force also developed capabilities 
that allowed the Global Hawk to be operated from bases in the United States while flying 
missions over Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The development of UAVs has been a relatively slow process since their beginnings 
as target drones and flying bombs. Many programs have been cancelled due to the cost of 
drones and the need for greater technological advances. As we move forward in the 21st 
century, unmanned flight has proven its worth and could very well prove to be the answer to 
expected logistical needs on future battlefields where unmanned resupply aircraft could 
exceed the benefits of the current air resupply systems. 
H. FUTURE CHALLENGES AND DEVELOPMENT 
 The DoD has looked to give greater capabilities to smaller forces that could 
accomplish more than has been possible previously. Unmanned systems have grown 
exponentially in the hope that they can provide a force multiplier to enhance DoD operations. 
The current DoD inventory increased from only 167 UASs in 2002 to almost 7,500 by the 
end of 2010 (Gertler, 2012). 
Current UAS capabilities vary and grow with the development of new payload 
technologies that make their role in future combat operations even more vital. Originally, 
UASs focused on providing reconnaissance, but their scope has been expanded to include 
ISR and battle-space awareness missions. Modern UASs are beginning to play larger roles in 
strike missions as continual developments are made in real-time targeting.   
The use of UASs has grown at exponential rates, but challenges remain in order to 
utilize the full potential of these systems, as outlined in the DoD’s (2011) Unmanned Systems 
Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036 and in a Congressional Research Service report, U.S. 
Unmanned Aerial Systems (Gertler, 2012). The challenges include interoperability, 
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autonomy, in-air refueling, and the development of new engine systems; however, new 
developments within these spheres point to new systems that can accomplish the force 
multiplication that the DoD is striving to achieve (DoD, 2011; Gertler, 2012). 
1. Interoperability 
 The achievements of unmanned systems over the past decade have led to a significant 
increase in the number of planned and procured acquisitions. In order to maximize the 
benefits of unmanned systems, the DoD is integrating unmanned systems with other 
platforms that will allow UAVs to operate in tandem with other systems across myriad battle 
space operations, such as air, ground, and maritime domains. The DoD believes that the key 
to achieving this is to adopt open systems architectures that allow increased flexibility and 
functionality, and longer system life cycles (DoD, 2011). The current lack of interoperability 
can lead to a reduction in the effectiveness of unmanned systems, as noted by Dyke 
Weatherington (Peck, 2004), head of the DoD’s UAS planning task force:  
There have been cases where a service’s UAV, if it could have gotten data to 
another service, another component, it may have provided better situational 
awareness on a specific threat in a specific area that might have resulted in 
different measures being taken. (Peck, 2004) 
 In order to help the DoD achieve interoperability, the DoD’s (2011) Unmanned 
Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036 provides four processes required to implement 
an open architecture structure. The first step is to develop service definitions and data models 
in order to support open architecture concepts. Once the models have been established, the 
second step is to develop repositories of components, interface standards, and infrastructure 
services using off-the-shelf technologies that allow all services to adapt, extend, and compose 
unmanned systems, and that support component reuse. The third component is increased 
collaboration between the government, industry, and academia to allow proper management 
and validation of component repositories. Finally, the DoD needs to move all its systems and 
those in development to the open architecture approach, which may prove costly. 
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2. Autonomy 
 The expansion of UASs has brought many new capabilities to military leaders for use 
on the battlefield. This expansion has also brought the burden of increased manpower needed 
to operate and maintain these systems. A top priority within the DoD with regard to UASs is 
to design these systems with greater autonomy. This autonomy would allow cooperative 
control of multiple UASs by a single operator and reduce the manpower associated with each 
system. Increased autonomy may reduce the manpower needed to operate UASs, but it may 
also reduce bandwidth needs, increase its endurance by responding to the outside 
environmental weather conditions, and better manage the system’s onboard sensors. 
 A fully autonomous system can select the desired goal it is programmed to meet. 
These systems can define how often operator interface is required to complete missions and 
can routinely choose behaviors that mimic human directions. In 2010, the Air Force released 
the results of a yearlong study highlighting the need for increased autonomy in modern 
weapon systems, especially given the rapid introduction of UASs. Researchers of the study 
“Technology Horizons” identified the need for greater system autonomy as the “single 
greatest theme” for future Air Force science and technology (S&T) investments (DoD, 2011). 
The way ahead for autonomous operations is for systems to operate as effectively as they do 
when they have undemanding missions and objectives. This can be a daunting task, given the 
complex environments and operations required of UASs, but the levels of autonomy can be 
adjusted based on mission requirements, and the systems should be designed to allow 
operators and the system to interact efficiently. 
3. In-Air Refueling 
In-air refueling is yet another challenge that the DoD has been focusing on in recent 
years and is one of the major limitations of UASs. The DARPA has been testing the 
capability of in-air refueling since 2006 and in 2012 plans to conduct aerial refueling testing 
of the KQ-X autonomous high-altitude aerial refueling program (Warwick, 2011). The 
process involves flying unmanned vehicles up to an air tanker, which then uses a fuel line 
that is inserted into a receptacle. This method is called the “probe and drogue method.” 
Successful testing has also been completed with a modified F/A-18 and could also be used 
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with manned aircraft, relieving the pilots of a difficult and tedious process of flying behind a 
tanker for extended periods of time.   
As of 2007, the DARPA believed in a realistic goal for fielding fully capable UAS 
autonomous refueling within 10 years (Hockmuth, 2007). Current testing has relied on GPS-
based navigation and off-the-shelf digital cameras to determine the UAS’s location relative to 
the tanker. Challenges thus far have revolved around the reliability of GPS data throughout 
the duration of the fueling operation, which can take in excess of 20 minutes. Further steps 
are needed to fully develop the concepts of operations and to determine the correct UAS with 
which the technology can be employed. 
4. Propulsion and Power  
 Vast arrays of propulsion systems have been used since the beginning days of 
unmanned flight. The dramatic increase of UASs has led to an increased demand for more 
powerful, efficient, and supportable propulsion systems. As was the case with refueling 
UASs, endurance and life cycle costs have been two of the most expensive aspects of the 
program. As technology has increased, the types of propulsion and power plants have grown. 
One type of system under development is fuel cell–generated electric power plants. Fuel cells 
work by converting a fuel source into electricity. Fuel cells differ from batteries in that they 
can produce electricity continually as long as there is a fuel source. The supporters of this 
technology believe that fuel cells could double the efficiency of mid-sized UAVs compared 
to those powered by internal combustion engines (Libby, 2005). Other systems under 
consideration include electrical storage devices, new types of generators, and energy-
harvesting devices, such as photovoltaic cells. Hybridization of these systems could also 
yield greater UAS performance compared to the propulsion and power plants currently in 
use. 
I. AIRSHIPS FROM THE PAST TO THE PRESENT  
 Airships’ early histories have been marked by many accomplishments and operational 
failures. Major operational failures, such as the Hindenburg, were tipping points that led to 
the decline of research and development for airships. New technologies and the use of UAVs 
 =
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
 do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 21 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
have mitigated many of the risks that past airships encountered, and have revived the DoD’s 
interest in using airships for a multitude of missions. 
  This renewed interest in airships has led to the development of many types of airships 
with many usages. In Chapter III, we discuss and differentiate the various modern airships in 
development today. In addition, we discuss platforms that the DoD currently uses for 
logistics supply and delivery.
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III. MODERN AIRSHIP DEVELOPMENTS 
A. RESURGENCE OF AIRSHIPS  
The golden era of airships has long passed, and the recent resurgence in the last 
decade has brought about new roles and missions for airships to fill. Airships have been 
produced in all shapes, sizes, and colors in the past, but they have followed traditional 
structural designs, namely non-rigid, semi-rigid, and rigid. Since the development of airships 
in the early 1900s, new technologies and materials have ushered in a new type of airship 
called a hybrid. Hybrid airships are the pinnacle of all airship designs and provide future 
prospects for a multitude of lift capabilities and long-endurance missions. 
In this chapter, we outline the various types of modern airships in production and 
their vulnerabilities and limitations. These airships have a multitude of missions, and each 
has been designed to meet the growing logistical requirements for the DoD’s military 
strategy. Modernized airships provide the DoD with a possible cost-effective and flexible 
alternative that may replace or work in tandem with current aging logistical platforms.     
B. CURRENT AIRSHIP CAPABILITIES  
Non-rigid, semi-rigid, and rigid airships are still being used today for various 
commercial applications, but hybrid airships can provide a commercial and strategic 
function. Major companies such as Northrop Grumman and Boeing, along with smaller 
companies, such as World Skycat Ltd., Discovery Air Innovations, Aeros, Skyhook 
International, and H2, have been developing heavy-lift hybrid airships to provide various lift 
capabilities. With the limited data on developing airships, we used four characteristics when 
comparing various airships. Lift, described in units of short tons, is the amount of weight an 
airship can carry. Because of the variable weights that each airship can carry, the sequential 
characteristics are based on maximum lift. Speed, described in units of nautical miles per 
hour or knots, is the maximum velocity at which an airship can move. Endurance, described 
in nautical miles, is the maximum distance an airship can travel. The last characteristic, 
altitude, described in units of feet, is the maximum height an airship can travel. Table 1 
summarizes the various characteristics of airships currently in development and the best 
estimates of lift, speed, endurance, and altitude that each company publicizes. 
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Table 1.   Airship Characteristics and Early Development Estimates 
AIRSHIP NAME COMPANY LIFT SPEED ENDURANCE ALTITUDE 
Skycat 220 World Skycat Ltd 220 tons 84 kts 3240 nm 10,000 ft 
H2 Clipper H2 200 tons 304 kts 3045 nm 75,000 ft 
Aeroscraft Aeros Inc. 65 tons 120 kts 3100 nm 12,000 ft 
HAV 366 Discovery Air Innovations 50 tons 105 kts 3000 nm 9,000 ft 
Skyhook Boeing/Skyhook Int’l 40 tons 70 kts 175 nm 6,000 ft 
LEMV Northrop- Grumman 10 tons 80 kts 1500–2400 nm 22,000 ft 
1. Skycat 220, Developed by World Skycat Ltd. 
 The Skycat airships—developed by World Skycat Ltd.—provide various types of 
airships for a multitude of uses, such as surveillance, emergency relief, firefighting, 
passenger transportation, and heavy-lift transportation (“SkyFreight,” n.d.). This type of 
hybrid airship generates more than half its lift by helium buoyancy and by the aerodynamic 
design of the balloon. The Skycat 220 (Appendix 7, Figure 37) is one of the heavy-lift 
hybrids on the higher end of the spectrum that is capable of lifting up to 220 tons, at a 
maximum speed of 84 knots, and for an endurance of 3,240 nautical miles, before it is 
required to refuel (“SkyFreight,” n.d.). The Skycat 220 provides a cost-effective alternative 
to airfreight and a faster means of transportation than sealift. For future developments, World 
Skycat Ltd. is producing a controlled-atmosphere variant of the Skycat 220 that can be used 
to transport fresh produce directly from farms to markets. The capital cost to construct one 
Skycat 220 is between $88 million and $95 million, with an operating cost of $1,400 per 
hour. Because it has fewer moving parts than its fixed-wing aircraft brethren, the Skycat 220 
requires only two weeks per year for maintenance, giving it a short turnaround and possibly 
better reliability (“SkyFreight,” n.d.). 
2. H2 Clipper, Developed by H2 Clipper, Inc. 
 The H2 Clipper (Appendix 7, Figure 38) is another hybrid heavy-lift airship that can 
be used for a multitude of missions, such as ISR; command, control, and communication 
(C3); and heavy-lift transportation (“The H2 Clipper,” 2011). H2 Clipper, Inc., based the 
airship’s Teflon-Kevlar–coated balloon design on geodesic domes or interlocking triangles 
that produce a circle. An American scientist, Richard “Bucky” Fuller, developed this design. 
This design helps strengthen the balloon and provides better aerodynamic flow against 
weather, debris, and ice shedding (“The H2 Clipper,” 2011). 
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 The difference between the H2 Clipper and other hybrid airships is the type of gas 
used and the propulsion system developed. Hydrogen makes up the majority of the lifting gas 
when combined with a helium closed-loop system. A closed-loop system is a control system 
that is self-regulating and separate from various other systems present. Closed-loop systems 
can detect any deviations from normal operations and employ self-correcting actions to 
maintain proper balance. This balance makes the airship neutrally buoyant and allows the 
airship to take off and land without using its engines. Once the airship is airborne and reaches 
an altitude of 45,000 feet, the hydrazine engines propel it at high speeds, keeping fuel costs 
low. Based on these differences, the H2 Clipper can lift approximately 200 tons, achieve a 
maximum speed of 304 knots, and have an endurance of 3,045 nautical miles before it needs 
to refuel (“The H2 Clipper,” 2011). The capital cost, operating cost, and maintenance period 
are unknown because the airship is still in development. 
3. Aeroscraft, Developed by Aeros, Inc. 
 The Aeroscraft is a medium-range heavy-lift hybrid airship developed by Aeros, Inc., 
that addresses future problems with the transportation infrastructure of the various modes of 
transportation: highway, rail, and water (Appendix 7, Figure 39). Although heavy materials 
can be lifted to a central hub via traditional methods, it is still necessary to transport heavy 
material to remote locations that may not have the infrastructure to support this endeavor 
(Aeroscraft Corporation, n.d.). 
 The design of the Aeroscraft is based on a rigid-type airship that allows an operator to 
control the ground and air-lift stages of the Aeroscraft. With its structure, the Aeroscraft can 
take off vertically, lift a maximum payload of 65 tons, reach speeds of 120 knots, and endure 
3,100 nautical miles before it needs to refuel (Aeroscraft Corporation, n.d.). In addition to 
providing support to the military, Aeros, Inc., aims to reduce transportation costs for various 
industries that require heavy-lift capability, such as construction and wind turbine installation 
(Aeroscraft Corporation, n.d.). The capital cost, operating cost, and maintenance period are 
unknown while the airship is still in the development stage. 
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4. HAV 366, Developed by Discovery Air Innovations 
 The hybrid airship vehicle (HAV) 366, developed by Discovery Air Innovations, is 
another medium-range heavy-lift airship that belongs to a series of airships that can provide 
various lift capabilities (Appendix 7, Figure 40). The hull is a laminated fabric construction 
that is aerodynamically shaped to act like a wing. Within the hull, an internal catenary system 
supports the payload module and provides up to 40% of the airship’s lift. In addition, the hull 
has internal diaphragms to support the wing-shape design and to provide 
compartmentalization to reduce loss of lifting gas (Discovery Air Innovations, n.d.).  
 The HAV 366 is specifically designed to provide a heavy-lift capability to locations 
that do not have the transportation infrastructure, and it can endure extreme environments, 
such as the Canadian Arctic. With its ability to vertically take off and land, the HAV 366 can 
carry a maximum payload of 65 tons, reach speeds of 100 knots, and endure 3,000 nautical 
miles before it needs to refuel (Discovery Air Innovations, n.d.). For future innovations, 
Discovery Air Innovations will provide a 400,000-lb payload airship variant in order to 
diversify its heavy-lift capability. The capital cost of producing an HAV 366 is roughly $40 
million, but the operating costs and maintenance period are unknown because this hybrid 
airship is in the testing stages (Discovery Air Innovations, n.d.).   
5. Skyhook, Developed by Boeing/Skyhook International 
 The Skyhook airship, a joint venture between Boeing and Skyhook International, is 
yet another deviation of hybrid designs (Appendix 7, Figure 41). The major differentiating 
feature of this airship is that it combines the features of a blimp with a helicopter. The 
Skyhook uses four heavy-duty helicopter rotors located on the four corners of the balloon 
structure, and it is the only hybrid of its kind that does not have a roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) 
hangar to carry cargo. The RO/RO is a design that easily transports heavy machinery and 
vehicular cargo onto a logistical platform. (We explain the benefits of RO/RO in Chapter 
IV.) Instead, the Skyhook uses its rotors to take off while the payload is suspended from the 
airship via suspending wires. The Skyhook can carry a maximum payload of 40 tons, reach a 
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 The Skyhook is a relatively lighter lift hybrid airship, compared to the others, and 
caters to industries that transport materials for loggers, miners, oil companies, and pipe 
builders in remote areas with little or no transportation infrastructure. The first prototype has 
been scheduled to fly in 2014 and has yet to be certified by Transport Canada and the U.S. 
Federal Aviation Administration (Sklar, 2009). The capital cost, operating cost, and 
maintenance period are unknown because this hybrid airship is still in development.    
6. LEMV Heavy Configuration, Developed by Northrop Grumman 
 The Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle (LEMV) is the last type of hybrid 
airship in development and is considered to be at the lower end of the heavy-lift capability 
(Appendix 7, Figure 42). Northrop Grumman developed the LEMV for the U.S. Army to 
provide ISR and heavy-lift functions. With an aerodynamic balloon and engine, the LEMV 
can lift a payload of 10 tons, reach a maximum speed of 80 knots, and endure 1,500–2,400 
nautical miles before needing to refuel (Northrup Grumman, 2012). 
 The payload of the LEMV can contain up to 18 vehicles in addition to 24 
crewmembers. The LEMV has a multi-mission capability to provide persistent surveillance, 
force protection, counter-drug operations, humanitarian relief, and heavy-lift logistical 
support for ground troops. Although the LEMV has a multitude of missions, its main mission 
is ISR, making all other missions, including heavy-lift, secondary (Northrup Grumman, 
2012). 
C. VULNERABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF AIRSHIPS 
All airships have varying levels of vulnerabilities and limitations for a particular class 
or type of airship, but they also have universal vulnerabilities or limitations. The mission and 
the environment of operations are key factors in what airships will be exposed to, but a well-
thought-out doctrine can help eliminate or mitigate any potential risk that an airship may 
face. 
Airships’ vulnerabilities have changed over the last few decades due to improvements 
in materials, computer systems, and balloon designs. The number one vulnerability, despite 
all these improvements, is against air defense systems. Airships and various major 
components aboard the airship can be vulnerable to various air defense systems, such as 
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7.62mm, 12.7mm, and 14.5mm armor piercing incendiary (API) rounds; 23mm API and high 
explosive incendiary tracer (HEIT) rounds; man-portable air-defense systems; and long-
range surface/ship-to-air missile systems. These threats can severely cripple an airship, 
especially in vulnerable areas, such as propulsion, navigation systems, crewmembers, cargo, 
and balloon structure (Newbegin, 2003). In order to negate this vulnerability, it is imperative 
that air superiority is established prior to airship operations or that the airship operates away 
from hostile forces before being deployed to certain areas (Newbegin, 2003). 
 Limitations, unlike vulnerabilities, can hinder airship operations instead of stopping 
them. Air-defense systems may expose the vulnerabilities of airships, but terrain and weather 
can provide limitations. According to the technical data each company provided, the majority 
of the airships we presented can perform a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL), and a short 
takeoff and landing (STOL). In order to take off or land, airships require large areas or fields 
free of obstructions, such as power lines, telephone poles, electrical wires, and so forth 
(Newbegin, 2003). According to World Skycat, Ltd., the Skycat airships in STOL mode 
require a landing and takeoff length of five hull sizes. The Skycat 220 requires a total of 925 
meters for STOL and about 185 meters for VTOL (“SkyFreight,” n.d.). We assume that all 
other VTOL/STOL airships follow similar parameters.    
 Weather is another major limitation and one of the most important planning factors 
for airships, maritime forces, and fixed-wing aircraft. Despite new technology in 
aerodynamics and weather forecasting, severe winds can hamper airship operations. There 
are very few ways to mitigate risks against weather; therefore, weather is a constant 
limitation (Newbegin, 2003). 
D. HELIUM VS. HYDROGEN FOR LIFT  
 The beginning of the 20th century showed great promise for airship use in passenger 
and freight transportation, but with safety issues and a series of unfortunate accidents, 
airships declined in use after World War II. Airships are still being used today and can be 
seen at various sporting events, giving bird’s-eye views of the play-by-play, or simply 
providing advertisement value, like the Goodyear blimp. The fundamental difference 
between the Goodyear blimp and the Hindenburg does not lie in the design of the airship, but 
in the type of lifting gas used. Modern airships use helium gas to provide lift, while previous 
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airships, such as the Hindenburg, used hydrogen gas. These two gases have defined the past 
uses of airships and will continue to define their future use. 
 Hydrogen and helium have similarities in physical properties and many differences in 
chemical properties. Hydrogen and helium gases are odorless, colorless, tasteless, and 
nontoxic (Linner, 1985). The hydrogen atom is the first element in the periodic table and 
consists of one proton and one electron; it is the most abundant element found in the universe 
and the basic building block for all other elements. Hydrogen helps fuel the combustion of 
the sun and is estimated to make up three quarters of the mass of the entire universe (Hart, 
2011). Hydrogen gas (H2) was first created in the 16th century by mixing metals with strong 
acids. Hydrogen gas is 14 times lighter than air, a highly combustible diatomic gas, and 
rarely found naturally. Current hydrogen gas production is conducted through various 
methods, such as the steaming of heated carbon, decomposition of hydrocarbons with heat, 
electrolysis of water, and displacement from acids by metals. The United States alone 
produces over three billion cubic feet of hydrogen gas per year; the main buyers are in the 
energy industry (Hart, 2011).  
Helium is the second most abundant element in the universe and the second element 
found on the periodic table; it consists of two protons and two electrons. Although first 
discovered in space, helium was not discovered on Earth until the end of the 19th century. 
Helium gas is inert, meaning it does not chemically bond easily with other elements; it is four 
times lighter than air and is part of the noble gases in the periodic table (Mineral Information 
Institute, 2008). Similar to hydrogen, helium is rarely found naturally. In fact, helium mines 
are so rare because helium can only be extracted from the by-product of the production of 
methane and natural gas liquids, and from trapped helium pockets created by the radioactive 
decay of heavy elements located in the Earth’s crust. It is estimated that United States’ 
helium reserves total 11.1 billion cubic meters, while the world’s reserves total 26.2 billion 
cubic meters. The main buyers of helium include medical, cryogenics, and nuclear industries 
that use helium as a way to cool machinery (Mineral Information Institute, 2008).   
1. The Helium Problem 
Helium may seem like a good substitute for hydrogen due to hydrogen gas’s 
combustible properties. The problem occurs with the amount of helium reserves in the world 
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and the growing demand for helium needed in industry. Figure 1 shows the historical demand 
of helium from 1990–2008 for the United States and foreign buyers. As indicated, the foreign 
demand for helium increased dramatically from 1990–2008, from 3,200 million cubic feet 
(MMcf) per year to over 6,000 MMcf/yr.   
 
Figure 1.   Historical Yearly Foreign, U.S., and Worldwide Demand for Helium  
(National Research Council, 2010, p. 35) 
 
The United States is the major supplier of industrial helium, but as industries that use 
helium move overseas, foreign demand increases exponentially while the United States’ 
relative demand decreases (National Research Council, 2010). 
 The production of helium is relatively time consuming and expensive, and it relies 
heavily on other gas processes. Current technologies that extract helium from natural gas 
have been inefficient in capturing helium before it escapes into the atmosphere. The rising 
demand for helium, coupled with the inability to produce helium at faster rates, has made 
helium a scarce resource that is subject to increases in market price. Figure 2 shows previous 
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Figure 2.   Actual and Projected Crude Helium Prices (Blue Line) With Annual 
Percent Increases From 2010 to 2015  
(National Research Council, 2010, p. 44) 
 
Airships are just a small market that uses helium as a major portion of airship design. 
As helium becomes scarcer and prices increase, it can be projected that hybrid airships that 
use helium will also be subject to an increase in production and maintenance costs. The price 
and availability of helium is yet another factor that must be taken into account when looking 
into airships as a viable alternative to other heavy-lift platforms.       
E. AIRSHIPS AS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE 
 Technological advances have redefined the uses of airships not only in the 
commercial sector, but also in the government sector. The different types of hybrid airships 
fulfill many of the missions that the DoD currently performs, and they could perform 
missions at a fraction of the cost. The hybrids’ various vulnerabilities, limitations, and 
dependency on helium are some of the issues that need to be addressed before the military 
decides to invest in these platforms. 
 In Chapter IV, we outline the various heavy-lift logistical platforms and their 
characteristics. In order to meet the needs of the future logistics delivery, we must understand 
what is currently available. The heavy-lift logistics platforms we discuss in Chapter IV 
include what the USTRANSCOM uses to provide strategic transportation through the Air 
Mobility Command (AMC) and the Military Sealift Command (MSC).          
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IV. CURRENT LOGISTICS PLATFORMS 
A. LOGISTIC PRESSURES  
The USTRANSCOM has come under congressional pressure in recent years to 
provide more cost-effective and efficient ways of delivering logistics. With the recent 
development of airships, the possibility exists that airships could replace or work in tandem 
with current logistics platforms to provide strategic transportation. In addition, airships could 
provide many capabilities that current logistics platforms cannot meet, such as fewer harbor 
and landing restrictions, and the ability to transport to remote areas with inadequate 
transportation infrastructures. 
In this chapter, we outline the current heavy-lift capabilities that the DoD uses for 
strategic transportation. These operations are carried out with numerous types of airlift and 
sealift platforms, depending on the speed and cargo capacity required. These capabilities 
allow the USTRANSCOM to provide a wide array of operations that supply the strategic 
transportation needs of the DoD.     
B. CURRENT LOGISTICS PLATFORMS    
The ability to forward project power across the world has been a stalwart of the 
United States military since the end of WWII. The past few decades have seen a shift from 
using overseas bases to using strategic transportation systems to move forces wherever they 
are needed. The USTRANSCOM’s mission is to develop and direct the joint deployment and 
distribution enterprise to globally project strategic national security capabilities (“About 
USTRANSCOM,” 2012). With the increased operational tempo of our armed forces, the 
need to effectively move logistics quickly, easily, and cheaply has become critically and 
politically important. Airships can easily achieve all three needs and help alleviate pressures 
that the USTRANSCOM faces. 
 The USTRANSCOM was established in 1987 to better coordinate mobility operations 
in alignment with the DoD’s strategic transportation requirements. The three major 
components within the USTRANSCOM are the Air Mobility Command (AMC), the Military 
Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. 
The MSC was originally established in 1949 as the Military Sealift Transportation Service 
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and provided strategic lift of large forces, including armored and support vehicles (CBO, 
2005). The AMC was established in 1948 as the Military Air Transport Service and allowed 
limited amounts of cargo to be transferred over long distances, but at higher speeds than 
through traditional shipping (CBO, 2005). In addition to cargo transfer, the AMC provides 
rapid transportation of troops and military personnel. 
 The strategic transportation systems that deliver logistics can be divided into three 
broad categories: airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning forces. The U.S. Armed Forces Logistics 
Support is further divided into 10 classification categories based on what is being 
transported. The classification system was developed so that categories of logistics could be 
grouped together for planning and delivery purposes. Each transportation system fits specific 
roles, with airlift and sealift providing much of the DoD’s global transportation needs.   
C. AIRLIFT 
 Airlift is the transportation system best suited for immediate requirements, such as 
humanitarian relief and troop transportation. Airlift is accomplished through the use of Air 
Force heavy-lift aircraft as well as commercial crafts from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet 
(CRAF). The CRAF is a partnership between the DoD and commercial air carriers that 
supplements the Air Force’s airlift when needed (CBO, 2005). The combination of these two 
elements can effectively deliver logistics overnight to anywhere around the globe. Although 
effective, airlift also has limitations, such as cost per delivery, cargo volume, life cycle 
maintenance costs, and airfield restrictions.  
1. The C-130 Hercules 
 The Air Force airlift fleet is composed mainly of three types of aircraft. The oldest 
and smallest of these aircraft is the C-130 Hercules (Appendix 7, Figure 32). The Air Force 
brought the C-130 into service in the 1950s and currently has specialized variants being 
flown within the Air Force’s inventory of 309 C-130s (United States Air Force [USAF], 
2011). The C-130J is the newest variant and has an endurance of 3,000 nautical miles at 
speeds of over 260 knots (USAF, 2011). One advantage this aircraft has is its ability to take 
off and land on unprepared runways. Despite its relatively small size, the C-130 can complete 
a multitude of operations, including troop and cargo transport, search and rescue, and aerial 
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refueling, while hauling up to 22 tons of cargo (USAF, 2011). The total cost of the C-130J 
program including research, development, test, and evaluation (RTD&E), procurement and 
acquisition operation, and maintenance totals $14,977,900,000 (Defense Acquisition 
Management Information Retrieval [DAMIR], 2010b). The total procurement cost of each 
aircraft is $68,044,000, with 26 more aircraft to be delivered by FY 2016 (DAMIR, 2010b).  
2. The C-5 Galaxy 
 The second oldest plane in the airlift fleet is the C-5 Galaxy (Appendix 7, Figure 34). 
The C-5 was introduced in the 1960s and has undergone various improvements throughout 
the years. At 247.8 feet in length and with a wingspan of 222.7 feet, the C-5 is one of the 
largest airplanes in the world (CBO, 2005). The Air Force has a total of 83 C-5 A/B/M 
variants in its inventory; each is designed to carry a large quantity of cargo or heavy pieces of 
military equipment (USAF, 2011). It has a wide fuselage with low cargo floors, and it is 
equipped with ramps to allow vehicles to on-load and off-load the 89 tons of cargo it can 
carry (USAF, 2011). In addition to its payload capability, the C-5 has an endurance of 6,000 
nautical miles at speeds over 350 knots (USAF, 2011). 
3. The C-17 Globemaster 
The second largest plane the Air Force has in its airlift fleet is the C-17 Globemaster 
(Appendix 7, Figure 33). This aircraft came into service in the 1990s with 163 planes in 
service in 2011 (USAF, 2011). The C-17 is smaller than the C-5, but was designed along the 
same lines as the C-5. It has the ability to carry up to 65 tons of cargo and has an endurance 
of 4,000 nautical miles at speeds over 400 knots (USAF, 2011). One benefit of the C-17 is 
that it has special flaps and engine thrust reversers, enabling it to land at much smaller 
airfields than the C-5. The total cost of the C-17 program, including RTD&E, procurement 
and acquisition operation, and maintenance totals $69,497,000,000 (DAMIR, 2010a). The 
total procurement cost of each aircraft is $244,198,000, with the last of these aircraft being 
procured in FY 2010 (DAMIR, 2010a).  
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D. SEALIFT 
 Sealift is the transportation system category best suited for sustainment requirements 
following the initial actions of an operation. Sealift is also the system of choice for 
transporting large amounts of cargo, especially heavy equipment and vehicles. During the 
course of long operations, sealift transports the majority of all logistics to their destined 
theaters, which is the most cost-effective way of transporting these logistics. The MSC sealift 
program transported more than 88 million square feet of combat equipment and more than 8 
billion gallons of fuel during the first three years of Operation Iraqi Freedom (“Sealift,” 
2012). The major disadvantage of sealift is the time needed to transfer from one location to 
another. The loading and unloading times of sealift ships are relatively slow, which adds to 
the overall transportation time. Ships are also easily intercepted in the open ocean without 
escorts. Finally, these ships have limited choice in the ports where they can berth due to their 
size.  
The MSC operates a total of 113 ships worldwide and also has access to 50 additional 
ships that are kept in the Ready Reserve Force (RRF; Military Sealift Command [MSC], 
n.d.e). These ships are owned and maintained by the Department of Transportation’s 
Maritime Administration. In addition to MSC and RRF ships, the DoD has the ability to 
contract the use of commercial shipping vessels via the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement to supplement MSC ships when additional sealift capability is required. Sealift is 
accomplished through the use of many types of vessels; however, this analysis focuses on the 
large, medium-speed (LMSR) RO/RO and the fast sealift ship (FSS).  
1. Roll-On/Roll-Off 
 RO/ROs are designed for transporting heavy machinery and vehicular cargo 
(Appendix 7, Figure 35). As such, RO/ROs are the preferred sealift vessel for U.S. Armed 
Forces ground units. Besides size, one particular advantage RO/ROs have over other vessels 
is their ability to transfer much of their cargo without the use of cranes. The MSC has four 
classes and a total of 19 LMSR RO/RO ships in its inventory; a single LMSR can carry an 
entire U.S. Army Task Force consisting of 58 tanks, 48 other tracked vehicles, and more than 
900 trucks and other vehicles (MSC, n.d.c; “Large,” 2012). These vessels can contain more 
than 310,000 square feet of cargo space, depending on the class of ship, and can maintain a 
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speed of 24 knots over 12,000 nautical miles (“T-AK-3008,” 2011). The total acquisition 
cost, including RTD&E and procurement, was $6,113,000,000, with each ship costing 
$263,495,000 (DAMIR, 2001). The last of the LMSR ships was delivered in FY 2000.   
2. Fast Sealift Ships 
 Fast sealift vessels (Appendix 7, Figure 36) are the world’s fastest cargo ships (“SS 
Regulus,” n.d.). The MSC operates eight of these ships as part of its 50 RRF ships under the 
sealift program office (MSC, n.d.b). Originally built in West Germany in 1973, these vessels 
were bought by the U.S. Navy in 1981 and converted into RO/ROs. Fast sealift ships are 
capable of making 33 knots and have 155,000 square feet of cargo space (CBO, 2005). 
E. MOVING FORWARD 
The USTRANSCOM is the only organization in the world with the ability to 
transport large quantities of fuel and cargo to any place around the globe. Current airlift and 
sealift capabilities provide the DoD with the ability to forward project power whenever a 
crisis occurs; however, there is a need to cost-effectively modernize our transportation 
platforms. The possibilities that modern airships bring, in conjunction with unmanned 
capabilities, can redefine how the DoD provides future logistical support to the warfighter.
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 The idea of using airships for military applications is not new. Many analyses have 
been conducted to determine their viability over numerous military and civilian applications. 
With the advent of new technologies and the increased cost of transportation, airships may 
once again be considered a viable alternative to current heavy-lift platforms. The analysis 
section of this thesis is designed to provide the cost effectiveness of airships against current 
heavy-lift platforms using a fixed cargo requirement of 2,500 short tons. In addition, we 
analyzed varying cargo requirements with fixed time requirements of 168 and 744 hours. 
 We designed two scenarios to analyze whether airships can be a viable alternative to 
current heavy-lift platforms over land and sea routes. In each scenario, we applied a break-
even analysis that determined an hourly operating cost for airships, derived from current 
heavy-lift platforms.    
1. Data Collection 
Data for the current heavy-lift platforms were derived from numerous sources, and 
are used throughout the two scenarios. Data include ground times and loading times, planned 
payload capacity, block speeds, ranges, and mission-capable rates. The data for airships were 
derived from the airships’ corporate websites, promotional brochures, and other Internet 
sources. Data include planned payload capacity, block speeds, and ranges. All other numbers 
used in the analysis were derived by making reasonable assumptions or were based on other 
platforms. For the purpose of this analysis the term airlift implies the use of the C-130J, C-
17, or C-5 aircraft. The term sealift refers to the LMSR and FSS class ships. These platforms 
are discussed in detail in Chapter IV. 
2. Distance 
The USTRANSCOM moves cargo throughout the world from numerous locations. 
The Scenario 1 analysis for airlift was conducted using the distance between Ramstein Air 
Base in Germany and Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, roughly 2,800 nautical miles. This 
route is shown in Appendix 8. These locations were selected in order to show realistic 
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operations for the delivery of logistics; however, the model can be extended to any situation. 
Sealift distances, including trucking, were established between Augusta, Italy; Karachi, 
Pakistan; and Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, roughly 3,800 nautical miles. As with airlift, 
these locations were selected to provide a realistic simulation of shipping through the 
Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Gulf of Aden, and of trucking from Karachi, Pakistan, to 
Bagram Air Base, but could be altered to include any distance the USTRANSCOM would 
need to transfer cargo.   
The Scenario 2 analysis for airlift and sealift was conducted using the distance 
between Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (U.S.), to Apra Harbor, Guam (U.S.), roughly 3,320 nautical 
miles. This route is shown in Appendix 8 and was chosen in order to allow a fair comparison 
between airlift and sealift over a sea route.   
3. Time 
The analysis throughout each scenario was conducted with time lengths of 168 and 
744 hours to complete the delivery of varying amounts of tonnage. The analytical model 
identifies how many platforms are needed to deliver the given cargo in a certain time span as 
well as the overall operational cost. Time to complete a mission is a factor when calculating 
the amount of aircraft needed and the number of sorties required for a particular mission. The 
total operating time of an aircraft is always the same no matter the mission duration and is 
based solely off of the block speed of a platform, the sorties or trips a platform is required to 
do, and the distance traveled. The model was also designed so that platforms not meeting a 
given time criteria are excluded from those time intervals.   
4. Cost 
Hourly operating costs for airlift and sealift platforms were used in each scenario to 
conduct the break-even analysis. The hourly operating rates for airlift platforms were taken 
from the Air Force’s aircraft reimbursement rate table A15–1 (USAF, 2011). The MSC 
Voyage Calculator, obtained through correspondence with Arthur Clark, calculated the 
hourly operating rates for sealift platforms (A. Clark, personal communication, March 29, 
2012). Hourly operating costs for airships were derived from the lowest operating cost of an 
airlift platform, the total operating time of the airlift platform, and the total operating time of 
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the airship. The equations for calculating these variables are located in Chapter VI, Analysis. 
The hourly operating cost for airships was assumed to be the minimum hourly cost derived 
from each airlift platform. We did this to establish a base so that airships and other platforms 
could be compared given an hourly rate. In addition to the hourly operating costs of each 
platform, we added the manning costs of the aircrew and the crew of the ships in order to 
analyze cost savings if airships could be engineered for unmanned flight.    
The break-even analysis multiplied the total number of platforms required, turn-
around time for each platform, the sorties required by each platform, and the operating cost 
of each platform. Overall cost was then determined by adding the total operational cost of 
conducting a given mission and the manning costs that each mission would require. In order 
to calculate cost per ton-mile, we divided the overall cost by the total miles covered per 
mission, per platform.  
5. Tonnage 
The analysis of airships and heavy-lift platforms uses tonnage in two different forms, 
as a fixed constant for each platform and as a variable in the break-even analysis. The 
planned payload capacity of each platform is the fixed constant and can be used for 
comparison between each of the platforms. The planned payload capacity for airlift platforms 
was taken from Air Force Pamphlet 10–1403 (USAF, 2011). The planned payload capacity 
for sealift platforms was taken from the MSC website and a Congressional Budget Office 
report (MSC, n.d.c; “Large,” 2012; CBO, 2005). The tonnage for sealift platforms was 
converted from square feet to tonnage. This calculation was provided through e-mail 
correspondence with Arthur Clark at the MSC (A. Clark, personal communication, March 29, 
2012). In order to compute the break-even analysis, a variable amount of tonnage can be used 
with any formula throughout both scenarios. The planned payload capacity for airship 
platforms was obtained through the various sources used throughout the thesis (Aeroscraft 
Corporation, n.d.; Discovery Air Innovations, n.d.; “The H2 Clipper,” 2011; Northrup 
Grumman, 2012; Sklar, 2009; “SkyFreight,” n.d.). 
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6. Assumptions and Conversions 
As in any analysis, we made assumptions in order to devise the models to compare 
various platforms. Throughout this analysis, we made certain assumptions in order to study 
whether airships could be considered a viable alternative to current heavy-lift platforms. In 
addition, in order to compare various factors of each platform, we made conversions to 
standardize all units so a valid comparison could be made. 
a. General 
The following general assumptions were made for all the platforms analyzed 
throughout this thesis. Airlift and sealift platforms can operate in a variety of weather 
environments; however, this analysis assumed optimal weather conditions. This allowed a 
straightforward comparison without having to recognize delays from inclement weather. In 
addition, we assumed air superiority and air defense were obtained to allow uninterrupted 
operations and that we had the diplomatic clearance to fly over allied airspace to the point of 
debarkation. 
The ability to use unprepared airfields or damaged airstrips is one possible 
benefit airships can provide for heavy-lift operations. The possibility of damage at air or 
seaports will be of great importance when planning missions. For the purpose of this thesis, 
however, we assumed that all air and seaports were adequately manned and free of damage 
and had the proper infrastructure to support all heavy-lift platforms.   
b. Airlift 
We made the following assumptions for airlift platforms. The speed of all 
airlift platforms was assumed to remain constant. Platform speeds were derived from Air 
Force Pamphlet 10–1403 (USAF, 2011). The speed of each platform also assumed a planned 
payload capacity and distance each aircraft can travel at that speed.   
Ground times for each aircraft were drawn from Air Force Pamphlet 10–1403 
(USAF, 2011). We assumed on-load and off-load times of the aircraft to be the maximum 
times listed. We also factored crew rest times and pre-flight checklists into the analysis. We 
assumed crew rest would consist of an eight-hour time span and a four-hour flight readiness 
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preparation for a total of 12 hours. In addition to the crew rest period, we assumed a three-
hour pre-flight checklist period to be conducted on each platform before each mission.   
To achieve the distances required in the various scenarios, we assumed all 
aircraft have the ability to be refueled mid-air without the requirement of intermediate stops. 
These mid-air refueling costs were not factored into the operating costs of the aircraft. Fuel 
costs were assumed to be $3.95 per gallon based on the Air Force’s aircraft reimbursement 
rate table A15–1 (USAF, 2011). We assumed cargo load to be at full platform capacity at all 
times, as found in Air Force Pamphlet 10–1403 (USAF, 2011). We simplified aircraft 
manning costs for the analysis and used costs associated with an officer pay grade of O-3 and 
an enlisted pay grade of E-6 (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2011). 
c. Sealift 
We made the following assumptions for sealift platforms. The speed of all 
sealift platforms was assumed to remain constant. The speeds of each platform were derived 
from the MSC calculator (A. Clark, personal communication, March 29, 2012) and are the 
maximum economical speed for each platform. We assumed the maximum payload capacity 
of a sealift ship, despite the tonnage applied to the scenario. In order to compensate for the 
cost difference between the planned payload and the maximum payload, operating costs were 
calculated by multiplying the ratio of planned payload by the maximum payload, or the pro-
rated costs of just the portion of cargo which is 2,500 tons. Maximum payload capacity for 
each platform was derived from the square feet of cargo space, which we calculated by 
converting it to short tons, using 5.5 square feet to one short ton. This information was 
obtained through correspondence with Arthur Clark at the MSC (A. Clark, personal 
communication, March 29, 2012). 
We did not include or calculate activation costs associated with the sealift 
platforms. We assumed the sealift platforms were already in theater and did not factor in the 
times or costs to deploy the platform in the area of operations. The availability of all sealift 
platforms was assumed to be 1.0. The on-load and off-load times were assumed to be the 
maximum times drawn from the Logistics Handbook for Strategic Mobility Planning 
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(Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Transportation Engineering 
Agency, 2011). 
For the purpose of analysis, we assumed all calculations provided by the MSC 
calculator were correct. These calculations included fuel costs, manning costs, and port costs. 
The crew size was taken from the MSC webpage and crew costs were based on the MSC 
calculator (MSC, 2012; MSC, 2012; A. Clark, personal communication, March 28, 2012). 
For simplicity, we rounded up crew costs for any mission that was less than one month. In 
addition, we assumed there were no stops between the port of embarkation and the port of 
debarkation; however, these stops can be calculated into the overall operational costs, if 
required. 
We added trucking costs for land-locked destinations and calculated them 
using a commercial trucking company from Pakistan (OQab Freight & Logistics Afghanistan 
Ltd., 2007). For every 30 tons of cargo (one truckload) transport costs are $5,000 per 
shipment. In Scenario 1, we factored 14 days into the equation for the trucks to complete the 
mission. Trucking costs do not include the costs to the U.S. military to protect the truck 
convoys. We assumed the trucking company had enough vehicles available to deliver an 
entire shipment at one time in convoy. 
d. Airships 
We made the following assumptions for airship platforms. The estimated 
minimum hourly operating costs were based on the minimum hourly flight costs of airlift. 
These minimum hourly operating costs were applied as limits and can be used as a baseline 
at which airships can be a viable alternative to current heavy-lift platforms.   
We assumed the speed of all airship platforms would remain constant. The 
speeds of each platform were derived from various airship sources and were assumed to be 
the most economical speed for the given amount of planned payload (Aeroscraft Corporation, 
n.d.; Discovery Air Innovations, n.d.; “The H2 Clipper,” 2011; Northrup Grumman, 2012; 
Sklar, 2009; “SkyFreight,” n.d.). In calculating each platform’s speed, we assumed a planned 
payload capacity and distance that each aircraft can travel at that speed. We assumed each 
airship mission flies the same flight patterns as airlift platforms.   
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We derived ground times for each airship proportionally from the calculated 
ground times of airlift platforms. We assumed airship on-load and off-load times were the 
maximum times listed. As with aircraft, crew rest times and pre-flight checklists were 
factored into the analysis. We used the same aircraft crew rest time and flight readiness 
preparation of 12 hours. In addition, we assumed a three-hour pre-flight checklist to be 
conducted on each platform before each mission.   
To achieve the distances required in the various scenarios, we assumed all 
airships have the ability to be refueled mid-air without the requirement of intermediate stops 
or the airships have been designed with a maximum endurance greater than the maximum 
distance required in the scenarios. If airships could refuel in mid-air, the costs were not 
factored into the operating costs of the airship. In addition, we assumed fuel costs to be the 
same as airlift platforms at $3.95 per gallon based on the Air Force’s aircraft reimbursement 
rate table A15–1 (USAF, 2011). Cargo capacity was assumed to be at full loads at all times 
and the planned payload capacity was the same as the maximum payload capacity. As with 
aircraft platform manning costs for aircraft, we simplified crew costs by using a standard 
officer pay grade of O-3 and an enlisted pay grade of E-6 (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense, 2011).   
B. PLATFORM SELECTION 
 We chose airlift and sealift as the primary platforms to compare against airships for 
several reasons. Motor vehicles and railroad alternatives were excluded from the analysis, as 
the majority of USTRANSCOM missions require inter-theater lift; however, trucking costs 
were added into the Scenario 1 sealift analysis to ensure the best estimate of overall cost and 
cost per ton-nautical mile.  
 The final port of debarkation is of great importance for strategic transportation 
planning considerations. In situations where harbors or airstrips have been damaged or 
become overcrowded, airships provide a unique alternative for logistics delivery as they 
require little infrastructure to off-load. Airships also provide better flexibility for 
transportation when the final port of debarkation is located further inland or a greater 
distance from conventional airports where other forms of intermodal transportation are 
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needed. For this analysis, the final port of debarkation was not of great importance because 
the models assumed point-to-point delivery.  
1. Airlift 
We chose the three airlift platforms analyzed due to their ability to perform numerous 
types of heavy-lift missions. The C-5 and the C-17 are the largest AMC aircraft available, 
and together they transport the majority of DoD heavy machinery and equipment. The C-130 
is the smallest of the airlift fleet, but has much greater flexibility than the other two aircraft 
due to its size and ability to land in relatively small airfields. The planning payloads of the C-
5, C-17, and C-130J are 61, 45, and 18 short tons, respectively (USAF, 2011). Other aircraft 
or rotary-wing aircraft were excluded from this analysis because of both their lack of cargo 
capacities and their inability for in-air refueling. 
2. Sealift 
 We chose the LMSR and FSS class ships as two sealift platforms for analysis. These 
two classes of ships represent the typical assets that the MSC deploys to deliver large 
quantities of cargo and equipment. Due to sealift’s relatively inexpensive cost and large 
capacity, sealift seems the logical choice for logistics transportation over any other type of 
heavy-lift platform; however, longer lead times are required to complete a mission, keeping 
other heavy-lift platforms or airships a viable option when time to deliver is a critical factor. 
Airlift and airships, in particular, are of value when shipping ports are not available, such as 
when Pakistan closed the Port of Karachi, or in underdeveloped countries without an 
infrastructure.   
C. MODELS CONSTRUCTION 
Information contained in Chapter V, sections A and B, was used to construct the 
models of analysis for this thesis. In order to effectively evaluate airships against current 
heavy-lift platforms, the data were initially separated into two scenarios. The first scenario 
(Appendix 8, Figure 43) evaluates airships against current platforms using over land and sea 
routes. The second scenario (Appendix 8, Figure 44) evaluates airships against current 
platforms using only a sea route so that air platforms and sealift platforms travel the exact 
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same distance. Using two scenarios is an advantageous method for military planners because 
it enables them to view costs associated with each platform over specified distances and in 
varying geographic locations.   
Each scenario was modeled in the same way with the only difference being the 
distances and geographic locations used. To evaluate each scenario, we provided a one-to-
one comparison, break-even data, and analysis sections showing the range of operating costs, 
potential cost savings, and manned versus unmanned costs for comparison. The main goal of 
the comparison was to evaluate whether airships, given specified operating costs, were a 
viable option to replace or work in tandem with current heavy-lift platforms, and whether the 
DoD should pursue airship technology as a means of logistics delivery in the future.   
1. Excel Model 
A basic Microsoft Excel model was based off information found in the various 
sources for AMC, MSC, and airship platforms. Using the performance characteristics of each 
platform, various models were created to extrapolate useful information that could answer 
the question of whether dirigibles could be a viable alternative to current heavy-lift 
platforms. The Excel model was divided into a data information section and five models: 
single-unit model, break-even model, replacement operating cost model, autonomous 
platforms model, and airship characteristics model. 
2. Data Information Section 
The data information section is part of the Excel file that contains all the basic 
information for each platform. It acts as the central location from which all five models pull 
their information. The Excel file is dynamic, meaning a user can change information on the 
data within this section and all the other models would reflect that change. This provides 
flexibility within the Excel file, allowing future users to correct any mistakes made in this 
analysis or to input new data collections. The data information section is divided into three 
portions: manning, general characteristics, and scenario information.   
In the manning portion, the military and civilian personnel, as well as their hourly 
wage rates, are given in order to approximate manning costs in all five models. In the general 
characteristics portion, ground, loading, unloading, pre-check, and crew rest times are given 
 =
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
 do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 48 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
for each platform in order to derive the different turn-around times required in further 
analysis. In addition, the general characteristics of the platform, such as payload capacity, 
block speed, range of operation, and altitude, are given in order to extrapolate more 
information in the models. Lastly, the scenario information shares the general information of 
Scenarios 1 and 2, such as the distance traveled and the total cargo to be moved. 
The data information section also serves as the main input of information for the 
scenarios. Users can input the distance of the mission for both air and sea platforms and 
provide a given mission duration time for a platform to complete a mission. These values are 
used with the three sections mentioned previously and apply to the five models.  
3. The Five Research Models 
 The five models fall in line with the various sections of the analysis to help answer 
the thesis question. The single-unit model uses the various characteristics found in the data 
information section and applies them to a single platform to complete a mission without a 
time constraint. In addition, tables are created in this model that show the various changes in 
total time to complete a mission over varying tonnage movement requirements. 
 The break-even model uses the same calculations as in the single-unit model, with the 
exception that, instead of one platform, various platforms are used to complete a mission. In 
addition to calculating the number of platforms to perform these missions, an hourly cost is 
assigned to airships, using the various operating costs from current logistic platforms. The 
break-even model also shows the impacts of the requirements of varying tonnage to be 
moved, similar to the calculations in the single-unit model. 
 The replacement operating cost model shows the various break-even hourly costs 
between each airship and other logistics platforms. Using these hourly operating costs, the 
model shows the cost savings of each airship if hourly operating costs were reduced by $100. 
It also provides the cost savings if hourly operating costs were reduced to that of a C-130J 
aircraft. 
 The autonomous platforms model shows the difference between manned airships and 
unmanned airships. Manned airship costs were derived from the break-even model and 
compared to the autonomous platform model when manpower was removed from the original 
equation. The model outputs the cost savings per mission of implementing unmanned 
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airships and compares the cost savings from manned AMC and MSC platforms against 
unmanned airships.   
 Finally, the airship characteristic model allows the user to change the input variables 
of plan payload and block speed of each airship in order to show improvements in total 
operating and manpower hours. Pivot tables were used to compare the effects of total 
operating and manpower hours based on an increase of block speed and plan payload by 
25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% of the original values. The model gives airship companies and 
the DoD the ability to build or modify requirements of each airship and determine the point 
of diminishing returns.           
4. MSC Calculator 
 Hidden in the Excel model is the MSC voyage-planning calculator that the MSC uses 
in order to plan budgets for various logistics transportation mission requirements. Using fuel 
curves, block speed calculations, and historical data, the voyage-planning calculator provides 
a near-accurate budget plan for the MSC to use. The MSC voyage-planning calculator is 
integrated into our model to better portray the MSC platforms and to ensure more accurate 
results. 
D. ANALYSIS AND MODEL EXPLANATION 
1. One-to-One Comparison 
The goal of the one-to-one comparison spreadsheet is to provide a threshold of 
associated costs when analyzing each of the current platforms in use. The data contained 
within the model show hourly operating costs and manning costs per platform. The data 
contained in this model are shown throughout the tables located in the analysis section of 
Chapters VI and VII.  
2. Break-Even Analysis 
The goal of the break-even analysis is to calculate the number of airships required to 
complete the same mission that current heavy-lift platforms provide, and to show the 
maximum costs an airship can have and be a viable alternative to the current lift platforms. 
Missions are based on the time durations mentioned previously and on varying total lift 
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requirement tonnage. The models output hourly operating costs per platform, the number of 
platforms required to complete a mission, and overall cost per ton-nautical mile.  
To obtain the desired analytical results, time durations and total tonnage are variable 
throughout the calculations. Each time variable can be changed, depending on the platform, 
for planning purposes. The variables include pre-checklist hours, crew rest hours, ground and 
loading times, total inter-/intra-theater distances, speed of each platform, the planned 
payload, and total delivery tons. From these variables, the model outputs the number of 
sorties, aircraft, and crews required for each mission. Using these outputs, we can then 
calculate the total average manning costs, total operating costs, and total overall costs. The 
total overall costs, the total tonnage, and total distance traveled are then used to calculate the 
cost per ton-nautical mile. 
3. Hourly Operating Cost Savings 
The goal of the hourly operating cost savings was to determine a “one-size-fits-all” 
hourly operating cost to compare airships against current heavy-lift aircraft. The hourly 
operating costs were calculated by using the aircraft total operating costs for a particular 
mission and the required airships to complete the same mission. The hourly operating costs 
of airships was determined by taking the total operating cost of the aircraft and dividing it by 
the total number of operating hours of an airship needed to complete a particular mission. 
These equations are further explained and delineated in Chapters VI and VII, in the Scenarios 
1 and 2 analyses. The lowest aircraft operating cost was used with the airship’s total 
operating time to establish a baseline that provides the one-size-fits-all hourly operating cost. 
a. Replacement Operating Costs 
In certain cases, it might not be prudent to judge the viability of airships 
against all three aircraft platforms combined. The following section of analysis was 
conducted to calculate the hourly operating cost of airships against each individual aircraft 
platform.   
Using the output of this analysis, planners can study the possibility of 
replacing aging platforms with airships by comparing them to one or more particular 
platforms. To make this comparison, we took the total operating cost of each particular 
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platform. We determined the operating cost of airships against each platform by taking the 
lowest operating cost of each platform and dividing it by the total number of operating hours 
that airships need for a particular mission. The result of this summation is the same as we 
previously calculated, but these calculations provide the total costs of just one platform rather 
than the costs of the three aircraft platforms combined, which is the result we explained in 
prior paragraphs. These equations are explained and delineated further in Chapters VI and 
VII, in the Scenarios 1 and 2 analyses.  
b. Platform Savings 
The airship hourly operating costs calculated in the replacement operating 
costs section are the maximum threshold that an airship’s hourly cost needs to be below. 
Anything beyond the maximum threshold will make that particular airship more costly than 
the aircraft it is being compared against. With this in mind, we calculated the cost savings 
that could be achieved by lowering the hourly operating costs of the airship below the 
threshold for each particular platform. We estimated the cost savings by reducing the 
maximum threshold dollar amount by $100 at a time, up to a total of $1,000. The total overall 
costs of a mission were calculated in the same manner as described for the one-to-one 
comparison and the break-even analysis; however, the hourly operating costs were lowered 
up to the total of $1,000 to observe the overall cost savings of a particular mission.  
c. Variable Short Tons With Constant Mission Duration Time 
Throughout this analysis, we focused on maintaining 2,500 short tons for lift 
requirements, yet in real-world operations, lift requirements vary from mission to mission. In 
this section of analysis, we examined the effects of varying lift requirements over a fixed 
mission time duration of 168 and 744 hours. The goal of this section was to determine at 
what point the varying tonnage negatively affects the hourly operating costs of airships. In 
order to calculate the output of overall cost based on tonnage, the same equations were used 
as throughout the rest of this section; however, the tonnage was made variable while the 
mission duration time was a fixed constant. 
 =
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
 do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 52 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
4. Autonomous Airships—Manned vs. Unmanned 
The goal of the manned versus unmanned section was to determine the cost savings 
that could be gained if airships could be designed with unmanned variants. Missions are 
based on 744 hours while transporting 2,500 short tons. The models output total cost savings 
between manned and unmanned systems.  
Each variable can be changed, depending on the platform, for planning purposes. The 
inputs for the manned section included the total operating cost and the total manning costs 
that provide the total overall costs. The input for the unmanned section was only the total 
operating cost. The total cost change is the difference between manning cost and unmanned 
cost. The output is based on time and tonnage. The calculations for total operating cost, total 
manning cost, and total overall cost were described previously and are explained in further 
detail in Chapters VI and VII.   
The manned versus unmanned spreadsheet compares all the airships based on their 
hourly operating cost, which was explained and derived in previous sections and is also 
presented in Chapters VI and VII.   
5. Additional Airship Analysis 
The goal of the additional airship analysis was to determine the overall operating and 
manpower hour reductions if airship developers were able to increase block speed or cargo 
capacity. The increase in these two variables would decrease the turnaround time (TAT) of 
each mission, allowing greater flexibility in the number of airships required and the types of 
missions airships could accomplish. The output of this model shows the reduction of total 
operating hours and the total manpower hours that result from increasing block speed and 
cargo capacity by 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%.   
Missions are based on 168 hours and the transport of 2,500 short tons. Cost savings 
were not analyzed in this chapter. Block speed and cargo capacity were the only 
characteristics examined in Chapter VIII. Hourly operating costs were derived for each of the 
airship platforms in Chapters VI and VII; however, the total cost savings that result from 
increasing block speed and cargo capacity could be understated without the valid hourly 
operating costs. Once the manufacturers of airships have established valid hourly operating 
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costs, the operating and manpower hours output of this analysis can easily be calculated to 
determine a cost savings.
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VI. ANALYSIS FOR SCENARIO 1 
A. ONE-TO-ONE COMPARISON 
 A one-to-one comparison was conducted for Scenario 1 (Appendix 8, Figure 43) to 
establish a baseline against which to analyze the characteristics of individual platforms. The 
purpose of the one-to-one comparison was to show the varying characteristics of each 
platform when time is not a critical factor. The characteristics include operating hours, turn-
around time (TAT), number of sorties, and planned payload.   
With these characteristics in mind, we calculated the number of days to complete a 
mission consisting of 2,500 short tons. A mission is defined as the total amount of time it 
takes to complete the delivery of the 2,500 short tons of cargo, given a certain number of 
sorties and a specific TAT for each platform. The ability of a platform to complete a round-
trip from point of embarkation, to point debarkation, and back to the point of embarkation is 
called a sortie. The equivalent of sortie for the MSC platforms is trip, which has the same 
meaning. In this analysis, for the mission to be considered complete, all platforms had to 
conduct a full sortie or trip. In order to calculate steady state of platforms, we recognized that 
a sortie or trip is twice the distance from the point of embarkation to the point of debarkation. 
The TAT is also used to determine the optimal number of platforms needed to complete a 
particular mission. The operating hours to complete a sortie or trip, the number of sorties or 
trips needed, and the TAT for each platform to complete the delivery of 2,500 short tons 
were calculated as follows. 
The ratio of twice the distance (D) and the block speed (B) of the platform provides 
the operating hours (TP) per sortie or trip of the platform (Equation 1). The summation of 
double the ground time (TG), operating time of platforms per sortie or trip (TP), pre-checks 
(for air platforms only; TC), and double the crew rest times (for air platforms only; TR) 
calculates the turn-around time (TA) for each platform (Equation 2). Later in this analysis, we 
change Equation 2 due to the crew rest being 12 hours rather than 24 hours since additional 
crews are available to augment a platform. Table 2 shows the variables associated with 
Equations 1 and 2.   
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Table 2.   Variable Characteristics for Equations 1 and 2 




B BLOCK SPEED 
KNOTS 
(KTS) 
TG GROUND/ONLOAD/OFFLOAD TIME HOUR (HR) 
TC FLIGHT PRE-CHECK TIME HOUR (HR) 
TR CREW REST TIME HOUR (HR) 
TP OPERATING TIME PER PLATFORM HOUR (HR) 
TA TURN-AROUND TIME PER PLATFORM HOUR (HR) 
 
We define Equations 1 and 2 as follows: 
 (TP: = Operating Time of Platforms)  
TP = (2 * D / B)       (1) 
 (TA: = Turn-Around-Time)  
TA = 2 * TG + TP + TC + 2 * TR (single-platform) 
  TA = 2 * TG + TP + TC + TR (multi-platform)    (2) 
Logic parameters for each platform are used to calculate the total number of sorties or 
trips needed (SAT) to complete a mission given a cargo movement capacity (Equation 3). If 
TAT (TA) is greater than mission duration time (TM), the total number of sorties is equal to 
zero (SAT = 0). If TA is less than TM and cargo moved (CM) is greater than plan cargo load 
(CP), SAT is equal to one. If CM is less than CP and the ratio of CM and CP multiplied by TA is 
less than TM, then SAT is equal to CM divided by CP, rounded up to the nearest whole number. 
If the opposite is true, SAT is equal to TM divided by TA, rounded down to the nearest whole 
number. This portion of the analysis assumes that there is only one logistical platform (IAT) to 
conduct this mission. Table 3 shows the variables associated with Equation 3. 
Table 3.   Variable Characteristics for Equation 3 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
TA TURN-AROUND TIME PER PLATFORM HOUR (HR) 
TM MISSION DURATION TIME HOUR (HR) 
SAT TOTAL NUMBER OF SORTIES/TRIPS SORTIES/TRIPS 
CP PAYLOAD CAPACITY FOR PLATFORM 
SHORT TONS 
(TONS) 
CM CARGO MOVEMENT REQUIREMENT 
SHORT TONS 
(TONS) 
IAT TOTAL NUMBER OF PLATFORMS PLATFORMS 
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Equation 3 is defined as follows: 
(SAT: = Maximum Number of Sorties/Trip per Platform)  
IF (TA > TM) 
SAT = 0  
ELSE 
 IF (CP < CM) 
 SAT = 1 
 ELSE 
IF (CM / CP * TA < TM) 
 IF (IAT = 1) 
SAT = Roundup (CM / CP, 0) 
ELSE 
SAT = Rounddown (TM / TA, 0)    (3) 
The product of the total number of platforms (IAT), the total number of sorties or trips 
needed (SAT), and operating hours per sortie or trip (TP) calculates the total operating hours 
(TO) of each platform to perform a mission (Equation 4). Again, for this single-unit analysis, 
we assumed that the number of platforms is equal to one (IAT = 1). Logic functions were 
placed in most of the equations to determine if a platform is capable of completing the 
mission given the platform’s TAT and time to complete the mission. Table 4 shows the 
variables associated with Equation 4.  
Table 4.   Variable Characteristics for Equation 4 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
TO TOTAL OPERATING HOURS HOUR (HR) 
TP OPERATING HOURS PER PLATFORM HOUR (HR) 
IAT TOTAL PLATFORMS PLATFORMS 
SAT 




Equation 4 is defined as follows: 
(TO: = Total Operating Hours) TO = IAT * SAT * TP.                     (4) 
Appendices 2–4 show the platform characteristics used in Table 5; to illustrate 
Equations 1–4, the characteristics of the C-130J are used as an example.
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Table 5.   C-130J Characteristics for 2,500 Short Tons 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: VALUES: 
D DISTANCE 2800 nm 
B BLOCK SPEED 320 kts 
CP PAYLOAD CAPACITY FOR PLATFORM 18 s. tons 
CM CARGO MOVEMENT REQUIREMENT 2500 s. tons 
TG GROUND/ONLOAD/OFFLOAD TIME 2.25 hrs 
TC FLIGHT PRE-CHECK TIME 3 hrs 
TR CREW REST TIME 12 hrs 
IAT TOTAL PLATFORMS 1 
TP OPERATING HOURS PER SORTIE OR TRIP - 
TA TAT FOR PLATFORMS - 
SAT 
TOTAL NUMBER OF SORTIES OR TRIPS 
REQUIRED 
- 
TO TOTAL OPERATING TIME - 
 
The operating hours (TP) per C-130J can be calculated by using Equation 1: 
TP = (2 * D / B) = (2 * 2800 nm) / 320 kts = 17.5 hrs. 
Turn-around-time (TA) can be calculated by using Equation 2: 
TA = 2 * TG + TP + TC + 2 * TR = (2 * 2.25 hrs) + 17.5 hrs + 3 hrs + (2 * 12 hrs) = 49.0 hrs. 
The maximum number of sorties (SAT) required to be flown by a C-130J can be 
calculated by Equation 3: 
SAT = Roundup (CM / CP, 0) = Roundup (2,500 tons/18 tons) = 139 sorties. 
Finally, the total operating time (TO) to complete a mission is represented by 
Equation 4: 
TO = IAT * SAT * TP = 1 aircraft * 139 sorties * 17.5 hrs = 2432.5 hrs. 
Table 6 shows the varying operating hours needed for each platform to complete the 
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Table 6.   Single Platform to Complete Mission of 2,500 Short Tons With No Time 
Constraint 
PLATFORMS OPERATING HRS: TURN‐AROUND‐TIME (Hrs): MAXIMUM SORTIES/TRIPS: TOTAL OPERATING HOURS (Hrs):
C‐130J  17.5 49.0 139 2432.5
C‐17 13.8 45.3 56 772.4
C‐5M 13.5 45.0 41 551.9
LMSR 672.8 672.8 1 672.8
FSS 626.9 626.9 1 626.9
SKYCAT 220 66.7 118.3 12 800.0
H2 CLIPPER 18.4 66.8 13 239.5
AEROSCRAFT 46.7 72.5 39 1820.0
HAV 366 53.3 76.7 50 2666.7
SKYHOOK 80.0 101.7 63 5040.0
LEMV 70.0 86.7 250 17500.0  
The single-unit comparison shows each platform’s performance if only one unit is 
available to conduct a mission of 2,500 short tons. This comparison does not have a time 
criticality factor, thus allowing each platform an unlimited amount of time to conduct the 
mission. In this case, the performance measure of lowest total operating hours was used to 
determine the best suited platform to conduct this mission. We can conclude that the 
platforms best suited to conduct the mission of 2,500 short tons are the H2 Clipper and C-
5M. The H2 Clipper airship beat out all three AMC platforms, both sealift vessels, and the 
other five airships. In addition, three out of six airships beat out the C-130J platform in total 
operating hours required to complete the mission. Based on the previous equations, it can 
also be deduced that as the amount of cargo moved increases, the total operating hours and 
the number of sorties or trips required will also increase. The relationship of the amount of 
cargo moved and the total operating time for all platforms can be seen in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.   Cargo Tons Moved vs. Total Operating Hours—One-to-One Comparison 
With 2,800 Nautical Miles for Airlift and 3,800 for Sealift 
 
As the tonnage movement requirement increases, the operating hours increase. The steepness 
of each platform’s slope is determined by the block speed and the payload capacity of each 
platform. A lower block speed and smaller payload would require more sorties or trips to 
complete a mission. The increase in sorties or trips will increase the total operating hours 
required to move a certain amount of tonnage. The steeper the slope, the more sorties or trips 
are required to complete a mission. The LEMV airship’s slope increases the fastest over a 
variable tonnage requirement and, therefore, is the least likely airship to be used for logistics 
deliveries with large tonnage requirement. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the FSS and 
LMSR are the preferable platforms to deliver a large tonnage requirement, as long as time is 
not a crucial factor.      
B. BREAK-EVEN MODEL 
 A break-even model is used to find the maximum hourly operating costs airships can 
incur and be competitive with current platforms. This model calculates the minimum number 
of platforms required to complete a mission. The number of platforms can be determined 
with the time it takes to complete a mission, the total distance of a mission, and the total 
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tonnage to be delivered. Once the number of platforms is established, a minimum operating 
cost among current airlift platforms can be found. The minimum costs for the airlift 
platforms are then used as the maximum operating cost for airships. In addition to these 
hourly operating costs, the model provides manning costs, overall cost of missions using 
airships, and the cost per ton-nautical mile. Finally, the break-even model outputs the total 
cost savings gained from using autonomous airships rather than manned variants. 
1. Operational Efficiency 
The first section of the break-even model outlines the operational efficiency of the 
platforms analyzed. The term operational efficiency refers to the total number of platforms 
required, trips or sorties that each platform must conduct, and the crews required to provide a 
steady state or constant flow of platforms to complete a given mission. The driving factors 
for the operational efficiency model are the total distance to complete the mission and the 
total tonnage that must be moved.  
With the new time restraint, or mission duration (TM), to conduct a mission, more 
than one platform is required to complete a mission if the total tonnage that must be moved is 
greater than a platform’s planned payload capacity. Unlike the one-to-one comparison 
analysis in which only one platform was used, here we must calculate the total number of 
platforms (IAT) required to complete a mission within a certain mission duration time 
(Equation 5). A logical function is used to determine whether or not a platform could perform 
the 2,500 short ton mission in a given time span. If the TAT (TA) is greater than the mission 
duration time (TM), the platform in question would not be selected and would be given an 
output of zero (IAT = 0). If TA is less than TM, the number of platforms (IAT) needed to 
complete a mission would be calculated by rounding up the ratio of cargo moved (CM) 
divided by the product of planned payload (CP) and the total number of sorties or trips 
required (SAT). A partial platform cannot be used in order to complete a mission and, 
therefore, the output is rounded up to the nearest whole number.   
Table 7 shows the variables associated in Equation 5 with the transportation of 2,500 
short tons.  
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Table 7.   Variable Characteristics for Equation 5 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
TA TURN-AROUND TIME PER PLATFORM HOUR (HR) 
TM MISSION DURATION TIME HOUR (HR) 
SAT 
TOTAL NUMBER OF SORTIES/TRIPS 
REQUIRED 
SORTIES/TRIPS 
CP PAYLOAD CAPACITY FOR PLATFORM 
SHORT TONS 
(TONS) 








We used the following equation: 
(IAT: = Total Number of Platforms Required)  
IF (TA > TM) 
IAT = 0 
ELSE 
IAT = Roundup (CM / (CP * SAT), 0)       (5) 
 Not all platforms conduct the maximum number of sorties/trips due to the amount of 
tonnage required to be moved. Instead, a certain number of platforms (IAF) will conduct the 
maximum sorties/trips (SAF) while the remaining platforms will conduct the remaining 
sorties/trips. In order to derive the number of platforms (IAF) needed to conduct the maximum 
number of sorties required (SAF), a logic statement compares the product of maximum 
number of sorties or trips required (SAT), total platforms required (IAT), and planned payload 
(CP) against cargo moved (CM). If the product of these three variables is less than CM, the IAF 
is equal to IAT – 1. If not, the IAF is equal to the IAT (Equation 6). To determine the maximum 
number of sorties/trips (SAF), we used the same logic statement to compare the product of 
SAT, IAT, and CP against CM. If the product of these three variables is greater than CM, then 
SAF is equal to SAT – 1, or else SAF will equal SAT (Equation 7). Table 8 shows the variables 
associated with Equations 6 and 7.
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Table 8.   Variable Characteristics for Equations 6 and 7 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
TA TURN-AROUND TIME PER PLATFORM HOUR (HR) 
TM MISSION DURATION TIME HOUR (HR) 
SAT TOTAL NUMBER OF SORTIES/TRIPS SORTIES/TRIPS 
SAF MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SORTIES/TRIPS SORTIES/TRIPS 
CP PAYLOAD CAPACITY FOR PLATFORM 
SHORT TONS 
(TONS) 
CM CARGO MOVEMENT REQUIREMENT 
SHORT TONS 
(TONS) 
IAT TOTAL NUMBER OF PLATFORMS  PLATFORMS 
IAF 




Equations 6 and 7 determine the number of platforms required to complete the 
maximum number of sorties for a given mission: 
(IAF: = Number of Platforms to Conduct Maximum Sorties/Trips)  
IF (TA > TM) 
IAF = 0 
ELSE 
 IF(SAT*IAT*CP > CM) 
  IF(SAT*IAT*CP - CM > CP) 
  IAF = IAT-1 
  ELSE 
  IAF = IAT 
 ELSE 
 IAF = IAT         (6) 
(SAF: = Maximum Number of Sorties/Trips)  
IF (IAF * SAT * CP < CM) 
SAF = SAT – 1 
ELSE  
SAF = SAT          (7) 
The total number of aircraft required will not always need to conduct the maximum 
number of sorties for a given mission. To ensure the number of total sorties is not inflated, 
the limited number of sorties (SAP) and the number of platforms that only complete a limited 
number of sorties (IAP) must be calculated. If turn-around time (TA) is greater than mission 
duration time (TM), then SAP is equal to zero. Otherwise, if IAF is less than IAT, SAP is equal to 
the difference of CM and the product of SAF, IAF, and CP divided by CP rounded up to the 
nearest whole number (Equation 8). For IAP, if TA is greater than TM, IAP is equal to zero. If 
IAF is less than IAT, IAP is equal to the difference between CM minus the product of SAF, IAF, 
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and CP divided by the product of CP and SAP (Equation 9). Table 9 shows the variables 
associated with Equations 8 and 9. 
Table 9.   Variables Characteristics of Equations 8 and 9 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
TA TURN-AROUND TIME PER PLATFORM HOUR (HR) 
TM MISSION DURATION TIME HOUR (HR) 
SAF MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SORTIES/TRIPS SORTIES/TRIPS 
SAP LIMITED NUMBER OF SORTIES/TRIPS SORTIES/TRIPS 
CP PAYLOAD CAPACITY FOR PLATFORM 
SHORT TONS 
(TONS) 




NUMBER OF PLATFORMS CONDUCTING 
MAXIMUM SORTIES/TRIPS
PLATFORMS 
IAT  TOTAL NUMBER OF PLATFORMS   PLATFORMS 
IAP 




Equation 8 determines the number of platforms that complete only a limited number 
of sorties: 
(SAP: = Limited Amount of Sorties/Trips) 
IF (TA > TM) 
SAP = 0 
ELSE 
 IF (IAF < IAT) 
 SAP = Roundup ((CM – [SAF * IAF * CP]) / CP, 0) 
 ELSE 
 SAP = 0         (8) 
(IAP: = Number of Platforms Only Completing Limited Sorties/Trips)  
IF (TA > TM) 
IAP = 0 
ELSE  
IF (IAF < IAT) 
IAP = IAT – IAF 
 ELSE 
 IAP = 0          (9) 
Given the number of platforms required to complete a mission, manpower in the form 
of crews are required to supply a steady state of platforms. The number of crews (W) is equal 
to the product of the total number of platforms (IAT) multiplied by 2 (Equation 10).  
Equation 10 was used to determine the number of crews (W) required: 
(W: = Number of Crews for Platforms) W = IAT x 2.    (10)  
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Table 10 shows the platform characteristics, provided in detail in Appendices 2–4, of the C-
130J. The C-130J is used to illustrate the use of Equations 5–10. 
Table 10.   C-130J Characteristics for 2,500 Short Tons 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: VALUES: 
CP PAYLOAD CAPACITY FOR PLATFORM 18 s. tons 
CM CARGO MOVEMENT REQUIREMENT 2500 s. tons 
TA TURN-AROUND TIME PER PLATFORM 49 hrs 
TM MISSION DURATION TIME 168 hrs 
 
Before using Equations 5 through 9, we must re-calculate the maximum number of 
sorties or trips required (SAT) for the C-130J due to multiple platforms being involved 
(Equation 3). With time now a critical factor, Equation 3 uses the mission duration time (TM) 
divided by the TAT (TA), rounded down to determine the maximum number of sorties or 
trips required (SAT). With Equation 3, we can calculate SAT: 
SAT = Rounddown(TM / TA, 0) = Rounddown (168 hrs / 49 hrs) = 3 sorties. 
The total number of C-130J platforms (IAT) required to complete the mission can be 
derived by using Equation 5: 
IAT = Roundup (CM / (CP * SAT)) 
     = Roundup (2,500 tons / (18 tons * 3 sorties)) = 47 platforms needed. 
The number of C-130J platforms needed to conduct the maximum number of 
sorties/trips (IAF) is determined by SAT. Because the product of SAT, IAT, and CP minus CM is 
less than CP, Equation 6 becomes the following: 
IAF = IAT – 1 = 47 platforms – 1 = 46 platforms. 
The majority of the C-130J platforms perform the maximum number of sorties/trips 
(SAF); therefore, we use Equation 7: SAF = SAT = 3 sorties. 
Because IAF is less than IAT, we can calculate the limited number of sorties (SAP) that 
platforms are required to conduct to complete a mission. Equation 8 is used to calculate the 
limited sorties required:  
SAP = Roundup ((CM – [SAF * IAF * CP])/ CP, 0) = Roundup ((2500 – [3 sorties * 46 platforms 
* 18 tons]) / 18 tons) = 1 sortie. 
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We can calculate the number of platforms (IAP) to conduct this single sortie. Using 
Equation 9, we can calculate the number of platforms needed: 
IAP = IAT – IAF = 47 platforms – 46 platforms = 1 platform required. 
 Finally, to run the 47 C-130J platforms, crews (W) must be assigned to augment these 
platforms. Equation 10 states the following: W = IAT * 2 = 47 platforms * 2 = 94 crews. 
Tables 11 and 12 both show the total number of platforms, maximum sorties/trips, 
limited sorties/trips, platforms to conduct limited sorties/trips, and platform crews to 
complete a mission of 2,500 short tons based on mission duration times of 168 and 
744 hours, respectively. In order to effectively compare platforms, mission duration is 
increased to show the value of sealift platforms when time is not a critical factor.  
Table 11.   Platform Characteristics—2,500 Short Tons With a  

























C‐130J 3 47 94 3 46 1 1 2432.5
C‐17 3 19 38 3 18 2 1 772.4
C‐5M 3 14 28 3 13 2 1 551.9
SKYCAT 220 1 12 24 1 12 0 0 800.0
H2 CLIPPER 2 7 14 2 6 1 1 239.5
AEROSCRAFT 2 20 40 2 19 1 1 1820.0
HAV 366 2 25 50 2 25 0 0 2666.7
SKYHOOK 1 63 126 1 63 0 0 5040.0
LEMV 1 250 500 1 250 0 0 17500.0  
Table 11 shows the output of each platform when mission duration totals 168 hours. 
As it is expected, the LMSR and FSS platforms cannot complete this mission within the 
mission duration time due to their TATs being greater than the required 168 hours. With both 
sealift platforms unavailable, the remainder of this analysis focuses on the remaining 
platforms.   
The important performance measures for this section of the analysis are the lowest 
total operating hours, lowest number of aircraft, the least number of sorties, and the least 
number of crews to complete the mission of 2,500 short tons within 168 hours. Not all 
aircraft will need to conduct the maximum number of sorties. For example, the C-130J 
requires 46 of the 47 aircraft to conduct a maximum of three sorties. The additional aircraft is 
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required to complete one sortie in order to minimize the number of sorties required to deliver 
2,500 short tons. This logic is applied to the rest of the platforms in the analysis.   
From the analysis, we can see the airships favor comparably with the aircraft. Two of 
the six airships required fewer platforms than all three aircraft. In addition, two of six 
airships required fewer crews than the aircraft, and four of the six airships were comparable 
with the aircraft in the number of crews required. Finally, all six airships required fewer 
sorties to complete a mission than all of the aircraft in this analysis.   
The H2 Clipper airship outperformed all platforms for this particular mission, while 
the LEMV was considered the outlier when adhering to these performance standards. The H2 
Clipper’s performance for this particular mission is due to its relatively large payload 
capacity of 200 short tons and its block speed of over 300 knots. The airships compare 
favorably in this section of the analysis, but it is important to remember the characteristics 
used for all the airships are best estimates provided by their respective companies. The 
airships’ true potential cannot be fully realized until airships have been fully built and tested 
to those characteristics; however, our model is robust in that a practitioner can input the true 
parameters and it will calculate the true characteristics of the airship.     
Table 12.   Platform Characteristics—2,500 Short Tons With a  

























C‐130J 15 10 20 15 9 4 1 2432.5
C‐17 16 4 8 16 3 8 1 772.4
C‐5M 16 3 6 16 2 9 1 551.9
LMSR 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 672.8
FSS 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 626.9
SKYCAT 220 6 2 4 6 2 0 0 800.0
H2 CLIPPER 11 2 4 11 1 2 1 239.5
AEROSCRAFT 10 4 8 10 3 9 1 1820.0
HAV 366 9 6 12 9 5 5 1 2666.7
SKYHOOK 7 9 18 7 9 0 0 5040.0
LEMV 8 32 64 8 31 2 1 17500.0  
Table 12 shows the output of each platform when mission duration totals 744 hours. 
Unlike with the previous mission duration time of 168 hours, the LMSR and FSS platforms 
are now available to complete the 2,500 short ton mission within the given mission duration 
time. The C-5M and H2 Clipper both outperform the aircraft, sealift, and other airships in 
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these performance measures. In addition, as the mission duration time increases, the number 
of air platforms decreases and the number of sorties increases. The increased number of 
sorties counteracts the decreased number of air platforms required to complete the mission, 
but the total operating hours remain the same. An increase of mission duration time does not 
affect the total operating time to complete a mission, but it does dictate the number of sorties 
and platforms required when tonnage remains the same. The total cost of procurement of air 
platforms versus the overall maintenance cost of conducting more sorties will need to be 
addressed in future research. 
2. Hourly Operating Costs for Airships 
The hourly operating costs of current platforms are firmly established; however, due 
to the absence of completed airships, the hourly operating costs of airships were derived from 
current airlift platforms. The total operating cost (NO) is calculated by calculating the product 
of total operating hours of the platform (TO) and the average hourly operating cost of the 
platform (HP; Equation 11). The total operating hours and the total operating cost remain the 
same despite the varying mission duration time. As mission duration time changes, the 
number of sorties and platforms changes to equal the same total operating hours. A “push-
and-pull” effect occurs between the number of sorties and platforms required to complete a 
mission with a changing mission duration time. The total operating time always remains 
unchanged until the total tonnage requirement changes. Table 13 defines the variable 
characteristics for Equation 11 and includes the C-130J input characteristics. 
Table 13.   Variable Characteristics for Equation 11, Including C-130J Input 
Parameters 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
C-130J 
PARAMETERS: 
NO TOTAL OPERATING COSTS HOUR (HR) - 
TO TOTAL OPERATING HOURS HOUR (HR) 2432.5 hrs 
HP HOURLY OPERATING COSTS FOR PLATFORM DOLLAR/HOUR $5,945.00/hr 
 
Equation 11 is defined as follows: 
(NO: = Total Operating Costs) NO = TO * HP.                           (11) 
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The C-130J’s total operating costs (NO) can be calculated from the total operating 
hours (TO) and the hourly operating costs of the C-130J as follows: 
NO = TO * HP = (2432.5 hrs) * ($5,945.00/hr) = $14,461,212.50.   
When rounding is involved, a rounding error may exist where calculated costs differ 
slightly from actual costs. 
Tables 14 and 15 show the operating costs for all platforms, with the exception of 
airships, for mission duration times of 168 and 744 hours. 
Table 14.   Total Operating Costs for AMC/MSC Platforms—2,500 Short Tons  
and a 168-Hour Mission Duration Time 
MISSION HOURS: C‐130J OP COSTS($): C‐17 OP COSTS($): C‐5M OP COSTS($): LMSR OP COST ($): FSS OP COST ($):
168 14,461,212.50$           10,938,151.72$       19,657,292.31$         N/A N/A  
Table 14 shows that the C-17 air platform has the lowest operating cost of the 
platforms that can deliver 2,500 tons within a 168-hour mission duration time. The C-17 has 
the second lowest operating hours amongst the three aircraft (Table 12), yet its costs are 
twice as low as the C-5M. This difference in hourly operating costs makes the C-17 the least 
costly aircraft in this situation. The LMSR and FSS platforms are not available to complete 
this mission within the specified mission duration time due to these platforms’ turn-around 
times.   
Table 15.   Total Operating Costs for AMC/MSC Platforms—2,500 Short Tons  
and a 744-Hour Mission Duration Time 
MISSION HOURS: C‐130J OP COSTS($): C‐17 OP COSTS($): C‐5M OP COSTS($): LMSR OP COST ($): FSS OP COST ($):
744 14,461,212.50$           10,938,151.72$       19,657,292.31$         124,253.33$              809,907.70$          
Table 15 shows the same scenario, but with a mission duration time of 744 hours. 
This extension in mission duration time allows the LMSR and FSS to complete the mission 
with only a 2,500 short ton cargo requirement. Both the LMSR and FSS have lower 
operating costs than the C-17 and the other two aircraft. The lower operating costs can be 
attributed to the use of only one ship and one trip for each to complete the 2,500 short ton 
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mission, therefore, reducing the total operating hours required to complete the mission. The 
aircraft platforms have the advantage over the ship platforms when mission duration times 
range from 48–626.9 hours, because the FSS is able to compete the mission. When mission 
duration time is extended beyond 672.8 hours, the LMSR has the lowest operating costs 
amongst all the platforms.    
The total hourly operating cost (HP-AIRSHIP) of airships is equal to the ratio of the total 
operating cost (NO-PLATFORM) of a platform and the total operating time (TO-AIRSHIP) for an 
airship (Equation 12). We derived the hourly operating costs of airships (HP-AIRSHIP) by 
utilizing the total operating costs derived from the air platforms in Tables 14 and 15. Because 
Table 14 excludes the ship platforms due to mission duration times, we use the information 
provided in Table 15 when ship platforms are included. Table 16 is used to define the 
variable description for Equation 12 and provide the input characteristics for the C-130J and 
the Skycat 220. 
Table 16.   Variable Descriptions for Equation 12 and C-130J and Skycat 220 
Characteristics—2,500 Short Tons With a 744-Hour Mission Duration 
Time 





HP-AIRSHIP HOURLY OPERATING COSTS FOR AIRSHIP DOLLAR/HOUR - - 
NO-AIRCRAFT TOTAL OPERATING COSTS FOR AIRCRAFT DOLLAR $14,461,212.50 - 
TO-AIRSHIP TOTAL OPERATING HOURS FOR AIRSHIP HOUR - 800 hrs 
 
Equation 12 is defined as follows: 
(HP-AIRSHIP: = Hourly Operating Cost of Airships).  
HP-AIRSHIP = NO-AIRCRAFT / TO-AIRSHIP       (12) 
For example, to calculate the break-even hourly cost between the C-130J aircraft and 
Skycat 220, we used the total operating cost of the C-130J (NO-C-130J) to transport 2,500 short 
tons (see Table 15) and the total operating hours (TO-SKYCAT 220) for the Skycat 220 to 
transport the same amount of cargo:  
 HP-SKYCAT 220 = NO-C-130J / TO-SKYCAT 220 = $14,461,212.50 / 800 hrs = $18,076.52/hr. 
Using Equation 12, Table 17 shows the break-even hourly operating costs between 
each platform and each airship for the cargo movement requirement of 2500 short tons. 
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SKYCAT 220 18,076.52$                   13,672.69$               24,571.62$                 155.32$                      1,012.38$             
H2 CLIPPER 60,387.48$                   45,675.80$               82,085.40$                 518.86$                      3,382.03$             
AEROSCRAFT 7,945.72$                     6,009.97$                 10,800.71$                 68.27$                        445.00$                 
HAV 366 5,422.95$                     4,101.81$                 7,371.48$                   46.59$                        303.72$                 
SKYHOOK 2,869.29$                     2,170.27$                 3,900.26$                   24.65$                        160.70$                 
LEMV 826.36$                         625.04$                     1,123.27$                   7.10$                           46.28$                   
C‐130J OP COSTS($): C‐17 OP COSTS($): C‐5M OP COSTS($): LMSR OP COST ($): FSS OP COST ($):
 
To determine the minimum overall hourly operating costs for each airship to use in 
the rest of this analysis, we decided to choose the lowest hourly operating cost among the 
three air platforms versus the sealift platforms. Airships’ characteristics closely resemble that 
of an aircraft and, therefore, would actually better portray hourly operating costs for the rest 
of the analysis. Choosing the lowest hourly operating costs from the three aircraft allows us 
to estimate the cost that an airship can operate at to meet the total operating cost of all three 
aircraft. These costs represent the maximum hourly threshold for airship hourly operating 
costs in order for them to be competitive with current aircraft. 
To determine the minimum overall hourly operating costs, we extracted the lowest 
hourly operating cost amongst all three aircraft. Based on the data in Table 17, the C-17 had 
the lowest total operating cost for the transportation of 2,500 short tons. Table 18 summarizes 
the hourly operating cost and total operating costs (Equation 11) of each airship, based off 
the C-17 total operating costs. These are the costs that are used for the rest of the analysis.  







LEMV 625.04$                                   10,938,151.72$                         
The total operational costs for each airship, as calculated in Table 18, are the same as 
the C-17’s total operating costs. The break-even hourly operating costs for each airship were 
calculated by dividing the total operating hours of each airship into the C-17’s total operating 
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costs. In order to calculate the total operating cost of each airship, total operating hours must 
be multiplied again with the break-even hourly operating costs, therefore, cancelling out the 
total operating hours and giving the total operating cost of the C-17. Further analysis will 
show that all the airships will have the same total operating costs, but in a later section, we 
analyze the change in total operating costs based on a reduction in hourly operating costs for 
each airship.     
Table 18 does not necessarily represent the hourly operating costs of an airship. 
Instead, it gives an hourly operating cost threshold at which anything greater than this cost 
will exclude an airship as a cost-effective alternative to other heavy-lift platforms. A larger 
baseline, therefore, represents an attractive alternative. Said another way, the H2 Clipper can 
have an hourly operating cost up to $45,675.80 and still be a competitive option compared to 
all heavy-lift platforms. A larger baseline provides a less restrictive range in which airships 
have to improve or meet the baseline. A lower baseline provides a more restrictive situation 
in which an airship can improve hourly operating costs from the baseline. Therefore, since 
the H2 Clipper and Skycat 220 have the highest hourly operating cost baselines, both have 
the advantage to seek improvements on their hourly operating costs compared to the other 
airships.   
For certain mission durations, some platforms could not meet the required TAT; 
therefore, the output of hourly operating costs did not exist. The minimum hourly operating 
costs were chosen from the range of values where a special function was implemented in 
Excel to disregard all hourly operating costs that were not applicable. As mentioned 
previously, MSC break-even operating costs were excluded from assigning an hourly cost 
because airship characteristics closely resemble that of aircraft.   
Table 17 shows the break-even hourly operating costs for an airship to compete 
against MSC platforms. The LMSR and FSS platforms’ hourly operating cost ranges from 
$7.10 to $3,382.03. Sealift platforms will always have the lowest overall hourly operating 
cost because they require fewer platforms and trips to complete a mission cargo load 
requirement of 2,500 short tons. In addition to minimum platform and trips, an MSC ship 
will not depart a port unless it is at or near its maximum plan payload, which allows the total 
cost of a mission to be spread across the total tonnage it is carrying.   
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In this analysis, we calculated the total operating cost and manpower cost for moving 
2,500 short tons with an MSC ship by taking the ratio of the total tonnage required to be 
moved and the total plan payload capacity, and then multiplying this ratio by the actual total 
operating costs of moving the maximum payload capacity. In a similar fashion, we calculated 
manpower cost to move the required tonnage by taking the ratio of total tonnage required to 
be moved by the total planned payload, and then multiplying this ratio by the total manpower 
cost of moving the maximum payload capacity.   
There will always be a trade-off between mission duration time and the platform that 
is chosen to complete a particular mission. When time critical missions are necessary, MSC 
ships are usually excluded from the options. Although airships share the operating 
characteristics of aircraft, airships can obtain an hourly operating cost that can make them a 
viable alternative to MSC ships. Later in the analysis, we discuss airship manufacturers’ 
options for improving these ships’ operating characteristics so they can possibly become a 
viable alternative to MSC ships.    
3. Manning and Overall Costs 
In addition to total operating costs, manning costs were also factored into the overall 
cost of a mission. Each platform is manned either by a crew of officers and enlisted staff or 
civilians. Before calculating the total manning costs, the total manpower hours must be 
calculated. The total manpower hours (TT) are calculated by multiplying the total number of 
platforms performing the maximum sorties (IAF), the maximum sorties (SAF), and the TAT 
(TA) of the platform. This value is then added to the product of the number of aircraft 
conducting limited sorties (IAP), the number of limited sorties (SAP), and the TAT (TA) of the 
platform (Equation 13). Table 19 provides the variables for Equation 13 and the input 
characteristics for the C-130J.
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Table 19.   Variable Descriptions for Equation 13 With C-130J Characteristics— 
2,500 Short Tons and a 744-Hour Mission Duration Time 




NUMBER OF PLATFORMS 
CONDUCTING MAXIMUM 
SORTIES/TRIPS 
PLATFORMS 9 platforms 
SAF 
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF 
SORTIES/TRIPS 
SORTIES/TRIPS 15 sorties 
IAP 
NUMBER OF PLATFORMS 
COMPLETING LIMITED SORTIES/TRIPS 
PLATFORMS 1 platform 
SAP LIMITED NUMBER OF SORTIES/TRIPS SORTIES/TRIPS 4 sorties 
TA TURN-AROUND TIME FOR PLATFORM HOURS (HR) 49 hrs 
TT 
TOTAL MANPOWER HOURS/TOTAL 
TIME TO COMPLETE MISSION 
HOURS (HR) - 
 
Equation 13 is calculated as follows: 
(TT: =Total Manpower Hours Costs for Air Platforms). 
TT = IAF * SAF * TA + IAP * SAP * TA       (13) 
For example, to calculate the total manpower hours (TT) for the C-130J, we used the 
information as calculated in previous tables and shown in Table 19: 
TT = IAF * SAF * TA + IAP * SAP * TA  
     = 9 platforms * 15 sorties * 49 hrs + 1 platform * 4 sorties * 49 hrs = 6,811 hours.  
Table 20 depicts the total manpower hours required to operate each air and sealift 
platform based on 2,500 short tons and a 744-hour mission duration time. Total manpower 
hours are dependent on the number of short tons required to be moved. As tonnage required 
to move increases, total manpower hours will also increase. As long as tonnage required to 
be moved remains constant, mission duration time will not affect total manpower hours.
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Table 20.   Total Manpower Hours per Platform—2,500 Short Tons With a 744-












LEMV 21666.7  
The total manning cost (NM) for air platforms is equal to the product of total time to 
complete a mission (TT) and the summation product of total manning of officers (MO) and 
enlisted personnel (ME) multiplied by the hourly wage of officers (HO) and enlisted personnel 
(HE; Equation 14). The total manning cost (NM) for sealift platforms is equal to the product of 
total time to complete a mission (TT) by the product of total manning of civilian personnel 
(MV) by the hourly wage of civilian personnel (HV; Equation 15). 
Table 21 is used to define the variables in Equations 14 and 15. 
Table 21.   Variable Descriptions for Equations 14 and 15 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
HE HOURLY ENLISTED WAGES DOLLARS 
HO HOURLY OFFICER WAGES DOLLARS 
HV HOURLY CIVILIAN WAGES DOLLARS 
ME MANNING FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL 
MO MANNING FOR OFFICERS PERSONNEL 
MV MANNING FOR CIVILIANS PERSONNEL 
NM TOTAL MANNING COSTS DOLLARS 
TT 
TOTAL MANPOWER HOURS/TOTAL TIME 
TO COMPLETE MISSION 
HOURS (HR) 
 
Equations 14 and 15 are defined as follows: 
(NM: =Total Manpower Costs for Air Platforms).  
NM = TT * (HO * MO + HE * ME)        (14)  
(NM : = Total Manpower Costs for Sealift Platforms).  
NM = TT * (MV * HV)         (15) 
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The final destination in Scenario 1 is not the final point of debarkation for sealift 
platforms. In order for equal comparison, trucking costs were included in the overall costs for 
sealift platforms. Trucking costs from Karachi, Pakistan, to Bagram, Afghanistan, are based 
on freight rates provided by OQab Freight & Logistics Afghanistan Ltd. (2007). If the sealift 
platform is unable to deliver its cargo to the final point of debarkation due to the TAT being 
larger than mission duration time, the total trucking cost (NT) is zero. If the TAT is less than 
the mission duration time, the total trucking cost is equal to the ratio of total cargo moved 
and 30 tons, which is then multiplied by the trucking cost (HT) of $4,100 (Equation 16). The 
total cargo moved divided by 30 tons is rounded up to the nearest whole number in order to 
determine the number of trucks needed to complete the final leg to the point of debarkation. 
Table 22 provides variable descriptions for Equation 16 and provides the input parameters 
for the LMSR platform.  
Table 22.   Variable Descriptions for Equation 16 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
LMSR 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
NT TOTAL TRUCKING COSTS DOLLARS  - 
HT 





CM CARGO MOVEMENT REQUIREMENT SHORT TONS 2500 short tons 
TA TURN-AROUND TIME HOURS 672.8 hrs 
TM MISSION DURATION TIME HOURS 744 hrs 
 
Equation 16 is calculated as follows: 
(NT: = Total Trucking Costs):  
IF (TA > TM) 
NT = 0 
ELSE 
NT = Roundup (CM / 30, 0) * HT       (16) 
For example, to calculate the total trucking costs of the LMSR from Karachi, 
Pakistan, to Bagram, Afghanistan, we used the variables defined in Table 22 and used them 
in Equation 16 as follows: NT = Roundup (CM / 30, 0) * HT  
      = Roundup (2,500 short tons / 30 short tons) * $4,100 = $344,400. 
The overall cost for air platforms given a particular mission (NA) is equal to the 
summation of the total operating cost (NO) and total manning costs (NM; Equation 17). The 
overall cost for sealift platforms given a particular mission is equal to the summation of the 
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total operating costs (NO), total manning costs (NM), and the total trucking costs (NT; 
Equation 18). Total trucking costs are only calculated for sealift platforms in Scenario 1.  
Table 23 provides the variable descriptions for Equations 17 and 18. 
Table 23.   Variable Descriptions for Equations 17 and 18 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
NT TOTAL TRUCKING COSTS DOLLARS  
NA 
OVERALL COSTS FOR AIR/SEALIFT 
PLATFORMS 
DOLLARS 
NM CARGO MOVEMENT REQUIREMENT SHORT TONS 
NO TURN-AROUND TIME HOURS 
 
Equations 17 and 18 are calculated as follows: 
(NA: = Overall Costs for Air Platforms): NA = NO + NM.   (17)  
(NA: = Overall Costs for Sealift Platforms): NA = NO + NM + NT.  (18)  
 For example, the total operating cost, total manning cost, and the overall costs can be 
calculated for the C-130J based on characteristics defined in Table 24. 
Table 24.   C-130J Characteristics—2,500 Short Tons With a  
744-Hour Mission Duration Time 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: C-130J: 
HE HOURLY ENLISTED WAGES $10.80/hr 
HO HOURLY OFFICER WAGES $16.27/hr 
ME MANNING FOR ENLISTED 2 enlisted (E-6) 
MO MANNING FOR OFFICERS 2 officers (O-3) 
NO TOTAL OPERATING COSTS $14,461,212.50 
IAF 
NUMBER OF PLATFORMS 
CONDUCTING MAXIMUM SORTIES/TRIPS 9 platforms 
SAF MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SORTIES/TRIPS 15 sorties 
IAP 
NUMBER OF PLATFORMS COMPLETING 
LIMITED SORTIES/TRIPS 
1 platform 
SAP LIMITED NUMBER OF SORTIES/TRIPS 4 sorties 
TT 
TOTAL MANPOWER HOURS/TOTAL TIME 
TO COMPLETE MISSION 
6,811 hours  
NA TOTAL OVERALL COSTS - 
NM TOTAL MANNING COSTS - 
 
To calculate total manning costs (NM) for the C-130J to move 2,500 short tons within 
a 744-hour mission duration time, we used Equation 14, as follows: 
NM = TT * (HO * MO + HE * ME)  
      = 6,811 * (2 officers * $16.27/hr + 2 enlisted * $10.80/hr) = $368,801.46. 
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Finally, using the total operating costs (see Table 14), we can calculate the overall 
costs based on Equation 17, as follows: 
NA = NO + NM = $14,461,212.50 + $368,801.46 = $14,830,013.96. 
Table 25 shows the various manning and overall costs for the various platforms for a 
given mission duration of 168 hours. To determine the most suitable platform to perform this 
particular mission, a performance measure of lowest total overall cost was used to compare 
the platforms. Two of the respective airships have lower total overall costs than all three 
aircraft platforms. All six of the airships were more cost effective than the C-5 and the C-
130J. Due to mission duration time, MSC ships are unable to complete the mission within the 
designated mission duration time. If the various companies make the hourly operating cost of 
airships lower than the baseline, the total overall cost will only decrease further. Later 
analysis will show the price difference of lower hourly operating costs.   
Table 25.   Total Overall Cost for Each Platform—2,500 Tons  
With a 168-Hour Mission Duration Time 
PLATFORMS TOTAL OP COST: TOTAL MANNING COST: TOTAL OVERALL COST:
C‐130J 14,461,212.50$   368,801.46$                      14,830,013.96$               
C‐17 10,938,151.72$   137,341.52$                      11,075,493.25$               
C‐5M 19,657,292.31$   159,560.43$                      19,816,852.74$               
LMSR N/A N/A N/A
FSS N/A N/A N/A
SKYCAT 220 10,938,151.72$   76,890.04$                        11,015,041.77$               
H2 CLIPPER 10,938,151.72$   46,989.94$                        10,985,141.67$               
AEROSCRAFT 10,938,151.72$   153,103.23$                      11,091,254.96$               
HAV 366 10,938,151.72$   207,567.01$                      11,145,718.74$               
SKYHOOK 10,938,151.72$   346,817.41$                      11,284,969.13$               
LEMV 10,938,151.72$   1,173,204.86$                   12,111,356.59$                  
 
Table 26 includes the total trucking costs along with the total operating costs, total 
manning costs, and the total overall cost for all platforms for a given 744-hour mission 
duration time. Extending the mission duration time to 744 hours allows MSC ships to be 
utilized as an option. Exclusively for the MSC ships, the total shipping cost to move 2,500 
short tons from Karachi, Pakistan, to Bagram, Afghanistan, was included in Table 26. Using 
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the performance measure for the previous mission duration time, the best platform to conduct 
this mission with the given parameters is the LMSR. 
Table 26.   Total Overall Cost for Each Platform—2,500 Tons  
With a 744-Hour Mission Duration Time 
PLATFORMS TOTAL TRUCKING COSTS: TOTAL OP COST: TOTAL MANNING COST: TOTAL OVERALL COST:
C‐130J N/A 14,461,212.50$                368,801.46$                     14,830,013.96$            
C‐17 N/A 10,938,151.72$                137,341.52$                     11,075,493.25$            
C‐5M N/A 19,657,292.31$                159,560.43$                     19,816,852.74$            
LMSR 341,666.67$                      124,253.33$                     25,514.24$                       491,434.24$                 
FSS 341,666.67$                      809,907.70$                     72,979.58$                       1,224,553.95$              
SKYCAT 220 N/A 10,938,151.72$                76,890.04$                       11,015,041.77$            
H2 CLIPPER N/A 10,938,151.72$                46,989.94$                       10,985,141.67$            
AEROSCRAFT N/A 10,938,151.72$                153,103.23$                     11,091,254.96$            
HAV 366 N/A 10,938,151.72$                207,567.01$                     11,145,718.74$            
SKYHOOK N/A 10,938,151.72$                346,817.41$                     11,284,969.13$            
LEMV N/A 10,938,151.72$                1,173,204.86$                  12,111,356.59$              
 
In both Table 25 and Table 26, it can be observed that total overall costs remain 
constant for all platforms over the mission duration times with the exception of the MSC 
platforms, due to their unavailability at the lower mission duration times. Although the total 
operating cost for each airship is equal to the total operating cost of the C-17 platform, total 
manpower costs determine the difference in total overall costs. Manpower costs continue to 
increase as total cargo moved increases and can account for the subtle differences in total 
overall costs and cost per short ton-nautical mile, as we discuss in the next section. 
4. Cost Per Ton-Nautical Mile 
To ensure that sealift and airlift costs were analyzed on an equal basis after 
calculating the total overall costs of a particular mission, we derived a cost per ton-nautical 
mile for each platform. This allows planners to realize the cost efficiency of sealift over any 
other platform when time is not a critical factor. Cost per ton-nautical mile (NC) is equal to 
the ratio of total overall costs (NA) over amount of cargo moved (CM), multiplied by the total 
distance (2 * D) traveled for a particular mission (Equation 19).  




 do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 80 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Table 27.   Variable Descriptions for Equation 19 With C-130J Characteristics— 
2,500 Short Tons and a 168-Hour Mission Duration Time 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
C-130J 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
CM CARGO MOVEMENT REQUIREMENT SHORT TONS  2500 short tons 
D DISTANCE NAUTICAL MILES 2800 nm 
NA TOTAL OVERALL COSTS DOLLARS $14,830,013.96 
NC COST PER TON-NAUTICAL MILE DOLLARS/TON-NAUTICAL MILE - 
 
Equation 19 is defined as follows: 
(NC: = Cost Per Ton-NM): NC = NA / (CM * 2 * D).    (19)  
 For example, to calculate the C-130J’s cost per ton-nautical mile (nm), we used the 
C-130J characteristics shown in Table 27. Using Equation 19, we calculated the cost per ton-
nautical mile as follows: 
NC = NA / (CM * 2 * D) = $14,830,013.96 / (2,500 short tons * 2 * 2800 nm)  
  = $1.06 per short ton-nautical mile. 
Tables 28 and 29 show each platform’s cost per ton-nm with mission duration times 
of 168 hours and 744 hours, respectively.   
Table 28.   Cost/Ton-NM for Each Platform—2,500 Short Tons  
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Table 29.   Cost/Ton-NM for Each Platform—2,500 Short Tons  












LEMV 0.87$                                          
  
Based on the TAT times in Table 6, the AMC platforms have the upper hand in 
delivering the 2,500 short tons for the first 45–67 hours. Both the sealift and airship 
platforms cannot make a round trip within that mission duration time. When the mission 
duration time is 67 hours, the H2 Clipper is the only airship available to complete the 
mission, but has the lowest cost per ton-nautical mile compared against the aircraft platforms. 
As the mission duration time increases to 168 hours, as depicted in Table 28, all six airships 
become available and have a lower cost per ton-nautical mile than the C-130J and C-5M. 
Two of the six airships have the same cost per ton-nautical mile as the C-17, while three of 
the six airships have a slightly greater cost per ton-nautical mile: $0.80, $0.81, and $0.87.  
Airships seem to dominate in reducing cost per ton-nautical mile until mission duration 
increases to 744 hours, as depicted in Table 29. At this point, both FSS and LMSR ships 
become available to complete the mission. The cost per ton-nautical of the FSS and LMSR is 
much lower than the cost of any air platforms, including airships. If time does not become a 
major factor, the MSC ships will always have a lower cost in general.  
C. HOURLY OPERATING COST SAVINGS 
 The hourly operating cost for each airship was calculated in order to determine if 
airships could be a viable alternative to all heavy-lift aircraft. A one-size-fits-all hourly 
operating cost was used in our analysis in order to compare airships to all platforms. 
However, based on the cost of procurement and life cycle costs of current platforms, airships 
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could provide a cheaper form of heavy-lift transportation when compared against each 
individual platform. The following analysis shows the hourly operating cost required to 
compete cost effectively against the other platforms. 
1. Replacement Operating Costs 
 In planning for the future, the DoD and USTRANSCOM will need to address the 
issue of aging platforms. As the current heavy-lift platforms age, maintenance and 
modernization costs will increase. In turn, these costs will cause the hourly operating costs of 
these platforms to continually rise. In this section of the analysis, we compare the costs of a 
mission given a specified tonnage and time frame. The break-even costs used in this section 
are not the minimum break-even costs calculated in previous sections, but are the costs based 
strictly on a particular tonnage and time. This allows us to compare airships against each 
individual air and ship platform without subtracting the higher operating costs of all the 
platforms combined, as we did previously.  
It may not be prudent to compare airships against all platforms at once, but, instead, 
to compare airships against each individual platform to analyze the validity of airships 
replacing these platforms. Replacing all the current forms of heavy-lift transportation is most 
likely not feasible; however, by studying the feasibility of replacing one or more of the 
individual platforms, we could discover a better option for reducing the cost of the overall 
mission of delivering heavy-lift logistics to theaters around the world.   
The following analysis is based on a mission with 2,500 short tons and a 744-hour 
mission duration time. Referring back to Tables 12 and 17, we find the number of airships, 
sorties required, and break-even costs for airships and other platforms in order to complete a 
cargo movement requirement of 2,500 short tons with a 744-hour mission completion time. 
These tables are essential for planners who are considering the future acquisition of airships 
and need to evaluate the costs associated with replacing current heavy-lift platforms.  
a. Platform Savings 
The hourly operating cost baselines (seen in Table 18) are thresholds that 
airships cannot go over in order to be considered an alternative to current heavy-lift logistics. 
Given these guidelines, we can calculate the cost savings if airship companies were able to 
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reduce the hourly costs in Table 18 by $100. Table 30 displays the total operational cost 
savings if the break-even hourly operational costs could be reduced by $100. 
Table 30.   Hourly Operating Cost Reduction of $100—2,500 Short Tons  







SKYCAT 220 13,672.69$                   10,938,151.72$         13,572.69$                                 10,858,151.72$          80,000.00$                
H2 CLIPPER 45,675.80$                   10,938,151.72$         45,575.80$                                 10,914,204.36$          23,947.37$                
AEROSCRAFT 6,009.97$                     10,938,151.72$         5,909.97$                                   10,756,151.72$          182,000.00$              
HAV 366 4,101.81$                     10,938,151.72$         4,001.81$                                   10,671,485.06$          266,666.67$              
SKYHOOK 2,170.27$                     10,938,151.72$         2,070.27$                                   10,434,151.72$          504,000.00$              
LEMV 625.04$                        10,938,151.72$         525.04$                                      9,188,151.72$            1,750,000.00$             
Table 30 shows that for every $100 reduction in hourly operating costs, the 
Skycat 220, H2 Clipper, Aeroscraft, HAV 366, Skyhook, and LEMV can provide a cost 
savings of approximately $80,000; $24,000; $182,000; $266,000; $504,000; and $1.75 
million, respectively, from the total operating costs of $10.9 million. Further analysis shows 
that if hourly operating costs are reduced by $1,000, the cost savings from the current total 
operating costs will increase 1,000-fold, as seen in Table 31. LEMV was excluded from 
Table 31 due to its relatively low hourly operating costs, which cannot be reduced by $1,000.   
Table 31.   Hourly Operating Cost Reduction of $1,000—2,500 Short Tons  










If we compare the hourly operating cost baselines for airships to the lowest 
hourly operating cost for an aircraft, the Skycat 220 and H2 Clipper are the only two airships 
that exceed the lowest hourly operating cost of the C-130J, which is $5,945 per hour. If the 
companies that produce the Skycat 220 and H2 Clipper were able to reduce their hourly 
operating costs to $5,945 per hour, both airships could possibly save a total of $6.2 million 
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and $9.5 million, respectively, as indicated in Table 32, from the total operating cost of $10.9 
million.   
Table 32.   Skycat 220 and H2 Clipper Hourly Operating Cost Reduction to $5,945  
and Cost Savings—2,500 Short Tons With a 744-Hour Mission Duration 
Time 
AIRSHIPS: OLD HOURLY OP COSTS: OLD TOTAL OP COSTS: NEW HOURLY OP COST REDUCED:  NEW TOTAL OP COSTS:
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
TOTAL OP COSTS:
SKYCAT 220 13,672.69$                   10,938,151.72$         5,945.00$                                   4,756,000.00$            6,182,151.72$           
H2 CLIPPER 45,675.80$                   10,938,151.72$         5,945.00$                                   1,423,671.05$            9,514,480.67$             
The implications from this analysis show that if companies invest in technologies that 
improve engine technology, fuel efficiency, maintenance, and various other factors, they can 
reduce the hourly operating costs of their products and provide a larger cost savings. This is 
especially true if they can reduce the cost by $100 or more. These baselines could be 
beneficial to the future acquisition of airships, because they allow DoD planners to determine 
if an airship is the right platform to perform a certain mission.          
2. Variable Short Tons With Constant Mission Duration Time 
Under the normal circumstances encountered by the DoD and USTRANSCOM, the 
amount of cargo to be transferred is larger than 2,500 short tons. In the previous sections of 
this analysis, we have shown how particular missions may have a constant amount of 
tonnage required over variable mission durations. If mission duration time is constant and 
tonnage changes, the number of operating hours required to complete a mission increases, as 
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Figure 4.   Number of Platforms Required With Variable Tonnage and a  
168-Hour Mission Duration 
 
 
Figure 5.   Number of Platforms Required With Variable Tonnage and a  
744-Hour Mission Duration 
 
Figures 4 and 5 show the number of platforms required to complete a mission whose 
tonnage varies from one to 60,000 short tons of material. As depicted in Figure 4, more 
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platforms are required to complete missions with relatively short time durations. Figure 5 
shows the opposite: fewer platforms are needed to complete missions with relatively long 
durations. Figure 5 also shows that ship platforms are available to complete missions with 
longer durations, but due to their large payload capacities, relatively few ship platforms will 
be needed to complete the missions, even when cargo tonnage increases. Although Figure 5 
does not show it, the number of ship platforms required to complete these missions is one or 
three platforms per mission.   
The effects of mission duration times can be seen in both figures; the slope of the line 
showing number of platforms required changes based on the variability in tonnage. With 
lower mission duration times, Figure 4 shows a relatively steeper slope compared to Figure 5. 
This sudden increase in slope can also translate into an increase in operating costs for all 
platforms. Based on the same event depicted in Figures 4 and 5, Figures 6 and 7 depict the 
impact on operating costs for mission duration times of 168 and 744 hours, respectively.    
 
Figure 6.   Platforms’ Operating Costs With Variable Tonnage and a  
168-Hour Mission Duration 
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Figure 7.   Platforms’ Operating Costs With Variable Tonnage and a  
744-Hour Mission Duration Time 
 
From Figures 6 and 7, we can conclude that as the tonnage of cargo to be moved 
increases, the total operating costs will increase at the same rate, no matter what the mission 
duration time is. This is due to the fact that total operating hours will remain the same over a 
varying mission duration time, as long as that cargo required to be moved is the same. Figure 
7 also shows the LMSR and FSS as options when mission duration time increases to 744 
hours. The “step” in the LMSR and FSS curves is due to the added ship required to complete 
a mission. For example, the LMSR’s planned payload capacity is 53,224.2 short tons, and 
once cargo required to be moved increases beyond this tonnage, another ship is needed to 
complete the mission. The same effect can be used to explain the FSS platform, which jumps 
from one to three platforms when the cargo required to be moved increases to 60,000 short 
tons. 
D. AUTONOMOUS AIRSHIPS—MANNED VS. UNMANNED 
 The idea of unmanned vehicles has been a source of continued debate in both politics 
and the military arena since the inception of unmanned drones. The benefit of unmanned 
vehicles stems from their ability to allow service members to remain at a safe distance from 
dangerous environments, while allowing them to complete the same types of missions. There 
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are potential benefits for creating autonomous airships, including potential cost savings when 
it comes to heavy-lift cargo. The following analysis shows the potential total cost benefit and 
the number of platforms necessary to complete a sample mission. In addition, the analysis 
shows the potential total cost benefit of autonomous airships when compared to current 
manned logistic platforms.   
1. Manned or Unmanned Airships 
Unmanned airships offer potential benefits because they both provide potential cost 
savings and can complete their mission in a timely and efficient manner. Unlike manned 
platforms, unmanned vehicles do not have to adhere to the crew rest limitations that most 
heavy-lift platforms have to factor into their flight plans. Table 33 shows the potential benefit 
of unmanned airships compared to manned airships in terms of the TAT, number of aircraft, 
number of crew, and number of sorties.   















SKYCAT 220 118.3 6 2 4 106.3 6 2 0
H2 CLIPPER 66.8 11 2 4 54.8 13 1 0
AEROSCRAFT 72.5 10 4 8 60.5 12 4 0
HAV 366 76.7 9 6 12 64.7 11 5 0
SKYHOOK 101.7 7 9 18 89.7 8 8 0
LEMV 86.7 8 32 64 74.7 9 28 0
UNMANNED AIRSHIPSMANNED AIRSHIPS
 
As Table 33 shows, the TAT of unmanned airships is 12 hours lower than that of 
manned aircraft due to the elimination of crew rest that pilots and crewmembers are required 
to take after flying for a certain number of hours. The new TAT means that airships can be 
used more frequently to deliver more cargo. The smaller TAT reduces the number of airships 
needed to maintain a steady-state delivery system, but at the same time increases the number 
of sorties required to complete the mission, as seen in Table 33; as the total number of 
airships decreases, sorties increase to maintain the steady state of the aircraft. Dependent on 
hourly operating cost, total-operating costs will remain the same. 
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 The biggest change from manned to unmanned airships comes from the total overall 
costs; this change is due to the decreased number of manpower hours needed to complete a 
mission. Table 34 shows the potential change to overall cost of a mission for each airship. 
Table 34.   Savings/Losses From Manned to Unmanned Airships—2,500 Short Tons  
With a 744-Hour Mission Duration 
Manned Overall Cost: Unmanned Overall Cost: Cost Change:
SKYCAT 220 11,015,041.77$                 10,938,151.72$                      76,890.04$                     
H2 CLIPPER 10,985,141.67$                 10,938,151.72$                      46,989.94$                     
AEROSCRAFT 11,091,254.96$                 10,938,151.72$                      153,103.23$                   
HAV 366 11,145,718.74$                 10,938,151.72$                      207,567.01$                   
SKYHOOK 11,284,969.13$                 10,938,151.72$                      346,817.41$                   
LEMV 12,111,356.59$                 10,938,151.72$                      1,173,204.86$                  
The cost change depicted in Table 34 results solely from the total manning costs that 
are required for manned airships. Because total operating costs will remain the same with a 
given tonnage, the total manning costs will make up the difference between manned and 
unmanned airship scenarios. All six airships show a potential benefit with unmanned variants 
for transporting 2,500 short tons within a 744-hour mission duration. If airships are flown at 
the same rate as their manned counterparts, additional cost savings will be incurred due to the 
total cost of manning.  
Table 35 shows the potential impact that total mission costs have on the cost per ton-
nautical mile for each airship. Five out of the six airships have decreased costs per ton-
nautical mile, while only one airship remains the same. Overall costs and cost per ton-
nautical mile are highly dependent on the mission duration and the amount of cargo to be 
moved. A change in either of these two may change the number of airships and sorties 
required to complete the mission. It is important to note that, with our model, as the number 
of sorties increases, the TAT decreases and number of airships available to complete a 
mission increases, therefore reducing the total number of airships required. Unmanned 
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Table 35.   Cost/Ton-Nm Changes—2,500 Short Tons With a 744-Hour Duration 
 
2. Manned Platforms vs. Unmanned Airships 
Table 35 shows that unmanned airships can offer a potential cost-saving benefit, 
especially when a mission happens quite frequently. Table 36 shows the total cost savings, or 
losses, between current heavy-lift platforms and unmanned airships.  
Table 36.   Total Cost Savings/Losses Between Platforms and Airships— 
2,500 Short Tons With a 744-Hour Mission Duration 
Manned AMC/MSC Overall Cost: Unmanned Airships' Total Cost: Total Cost Change:
C‐130J 14,830,013.96$                               10,938,151.72$                                     3,891,862.24$                               
C‐17 11,075,493.25$                               10,938,151.72$                                     137,341.52$                                  
C‐5M 19,816,852.74$                               10,938,151.72$                                     8,878,701.01$                               
LMSR 491,434.24$                                     10,938,151.72$                                     (10,446,717.48)$                           
FSS 1,224,553.95$                                 10,938,151.72$                                     (9,713,597.77)$                               
Unmanned airships can provide cost savings compared to all of the heavy-lift air 
platforms. Table 36 shows that the greatest cost savings can be gained by using unmanned 
airships to replace the C-5M platform. All six airships provide a positive cost savings, 
ranging from $137,000 to $9 million, against the three AMC platforms. Due to the relatively 
small overall costs of MSC ships, unmanned airships cannot compete against them. All six 
airships provide a negative cost savings when compared to MSC ships.    
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VII. ANALYSIS FOR SCENARIO 2 
A. ONE-TO-ONE COMPARISON 
 We conduct a second one-to-one comparison in Scenario 2 in order to establish a 
baseline against which to analyze the characteristics of individual platforms. The purpose of 
the one-to-one comparison is the same in each scenario; however, Scenario 2 shows the 
varying characteristics of each platform when time is not a factor over a continuous sea route 
from Hawaii to Guam. The characteristics include operating hours, turn-around time (TAT), 
number of sorties, and planned payload. Equations 1–19 in Scenario 1 apply to Scenario 2 in 
determining the various values associated in the analysis.  
Scenario inputs are based on the fact that this scenario is solely over water. The 
overall distance for both airlift and sealift is 3,320 nautical miles; there are no time or 
monetary constraints for a canal transit, and there are no associated trucking costs for 
delivery to the final destination for sealift. The benefit of conducting this scenario is to 
establish total overall costs based on the platforms alone.  
With these characteristics in mind, we calculated the number of days to complete a 
mission consisting of 2,500 short tons. In this analysis, in order for the mission to be 
completed, all platforms must complete a full sortie or trip. The total distance traveled is 
twice the distance from the point of embarkation to the point of debarkation in order to 
calculate a steady state of platforms. Again, for this single-unit analysis, we assumed that the 
number of platforms is one. Logic checks were placed in most of the equations to determine 
if a platform is capable of completing the mission given the platform’s TAT and time to 
complete the mission. As with Scenario 1, the equations are listed to aid in the development 
of the scenario. With few exceptions, such as the values involving trucking costs, the 
equations do not change from either scenario, but the values’ output will be in line with the 
requirements of Scenario 2.   
The ratio of twice the distance (D) and the block speed (B) of the platform provides 
the operating hours (TP) per sortie or trip of the platform (Equation 1). The summation of 
double the ground time (TG), operating time of platforms per sortie or trip (TP), pre-checks 
(for air platforms only; TC), and double the crew rest times (for air platforms only; TR) 
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calculates the turn-around time (TA) for each platform (Equation 2). Later, we will change 
Equation 2 due to the crew rest being 12 hours rather than 24 hours since additional crews 
will be available to augment a platform. Table 37 shows the variables associated with 
Equations 1 and 2.   
Table 37.   Variable Characteristics for Equations 1 and 2 




B BLOCK SPEED KNOT (KTS) 
TG GROUND/ONLOAD/OFFLOAD TIME HOUR (HR) 
TC FLIGHT PRE-CHECK TIME HOUR (HR) 
TR CREW REST TIME HOUR (HR) 
TP OPERATING TIME PER PLATFORM HOUR (HR) 
TA TURN-AROUND TIME PER PLATFORM HOUR (HR) 
 
Equations 1 and 2 are calculated as follows: 
(TP: = Operating Time of Platforms) TP = (2 * D / B).                         (1) 
(TA: = Turn-Around-Time) TA = 2 * TG + TP + TC + 2 * TR (single-platform). 
    TA = 2 * TG + TP + TC + TR (multi-platform). (2) 
Logic parameters for each platform are used to calculate the total number of sorties or 
trips needed (SAT) to complete a mission given a cargo movement capacity (Equation 3). If 
the TAT (TA) is greater than the mission duration time (TM), the total number of sorties is 
equal to zero (SAT = 0). If TA is less than TM and the cargo moved (CM) is greater than the 
plan cargo load (CP), SAT is equal to one. If CM is less than CP and the ratio of CM and CP 
multiplied by TA is less than TM, then SAT is equal to CM divided by CP rounded up to the 
nearest whole number. If the opposite is true, SAT will equal TM divided by TA rounded down 
to the nearest whole number. In this portion of the analysis, we assume that there is only one 
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Table 38.   Variable Characteristics for Equation 3  
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
TA TURN-AROUND TIME PER PLATFORM HOUR (HR) 
TM MISSION DURATION TIME HOUR (HR) 
SAT 
TOTAL NUMBER OF SORTIES OR TRIPS 
REQUIRED 
SORTIES/TRIPS 
CP PAYLOAD CAPACITY FOR PLATFORM 
SHORT TONS 
(TONS) 




Equation 3 is calculated as follows: 
(SAT: = Maximum Amount of Sorties/Trip per platform):  
IF (TA > TM) 
SAT = 0  
ELSE 
 IF (CP < CM) 
 SAT = 1 
 ELSE 
IF (CM / CP * TA < TM) 
 IF (IAT = 1) 
SAT = Roundup (CM / CP, 0) 
ELSE 
SAT = Roundup (TM / TA, 0)     (3) 
The product of the total number of platforms (IAT), the total number of sorties or trips 
needed (SAT), and the operating hours per sortie or trip (TP) calculates the total operating 
hours (TO) of each platform to perform a mission (Equation 4). Again, for this single-unit 
analysis, we assume that the number of platforms is equal to one (IAT = 1). Logic functions 
were placed in most of the equations to determine if a platform is capable of completing the 
mission given the platform’s TAT and time available to complete the mission. Table 39 
shows the variables associated with Equation 4.  
Table 39.   Variable Characteristics for Equation 4 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
TO TOTAL OPERATING HOURS HOUR (HR) 
TP OPERATING HOURS PER PLATFORM HOUR (HR) 
IAT TOTAL PLATFORMS PLATFORMS 
SAT 
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Equation 4 is calculated as follows: 
(TO: = Total Operating Hours) TO = IAT * SAT * TP.    (4)  
Appendices 2–4 show the platform characteristics used in Table 40; to illustrate Equations 1–
4, the characteristics of the C-130J are used as an example. 
Table 40.   C-130J Characteristics for 2,500 Short Tons 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: VALUES: 
D DISTANCE 3320 nm 
B BLOCK SPEED 320 kts 
CP PAYLOAD CAPACITY FOR PLATFORM 18 s. tons 
CM CARGO MOVEMENT REQUIREMENT 2500 s. tons 
TG GROUND/ONLOAD/OFFLOAD TIME 2.25 hrs 
TC FLIGHT PRE-CHECK TIME 3 hrs 
TR CREW REST TIME 12 hrs 
IAT TOTAL PLATFORMS 1 
TP OPERATING HOURS PER SORTIE OR TRIP - 
TA TURN-AROUND TIME FOR PLATFORMS - 
SAT 




The operating hours (TP) per C-130J can be calculated by using Equation 1: 
TP = (2 * D / B) = (2 * 3320 nm) / 320 kts = 20.75 hrs. 
Turn-around time (TA) can be calculated by using Equation 2: 
TA = 2 * TG + TP + TC + 2 * TR = (2 * 2.25 hrs) + 20.75 hrs + 3 hrs + (2 * 12 hrs) = 52.3 hrs. 
The total number of sorties required (SAT) to be flown by a C-130J can be calculated 
by Equation 3: 
SAT = Roundup (CM / CP, 0) = Roundup (2,500 tons / 18 tons) = 139 sorties. 
Finally, the total operating time (TO) to complete a mission is represented by 
Equation 4: 
TO = IAT * SAT * TP = 1 aircraft * 139 sorties * 20.75 hrs = 2,884.25 hrs 
Table 41 shows the varying operating hours for each platform to complete the 
delivery of 2,500 tons over 3,320 nautical miles for airlift and sealift platforms.
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Table 41.   Single Platform to Complete Mission of 2,500 Short Tons  
With No Time Constraint 
PLATFORMS OPERATING HRS: TURN‐AROUND‐TIME (Hrs): MAXIMUM SORTIES/TRIPS: TOTAL OPERATING HOURS (Hrs):
C‐130J  20.8 52.3 139 2884.3
C‐17 16.4 47.9 56 915.9
C‐5M 16.0 47.5 41 654.4
LMSR 589.5 589.5 1 589.5
FSS 541.8 541.8 1 541.8
SKYCAT 220 79.0 130.7 12 948.6
H2 CLIPPER 21.8 70.2 13 283.9
AEROSCRAFT 55.3 81.2 39 2158.0
HAV 366 63.2 86.6 50 3161.9
SKYHOOK 94.9 116.5 63 5976.0
LEMV 83.0 99.7 250 20750.0  
The single-unit comparison shows each platform’s performance if only one unit is 
available to conduct a mission of 2,500 short tons. This comparison does not have a time 
criticality factor, thus allowing each platform an unlimited amount of time to conduct the 
mission. In this case, the performance measure of lowest total operating hours is used to 
determine the best suited platform to conduct this mission.    
We can conclude that the platforms that are best suited to conduct the mission of 
2,500 short tons are the H2 Clipper and the two sealift vessels, in that order. The H2 Clipper 
airship continuously has the lower operating hours compared to all three AMC platforms, 
both sealift vessels, and the remaining airships. In addition, three out of six airships beat out 
the C-130J platform in total operating hours required to complete the mission. Based on the 
previous equations, we can also deduce that as the amount of cargo moved increases, the 
total operating hours and the number of sorties or trips required will also increase. The 
relationship of the amount of cargo moved and total operating time for all platforms can be 
seen in Figure 8.   
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Figure 8.   Cargo Tons Moved vs. Total Operating Hours—One-to-One Comparison 
With a Distance of 3,320 Nautical Miles and No Time Restraint 
 
B. BREAK-EVEN MODEL 
 The goal of the second break-even model is the same as in the first scenario. We 
calculate the minimum number of platforms required to complete a mission with the new 
requirements listed in the previous section. The amount of time to complete a mission is 
based on varying the distance and the total tonnage to be delivered. The output of this model 
provides the number of platforms needed for a particular mission from which we can 
calculate the minimum hourly operating cost for each airship. In addition to the minimum 
hourly operating cost for each airship, the model provides manning costs, overall costs of 
missions using airships, and the cost per ton-nautical mile. Finally, the break-even model 
outputs the total cost savings gained from using autonomous airships versus manned variants. 
1. Operational Efficiency 
The first section of the break-even model outlines the operational efficiency of the 
platforms analyzed. The driving factors for the operation efficiency model are the total 
distance to complete the mission and the total required tonnage to be moved.  
 =
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
 do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 97 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
With the new time restraint or mission duration (TM) to conduct a mission, more than 
one platform is required to complete a mission if the total tonnage needed to be moved is 
greater than a platform’s planned payload capacity. Unlike the one-to-one comparison 
analysis where only one platform was being used, we are required to calculate the total 
number of platforms (IAT) required to a complete a mission within a certain mission duration 
time (Equation 5). A logical function is used to determine whether or not a platform could 
perform the 2,500 short ton mission in a given time span. If the TAT (TA) is greater than the 
mission duration time (TM), the platform in question would not be selected and would be 
given an output of zero (IAT = 0). If TA is less than TM, the number of platforms needed (IAT) 
to complete a mission would be calculated by rounding up the amount of cargo moved (CM) 
divided by the product of planned payload (CP) and the total number of sorties or trips 
required (SAT). A partial platform cannot be used in order to complete a mission and, 
therefore, the output is rounded up to the nearest whole number.   
Table 42 shows the variables associated with Equation 5 for the transportation of 
2,500 short tons.  
Table 42.   Variable Characteristics for Equation 5 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
TA TURN-AROUND TIME PER PLATFORM HOUR (HR) 
TM MISSION DURATION TIME HOUR (HR) 
SAT 
TOTAL NUMBER OF SORTIES/TRIPS 
REQUIRED 
SORTIES/TRIPS 
CP PAYLOAD CAPACITY FOR PLATFORM 
SHORT TONS 
(TONS) 




TOTAL NUMBER OF PLATFORMS 
REQUIRED 
PLATFORMS 
We used the following equation: 
(IAT: = Total Amount Platforms Required)  
IF (TA > TM) 
IAT = 0 
ELSE 
IAT = ROUNDUP (CM / (CP * SAT), 0)      (5)  
Not all platforms will conduct the maximum amount of sorties/trips due to the 
amount of tonnage required to be moved. Instead, a certain number of platforms (IAF) will 
conduct the maximum sorties or trips (SAF), while the remaining platforms will conduct the 
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remaining sorties/trips. In order to derive the number of platforms (IAF) needed to conduct the 
maximum amount of sorties (SAF), a logic statement compares the product of total number of 
sorties (SAT), total platforms required (IAT), and planned payload (CP) against (CM). If the 
product of these three variables is less than CM, the IAF is equal to IAT – 1. If not, the IAF is 
equal to the IAT (Equation 6). To determine the maximum number of sorties or trips required 
(SAF), we used the same logic statement to compare the product of SAT, IAT, and CP against 
CM. If the product of these three variables is greater than CM, then SAF is equal to SAT – 1, or 
else SAF is equal to SAT (Equation 7). Table 43 shows the variables associated with Equations 
6 and 7. 
Table 43.   Variable Characteristics for Equations 6 and 7 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
TA TURN-AROUND TIME PER PLATFORM HOUR (HR) 
TM MISSION DURATION TIME HOUR (HR) 
SAT TOTAL NUMBER OF SORTIES/TRIPS SORTIES/TRIPS 
SAF MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SORTIES/TRIPS SORTIES/TRIPS 
CP PAYLOAD CAPACITY FOR PLATFORM 
SHORT TONS 
(TONS) 
CM CARGO MOVEMENT REQUIREMENT 
SHORT TONS 
(TONS) 
IAT TOTAL NUMBER OF PLATFORMS  PLATFORMS 
IAF 




The following equations determine the number of platforms required to complete the 
maximum amount of sorties for a given mission: 
(IAF: = Number of Platforms to Conduct Maximum Sorties/Trips)  
IF (TA > TM) 
IAF = 0 
ELSE 
 IF(SAT * IAT * CP > CM) 
  IF(SAT * IAT * CP – CM > CP) 
  IAF = IAT – 1 
  ELSE 
  IAF = IAT 
 ELSE 
 IAF = IAT         (6) 
 
(SAF: = Maximum Number of Sorties/Trips)  
IF (IAF * SAT * CP < CM) 
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SAF = SAT – 1 
ELSE  
SAF = SAT          (7) 
The total number of aircraft required will not always need to conduct the maximum 
number of sorties for a given mission. To ensure the number of total sorties is not inflated, 
the limited number of sorties (SAP) and the number of platforms that only complete a limited 
number of sorties (IAP) must be calculated. If turn-around time (TA) is greater than mission 
duration time (TM), then SAP is equal to zero. Otherwise, if IAF is less than IAT, SAP is equal to 
the difference of CM and the product of SAF, IAF, and CP divided by CP rounded up to the 
nearest whole number (Equation 8). For IAP, if TA is greater than TM, IAP is equal to zero. If 
IAF is less than IAT, IAP is equal to the difference between CM minus the product of SAF, IAF, 
and CP divided by the product of CP and SAP (Equation 9). Table 44 shows the variables 
associated with Equations 8 and 9.  
Table 44.   Variables Characteristics of Equations 8 and 9 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
TA TURN-AROUND TIME PER PLATFORM HOUR (HR) 
TM MISSION DURATION TIME HOUR (HR) 
SAF 
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SORTIES OR 
TRIPS REQUIRED 
SORTIES/TRIPS 
SAP LIMITED NUMBER OF SORTIES/TRIPS SORTIES/TRIPS 
CP PAYLOAD CAPACITY FOR PLATFORM 
SHORT TONS 
(TONS) 




NUMBER OF PLATFORMS CONDUCTING 
MAXIMUM SORTIES/TRIPS
PLATFORMS 
IAT  TOTAL NUMBER OF PLATFORMS   PLATFORMS 
IAP 




The following equation determines the number of platforms that only complete a 
limited number of sorties: 
(SAP: = Limited Number of Sorties/Trips) 
IF (TA > TM) 
SAP = 0 
ELSE 
 IF (IAF < IAT) 
 SAP = Roundup ((CM – [SAF * IAF * CP]) / CP, 0) 
 ELSE 
 SAP = 0         (8) 
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(IAP: = Number of Platforms Only Completing Limited Sorties/Trips)  
IF (TA > TM) 
IAP = 0 
ELSE  
IF (IAF < IAT) 
IAP = IAT – IAF 
 ELSE 
 IAP = 0          (9) 
Given the number of platforms required to complete a mission, manpower, in the 
form of crews, are required to supply a steady state of platforms. The number of crews (W) is 
equal to the product of the total number of platforms (IAT) multiplied by two (Equation 10).  
The following equation was used to determine the number of crews (W) required: 
(W: = Number of Crews for Platforms) W = IAT x 2.    (10) 
Table 45 shows the platform characteristics provided in more detail in Appendices 2–
4 of the C-130J. The C-130J is used as an example to demonstrate the use of Equations 5–10.  
Table 45.   C-130J Characteristics for 2,500 Short Tons 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: VALUES: 
CP PAYLOAD CAPACITY FOR PLATFORM 18 s. tons 
CM CARGO MOVEMENT REQUIREMENT 2500 s. tons 
TA  TURN-AROUND TIME PER PLATFORM  52.3 hrs 
TM  MISSION DURATION TIME  168 hrs 
 
Before using Equations 5–9, we must re-calculate the maximum number of sorties or 
trips required (SAT) for the C-130J due to multiple platforms being involved (Equation 3). 
With time now a critical factor, Equation 3 uses the mission duration time (TM) divided by 
the TAT (TA) rounded down to determine the maximum number of sorties or trips required 
(SAT). With Equation 3, we can calculate SAT: 
SAT = ROUNDDOWN (TM / TA, 0) = ROUNDDOWN (168 hrs / 52.3 hrs) = 3 sorties. 
The total number of C-130J platforms (IAT) required to complete the mission can be 
derived by using Equation 5: 
IAT = ROUNDUP (CM / (CP * SAT)) 
     = ROUNDUP (2,500 tons / (18 tons * 3 sorties)) = 47 platforms needed. 
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The number of C-130J platforms needed to conduct the maximum number of 
sorties/trips (IAF) is determined by SAT. Because the product of SAT, IAT, and CP minus CM is 
less than CP, Equation 6 becomes the following: 
IAF = IAT – 1 = 47 platforms – 1 = 46 platforms. 
The majority of the C-130J platforms will perform the maximum number of 
sorties/trips (SAF); therefore, we use Equation 7: SAF = SAT = 3 sorties. 
Because IAF is less than IAT, we can calculate the limited number of sorties (SAP) that 
platforms are required to conduct to complete a mission. Equation 8 is used to calculate the 
limited sorties required:  
SAP = ROUNDUP ((CM – [SAF * IAF * CP])/ CP, 0) 
SAP = ROUNDUP ((2500 – [3 sorties * 46 platforms * 18 tons]) / 18 tons) = 1 sortie. 
We can calculate the number of platforms (IAP) required to conduct this single sortie. 
Using Equation 9, we can calculate the number of platforms needed: 
IAP = IAT – IAF = 47 platforms – 46 platforms = 1 platform required. 
 Finally, to run the 47 C-130J platforms, crews (W) must be assigned to man these 
platforms. Equation 10 states the following: W = IAT * 2 = 47 platforms * 2 = 94 crews. 
Tables 46 and 47 show the total number of platforms, maximum sorties/trips, limited 
sorties/trips, platforms to conduct limited sorties/trips, and platform crews necessary to 
complete a mission of 2,500 short tons based on mission duration times of 168 hours and 744 
hours, respectively. In order to effectively compare platforms, mission duration is increased 
to show the value of sealift platforms when time is not a critical factor. 
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Table 46.   Platform Characteristics—2,500 Short Tons With a  




























C‐130J 3 47 94 3 46 1 1 2884.3
C‐17 3 19 38 3 18 2 1 915.9
C‐5M 3 14 28 3 13 2 1 654.4
SKYCAT 220 1 12 24 1 12 0 0 948.6
H2 CLIPPER 2 7 14 2 6 1 1 283.9
AEROSCRAFT 2 20 40 2 19 1 1 2158.0
HAV 366 1 50 100 1 50 0 0 3161.9
SKYHOOK 1 63 126 1 63 0 0 5976.0
LEMV 1 250 500 1 250 0 0 20750.0  
Table 46 shows the output of each platform when mission duration totals 168 hours. 
As expected, the LMSR and FSS platforms cannot complete this mission within the mission 
duration time due to their TATs being greater than the required 168 hours. With both sealift 
platforms unavailable, this portion of the analysis focuses on the non-sealift platforms.   
The performance measures of importance for this section of the analysis are the 
lowest total operating hours, lowest number of aircraft, least number of sorties, and least 
number of crews to complete the mission of 2,500 short tons within 168 hours. Not all 
aircraft will need to conduct the maximum number of sorties. For example, the C-130J 
requires 46 of the 47 aircraft to conduct a maximum of three sorties. The additional aircraft is 
required to complete one sortie in order to minimize the number of sorties required to deliver 
2,500 short tons. This logic is applied to the rest of the platforms throughout the analysis.   
One of the six airships beat out all three aircraft in total operating time, while two out 
of the six airships required fewer platforms than the three aircraft to complete the mission. In 
addition, two of six airships required fewer crews than the aircraft, and three of the six 
airships were comparable to the number of crews that the aircraft required. Finally, all six 
airships required fewer sorties to complete the mission than all of the aircraft in this analysis.   
The H2 Clipper airship again outperformed all platforms for this particular mission, 
while the LEMV was considered the outlier among all of the platforms when adhering to 
these performance standards. The H2 Clipper’s superior performance for this particular 
mission is due to its relatively large payload capacity of 200 short tons and its block speed of 
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over 300 knots. The airships compare favorably in this section of analysis, but it is important 
to remember the characteristics used for all the airships are best estimates provided by their 
respective companies. The airships’ true potential cannot be fully realized until airships have 
been fully built and tested to those characteristics; however, our model is robust in that a 
practitioner can input the true parameters, and it will calculate the true characteristics of the 
airship.     
Table 47 shows the output of each platform when mission duration totals 744 hours. 
Unlike with the previous mission duration time of 168 hours, the LMSR and FSS platforms 
are now able to complete the 2,500 short ton mission within the given mission duration time. 
The H2 Clipper outperforms even the LMSR and FSS now that they are available. The 
LMSR and FSS both outperform the aircraft and the other five airships in these performance 
measures, but, as Table 37 shows, as the mission duration time increases, the number of 
platforms required for aircraft and airships decreases, while the number of sorties increases. 
The increased number of sorties counteracts the decreased number of air platforms required 
to complete the mission, but the total operating hours remain the same. An increase of 
mission duration time does not affect the total operating time to complete a mission, but it 
does dictate the number of sorties and platforms required when tonnage moved remains the 
same. Future research will need to analyze the total cost of procurement of air platforms 
versus the overall maintenance cost of conducting more sorties. 
Table 47.   Platform Characteristics—2,500 Short Tons  




























C‐130J 14 10 20 14 9 13 1 2884.3
C‐17 15 4 8 15 3 11 1 915.9
C‐5M 15 3 6 15 2 11 1 654.4
LMSR 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 589.5
FSS 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 541.8
SKYCAT 220 5 3 6 5 2 2 1 948.6
H2 CLIPPER 10 2 4 10 1 3 1 283.9
AEROSCRAFT 9 5 10 9 4 3 1 2158.0
HAV 366 8 7 14 8 6 2 1 3161.9
SKYHOOK 6 11 22 6 10 3 1 5976.0
LEMV 7 36 72 7 35 5 1 20750.0  
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2. Hourly Operating Costs for Airships 
The total operating cost (NO) is calculated by the product of total operating hours of 
the platform (TO) and the average hourly operating cost of the platform (HP; Equation 11). 
The total operating hours and the total operating cost remain the same despite the varying 
mission duration time. It can be observed that as mission duration time changes, the number 
of sorties and platforms changes to equal the same total operating hours. Table 48 defines the 
variable characteristics for Equation 11 and includes the input characteristics for the C-130J. 
Table 48.   Variable Characteristics for Equation 11, Including C-130J Input 
Parameters 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
C‐130J 
PARAMETERS: 
NO TOTAL OPERATING COSTS HOUR (HR) ‐ 
TO TOTAL OPERATING HOURS HOUR (HR) 2884.25 hrs 
HP HOURLY OPERATING COSTS FOR PLATFORM DOLLAR/HOUR $5,945.00/hr 
 
We calculated Equation 11 as follows: 
(No: = Total Operating Costs) NO = TO * HP.     (11) 
The C-130J’s total operating cost (NO) can be calculated from the total operating 
hours (TO) and hourly operating costs of the C-130J:  
NO = TO * HP = (2884.25 hrs) * ($5,945.00/hr) = $17,146,866.25. 
Tables 49 and 50 show the operating costs for all platforms, with the exception of 
airships, for mission duration times of 168 and 744 hours. 
Table 49.   Total Operating Costs for AMC/MSC Platforms—2,500 Short Tons and a 
168-Hour Mission Duration Time 
MISSION HOURS: C‐130J OP COSTS($): C‐17 OP COSTS($): C‐5M OP COSTS($): LMSR OP COST ($): FSS OP COST ($):
168 17,146,866.25$           12,969,522.76$       23,307,932.31$         N/A N/A  
Table 49 shows that the C-17 air platform is the platform with the lowest operating 
cost to deliver 2,500 short tons within a 168-hour mission duration time. The C-17 has the 
second lowest operating hours amongst the three aircraft, yet its costs are twice as low as the 
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C-5M. This difference in hourly operating costs makes the C-17 the less costly aircraft in this 
situation. It can also be observed that the LMSR and FSS platforms are not available to 
complete this mission within the specified mission duration time due to the TATs of each 
platform.   
Table 50.   Total Operating Costs for AMC/MSC Platforms—2,500 Short Tons and a 
744-Hour Mission Duration Time 
MISSION HOURS: C‐130J OP COSTS($): C‐17 OP COSTS($): C‐5M OP COSTS($): LMSR OP COST ($): FSS OP COST ($):
744 17,146,866.25$           12,969,522.76$       23,307,932.31$         119,761.09$              565,275.23$          
 
Table 50 shows the same scenario, but with a mission duration time of 744 hours. 
This extension in mission duration time allows the LMSR and FSS to complete the mission, 
with only a 2,500 short ton cargo requirement. It can also be observed that both the LMSR 
and FSS have lower operating costs than the C-17 and the other two aircraft. The lower 
operating costs can be attributed to the use of only one ship and one trip for each to complete 
the 2,500 short ton mission, therefore, reducing the total operating hours required to complete 
the mission.   
Based on Tables 49 and 50, we can conclude that the aircraft platforms have the 
advantage over the ship platforms to complete a mission with time durations up to 
541.8 hours, which is the time required for an FSS to finish the mission. When mission 
duration time is extended beyond 589.5 hours, the LMSR has the lowest operating costs 
amongst all the platforms.    
The total hourly operating cost (HP-AIRSHIP) of airships is equal to the ratio of the total 
operating cost (NO-PLATFORM) of a platform and the total operating time (TO-AIRSHIP) for an 
airship (Equation 12). We derived the hourly operating costs of airships (HP-AIRSHIP) by 
utilizing the total operating costs derived for each platform in Tables 49 and 50. Because 
Table 49 excludes the ship platforms due to the short mission duration times, we used the 
information provided in Table 50, which includes ship platforms. Table 51 is used to define 
the variable descriptions for Equation 12 and to provide the input parameters for the C-130J 
and the Skycat 220.  
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Table 51.   Variable Descriptions for Equation 12, and C-130J and Skycat 220 
Characteristics—2,500 Short Tons With a 744-Hour Mission Duration 
Time 





HP-AIRSHIP HOURLY OPERATING COSTS FOR AIRSHIP DOLLAR/HOUR - - 
NO-AIRCRAFT TOTAL OPERATING COSTS FOR AIRCRAFT DOLLAR $17,146,866.25 - 
TO-AIRSHIP TOTAL OPERATING HOURS FOR AIRSHIP HOUR - 948.571 hrs 
 
We calculated Equation 12 as follows: 
(HP-AIRSHIP: = Hourly Operating Cost of Airships).  
HP-AIRSHIP = NO-AIRCRAFT / TO-AIRSHIP       (12) 
For example, to calculate the break-even hourly cost between the C-130J aircraft and 
Skycat 220, we use the total operating cost (NO-C-130J) of the C-130J to transport 2,500 short 
tons (shown in Table 51) and the total operating hours (TO-SKYCAT 220) for the Skycat 220 to 
transport the same amount of cargo:  
 HP-SKYCAT 220 = NO-C-130J / TO-SKYCAT 220 = $17,146,866.26 / 948.571 hrs = $18,076.52/hr. 
Using Equation 12, Table 52 shows the break-even hourly operating costs between 
each platform and each airship for the cargo movement requirement of 2,500 short tons with 
a mission duration of 744 hours. 
Table 52.   Break-Even Hourly Costs Between Each AMC/MSC Platform and  
Airships—2,500 Short Tons With a 744-Hour Mission Duration Time 
MISSION DURATION: 744 HRS
CARGO MOVEMENT: 2500 SHORT TONS
SKYCAT 220 18,076.52$                   13,672.69$               24,571.62$                 126.25$                      595.92$                 
H2 CLIPPER 60,387.48$                   45,675.80$               82,085.40$                 421.77$                      1,990.77$             
AEROSCRAFT 7,945.72$                     6,009.97$                 10,800.71$                 55.50$                        261.94$                 
HAV 366 5,422.95$                     4,101.81$                 7,371.48$                   37.88$                        178.78$                 
SKYHOOK 2,869.29$                     2,170.27$                 3,900.26$                   20.04$                        94.59$                   
LEMV 826.36$                         625.04$                     1,123.27$                   5.77$                           27.24$                   
C‐130J OP COSTS($): C‐17 OP COSTS($): C‐5M OP COSTS($): LMSR OP COST ($): FSS OP COST ($):
 
To determine the minimum overall hourly operating costs for each airship, which we 
use in the rest of this analysis for Scenario 2, we decided to choose the lowest hourly 
operating cost among the three air platforms versus the sealift platforms, as we did in 
Scenario 1.   
To determine the minimum overall hourly operating costs, we extracted the lowest 
hourly operating cost amongst the three aircraft. Based on the data in Table 52, the C-17 had 
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the lowest total operating cost for the transportation of 2,500 short tons. Table 53 summarizes 
the hourly operating cost and total operating costs (Equation 11) of each airship based on the 
C-17 total operating costs, results that we use in the rest of the analysis.  







LEMV 625.04$                                   12,969,522.76$                         
The total operational costs for each airship, as calculated in Table 53, are the same as 
the C-17 total operating costs. The break-even hourly operating costs for each airship were 
calculated by dividing the total operating hours of each airship into the C-17’s total operating 
costs, which is the same calculation we used in Scenario 1. In a later section, we analyze the 
change of total operating costs based on a reduction in hourly operating costs for each 
airship.     
Table 53 does not necessarily represent an airship’s actual hourly operating cost. 
Instead, it gives an hourly operating cost threshold; anything greater than this cost will 
exclude an airship as a cost-effective alternative to other heavy-lift platforms. A larger 
baseline, therefore, represents an attractive alternative. Said another way, the H2 Clipper can 
have an hourly operating cost of up to $45,675.80 and still be a competitive option compared 
to all heavy-lift platforms. A larger baseline provides a less restrictive range in which 
airships can improve or meet the baseline. A lower baseline provides a more restrictive 
situation where an airship can improve its hourly operating costs from the baseline. 
Therefore, since the H2 Clipper and Skycat 220 have the highest hourly operating cost 
baselines, both have the advantage to seek improvements on their hourly operating costs 
compared to the other airships.    
Table 52 also shows the break-even hourly operating costs for an airship to compete 
against MSC platforms. The hourly operating cost ranges from $5.77 to $1,990.77 for the 
LMSR and the FSS platforms. Sealift platforms will always have the lowest overall hourly 
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operating cost because they require fewer platforms and trips to complete a mission cargo 
load requirement of 2,500 short tons. In addition to a minimum number of platforms and 
trips, an MSC ship will not depart a port unless it is at or near its maximum planned payload, 
which allows the total cost of a mission to be spread across the total tonnage it is carrying.   
3. Manning and Overall Costs 
The number of total manpower hours (TT) is calculated by multiplying the total 
number of platforms performing the maximum sorties (IAF), the maximum sorties (SAF), and 
the TAT of the platform (TA). This value is then added to the product of the number of 
aircraft conducting limited sorties (IAP), the number of limited sorties (SAP), and the TAT of 
the platform (TA; Equation 13). Table 54 provides the variable descriptions for Equation 13 
and the input characteristics of the C-130J. 
Table 54.   Variable Descriptions for Equation 13 With C-130J Characteristics—
2,500 Short Tons and a 744-Hour Mission Duration Time 




NUMBER OF PLATFORMS 
CONDUCTING MAXIMUM 
SORTIES/TRIPS 
PLATFORMS 9 platforms 
SAF 
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF 
SORTIES/TRIPS 
SORTIES/TRIPS 14 sorties 
IAP 
NUMBER OF PLATFORMS 
COMPLETING LIMITED SORTIES/TRIPS 
PLATFORMS 1 platform 
SAP LIMITED NUMBER OF SORTIES/TRIPS SORTIES/TRIPS 13 sorties 
TA TURN-AROUND TIME FOR PLATFORM HOURS (HR) 52.25hrs 
TT 
TOTAL MANPOWER HOURS/TOTAL 
TIME TO COMPLETE MISSION 
HOURS (HR) - 
 
We calculated Equation 13 as follows: 
(TT: =Total Manpower Hours Costs for Air Platforms). 
TT = IAF * SAF * TA + IAP * SAP * TA.       (13) 
For example, to calculate the total manpower hours (TT) for the C-130J, we use the 
information calculated in previous tables and shown in Table 54: 
TT = IAF * SAF * TA + IAP * SAP * TA  
     = 9 platforms * 14 sorties * 52.25 hrs + 1 platform * 13 sorties * 52.25 hrs  
     = 7262.75 hours.  
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Table 55 depicts the total manpower hours required to operate each air and sealift 
platform based on 2,500 short tons and a 744-hour mission duration time. Total manpower 
hours are dependent on the number of short tons required to be moved. As tonnage required 
increases, total manpower hours also increase. As long as tonnage required to be moved 
remains constant, mission duration time does not affect the total manpower hours. 
Table 55.   Total Manpower Hours per Platform—2,500 Short Tons With a 744-












LEMV 24916.7  
The total manning cost (NM) for air platforms is equal to the product of total time to 
complete a mission (TT) and the summation product of the total manning of officers (MO) 
and enlisted personnel (ME) multiplied by the hourly wage of officers (HO) and enlisted 
personnel (HE; Equation 14). The total manning cost (NM) for sealift platforms is equal to the 
product of total time to complete a mission (TT), the product of total manning of civilian 
personnel (MV) and by the hourly wage of civilian personnel (HV; Equation 15). 
Table 56.   Variable Descriptions for Equation 14 and 15 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
HE HOURLY ENLISTED WAGES DOLLARS 
HO HOURLY OFFICER WAGES DOLLARS 
HV HOURLY CIVILIAN WAGES DOLLARS 
ME MANNING FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL 
MO MANNING FOR OFFICERS PERSONNEL 
MV MANNING FOR CIVILIANS PERSONNEL 
NM TOTAL MANNING COSTS DOLLARS 
TT 
TOTAL MANPOWER HOURS/TOTAL TIME 
TO COMPLETE MISSION 
HOURS (HR) 
 
Equations 14 and 15 are calculated as follows: 
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(NM: =Total Manpower Costs for Air Platforms).  
NM = TT * (HO * MO + HE * ME).       (14)   
(NM : = Total Manpower Costs for Sealift Platforms).  
NM = TT* (MV * HV).         (15) 
The overall cost for both air and sealift platforms, given a particular mission (NA), is 
equal to the summation of the total operating cost (NO) and total manning costs (NM). Total 
trucking costs (NT) was not included in this scenario and only pertains to Scenario 1. 
Equations 17 and 18, which calculate overall costs for air and sea platforms, are exactly the 
same in Scenario 2, but to keep continuity from Scenario 1, they are considered separate 
equations. The difference between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 is that the total trucking costs 
(NT) has been excluded in Equation 18. Table 57 provides the variable descriptions for 
Equations 17 and 18. 
Table 57.   Variable Descriptions for Equations 17 and 18 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
NA 
OVERALL COSTS FOR AIR/SEALIFT 
PLATFORMS 
DOLLARS 
NM CARGO MOVEMENT REQUIREMENT SHORT TONS 
NO TURN-AROUND TIME HOURS 
 
We calculated Equations 17 and 18 as follows: 
(NA: = Overall Costs for Air Platforms): NA = NO + NM.   (17) 
(NA: = Overall Costs for Sealift Platforms): NA = NO + NM. (18) 
 For example, the total operating cost, total manning cost, and the overall costs can be 
calculated for the C-130J based on the characteristics defined by Table 58.
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Table 58.   C-130J Characteristics—2,500 Short Tons With a Mission Duration of 
744 Hours 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: C-130J: 
HE HOURLY ENLISTED WAGES $10.80/hr 
HO HOURLY OFFICER WAGES $16.27/hr 
ME MANNING FOR ENLISTED 2 enlisted (E-6) 
MO MANNING FOR OFFICERS 2 officers (O-3) 
NO TOTAL OPERATING COSTS $17,146,866.25 
IAF 
NUMBER OF PLATFORMS CONDUCTING 
MAXIMUM SORTIES/TRIPS 9 platforms 
SAF MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SORTIES/TRIPS 14 sorties 
IAP 
NUMBER OF PLATFORMS COMPLETING 
LIMITED SORTIES/TRIPS 
1 platform 
SAP LIMITED NUMBER OF SORTIES/TRIPS 13 sorties 
TT 
TOTAL MANPOWER HOURS/TOTAL TIME 
TO COMPLETE MISSION 
7,262.75 hours  
NA TOTAL OVERALL COSTS - 
NM TOTAL MANNING COSTS - 
 
To calculate total manning costs (NM) for C-130J to move 2,500 short tons within a 
744-hour mission duration time, we used Equation 16: 
NM = TT * (HO * MO + HE * ME)  
      = 7,262.8 * (2 officers * $16.27/hr + 2 enlisted * $10.80/hr) = $393,205.28. 
Finally, using the total operating costs (Table 14), we calculated the overall costs 
based on Equation 17: 
NA = NO + NM = $17,146,866.25 + $393,205.28 = $17,540,071.53. 
Numbers and cost outputs will vary from the examples and tables due to rounding errors. The 
rounding errors are negligible to the overall costs.   
Table 59 shows the various manning and overall costs for the various platforms for a 
given mission duration of 168 hours. To determine the most suitable platform to perform this 
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Table 59.   Total Overall Cost for Each Platform—2,500 Short Tons With a 
168-Hour Mission Duration 
PLATFORMS TOTAL OP COST: TOTAL MANNING COST: TOTAL OVERALL COST:
C‐130J 17,146,866.25$   393,262.78$                      17,540,129.03$               
C‐17 12,969,522.76$   145,108.95$                      13,114,631.71$               
C‐5M 23,307,932.31$   168,432.48$                      23,476,364.79$               
LMSR N/A N/A N/A
FSS N/A N/A N/A
SKYCAT 220 12,969,522.76$   84,934.88$                        13,054,457.63$               
H2 CLIPPER 12,969,522.76$   49,398.10$                        13,018,920.86$               
AEROSCRAFT 12,969,522.76$   171,405.23$                      13,140,927.99$               
HAV 366 12,969,522.76$   234,383.13$                      13,203,905.88$               
SKYHOOK 12,969,522.76$   397,499.86$                      13,367,022.61$               
LEMV 12,969,522.76$   1,349,185.59$                   14,318,708.35$                  
 
As seen in Table 59, two of the six airships beat out all three aircraft platforms. All 
six of the airships were more cost effective than the C-5 and the C-130J. Due to the short 
mission duration time, MSC ships cannot perform the mission and, therefore, are at a 
disadvantage compared to other air platforms. If manufacturers make the hourly operating 
cost of airships lower than the baseline, the total overall cost will only decrease further. Later 
analysis will show the price difference of lower hourly operating costs.   
Table 60 shows the total operating costs, total manning costs, and the total overall 
cost for all platforms for a given 744-hour mission duration time. Extending the mission 
duration time to 744 hours allows MSC ships to be utilized as an option. Using the 
performance measure for the previous mission duration time, we notice that the best platform 
to conduct this mission with the given parameters is the LMSR.  
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Table 60.   Total Overall Cost for Each Platform—2,500 Short Tons  
With a 744-Hour Mission Duration 
PLATFORMS TOTAL OP COST: TOTAL MANNING COST: TOTAL OVERALL COST:
C‐130J 17,146,866.25$                 393,262.78$                     17,540,129.03$               
C‐17 12,969,522.76$                 145,108.95$                     13,114,631.71$               
C‐5M 23,307,932.31$                 168,432.48$                     23,476,364.79$               
LMSR 119,761.09$                      22,352.91$                       142,114.00$                    
FSS 565,275.23$                      63,074.00$                       628,349.23$                    
SKYCAT 220 12,969,522.76$                 84,934.88$                       13,054,457.63$               
H2 CLIPPER 12,969,522.76$                 49,398.10$                       13,018,920.86$               
AEROSCRAFT 12,969,522.76$                 171,405.23$                     13,140,927.99$               
HAV 366 12,969,522.76$                 234,383.13$                     13,203,905.88$               
SKYHOOK 12,969,522.76$                 397,499.86$                     13,367,022.61$               
LEMV 12,969,522.76$                 1,349,185.59$                  14,318,708.35$                 
 
Tables 59 and 60 show that total overall costs remain constant for all platforms over 
the mission duration times, with the exception of the MSC platforms, due to their limited 
availability. Although the total operating cost for each airship is equal to the total operating 
cost of the C-17 platform, total manpower costs determine the difference in total overall 
costs. Manpower costs continue to increase as total cargo moved increases and can account 
for the subtle differences in total overall costs and cost per short ton-nautical, which we 
discuss in the next section. 
4. Cost Per Ton-Nautical Mile 
Cost per ton-nautical mile (NC) is equal to the ratio of total overall costs (NA) and the 
amount of cargo moved (CM) multiplied by the total distance (2 * D) traveled for a particular 
mission (Equation 19). Table 61 defines Equation 19 and the input characteristics of the C-
130J. 
Table 61.   Variable Description for Equation 19 With C-130J Characteristics—
2,500 Short Tons and a 168-Hour Mission Duration Time 
SYMBOLS: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS: UNITS: 
C-130J 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
CM CARGO MOVEMENT REQUIREMENT SHORT TONS  2500 short tons 
D DISTANCE NAUTICAL MILES 3320 nm 
NA TOTAL OVERALL COSTS DOLLARS $17,146,866.25
NC COST PER TON-NAUTICAL MILE DOLLARS/TON-NAUTICAL MILE - 
 
Equation 19 is calculated as follows: 
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(NC: = Cost Per Ton-NM): NC = NA / (CM * 2 * D).     (19) 
 For example, to calculate the C-130J’s cost per ton-nautical mile, we used the 
calculations in Table 61, which shows the C-130J characteristics previously presented in 
other tables. Using Equation 19, we calculate the cost per ton-nautical mile as follows: 
NC = NA / (CM * 2 * D) = $17,146,866.25 / (2,500 short tons * 2 * 3,320 nm)  
  = $1.03 per short ton-nautical mile. 
In the Excel model, the cost per ton-nautical is closer to $1.06 per short ton-nautical 
mile due to the rounding errors associated with this example. Tables 62 and 63 show the cost 
per ton-nm for each platform, assuming mission duration times of 168 hours and 744 hours, 
respectively.   
Table 62.   Cost/Ton-NM for Each Platform—2,500 Short Tons With a 168-Hour 












LEMV 0.86$                                          
Table 63.   Cost/Ton-NM for Each Platform—2,500 Short Tons  
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Based on the TAT times in Table 42, the AMC platforms have the upper hand in 
delivering the 2,500 tons for the first 45–70.2 hours. Neither the sealift nor the airship 
platforms can make a round trip within that mission duration time. When the mission 
duration is 70.2 hours, the H2 Clipper is the only airship available to complete the mission, 
but it has the lowest cost per ton-nautical mile compared with the aircraft platforms. As the 
mission duration time increases to 168 hours, as depicted in Table 62, all six airships become 
available and have a lower cost per ton-nautical mile compared to the C-130J and C-5M. 
Two of the six airships have the same cost per ton-nautical mile as the C-17, while three of 
the six airships have a slightly greater cost per ton-nautical mile of $0.80, $0.81, and $0.86. 
Airships seem to dominate in reducing cost per ton-nautical mile until mission duration 
increases to 744 hours, as depicted in Table 63. Both the FSS and LMSR ships become 
available to complete the mission at that time. The FSS and LMSR both have a cost per ton-
nautical that is lower than that of air platforms, including airships. If time is not a major 
factor, the MSC ships always have a lower cost in general.  
C. HOURLY OPERATING COST SAVINGS 
 The hourly operating cost for each airship was calculated in order to determine if 
airships could be a viable alternative to all heavy-lift aircraft. A one-size-fits-all hourly 
operating cost was used in our analysis in order to compare airships to all platforms. 
However, based on the cost of procurement and life cycle costs of current platforms, airships 
could provide a cheaper form of heavy-lift transportation than any other platform.   
1. Replacement Operating Costs 
The following analysis is based on a mission of 2,500 short tons and a 744-hour 
completion time. Referring back to Tables 47 and 50, we can find the number of airships, 
sorties required, and break-even costs between airships and other platforms for a cargo 
movement requirement of 2,500 short tons with a 744-hour mission completion time. 
These tables are essential for planners who are considering future acquisitions of airships and 
need to evaluate the cost savings associated with replacing current heavy-lift platforms.  
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a. Platform Savings 
The hourly operating costs baselines (seen in Table 48) are thresholds that 
airships cannot go over in order to be considered an alternative to current heavy-lift logistics. 
Given these guidelines, we can calculate the cost savings if airship companies are able to 
reduce the hourly costs in Table 48 by $100. Table 64 calculates the total operational cost 
savings if the break-even hourly operational costs were reduced by $100. 
Table 64.   Hourly Operating Cost Reduction of $100—2,500 Short Tons With a 744-







SKYCAT 220 13,672.69$                   12,969,522.76$         13,572.69$                                 12,874,665.62$          94,857.14$                
H2 CLIPPER 45,675.80$                   12,969,522.76$         45,575.80$                                 12,941,128.02$          28,394.74$                
AEROSCRAFT 6,009.97$                     12,969,522.76$         5,909.97$                                   12,753,722.76$          215,800.00$              
HAV 366 4,101.81$                     12,969,522.76$         4,001.81$                                   12,653,332.28$          316,190.48$              
SKYHOOK 2,170.27$                     12,969,522.76$         2,070.27$                                   12,371,922.76$          597,600.00$              
LEMV 625.04$                        12,969,522.76$         525.04$                                      10,894,522.76$          2,075,000.00$             
Table 65.   Hourly Operating Cost Reduction of $1,000—2,500 Short Tons With a 











Table 64 shows that for every $100 reduction in hourly operating costs, the Skycat 
220, H2 Clipper, Aeroscraft, HAV 366, Skyhook, and LEMV can provide a cost savings of 
approximately $94,900; $28,400; $215,800; $316,200; $597,600; and $2.1 million, 
respectively, from the total operating costs of $12.97 million. Further analysis shows that if 
hourly operating costs are reduced by up to $1,000, the cost savings from the current total 
operating costs will increase 1,000-fold, as seen in Table 65. The LEMV was excluded from 
Table 65 due to its relatively low hourly operating costs that cannot be reduced by $1,000.   
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 If we compare the hourly operating cost baselines for airships to the lowest hourly 
operating cost for an aircraft, the Skycat 220 and H2 Clipper are the only two airships that 
are over the lowest hourly operating costs of the C-130J, which is $5,945 per hour. If the 
companies that produce the Skycat 220 and H2 Clipper were able to reduce their hourly costs 
to $5,945 per hour, both airships could possibly save a total of $7.3 million and $11.3 
million, respectively, as shown in Table 66, from the total operating cost of $12.97 million.   
Table 66.   Skycat 220 and H2 Clipper Hourly Operating Cost Reduction to $5,945 
and Cost Savings—2,500 Short Tons With a 744-Hour Mission Duration 
Time 
AIRSHIPS: OLD HOURLY OP COSTS: OLD TOTAL OP COSTS: NEW HOURLY OP COST REDUCED:  NEW TOTAL OP COSTS:
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
TOTAL OP COSTS:
SKYCAT 220 13,672.69$                   12,969,522.76$         5,945.00$                                   5,639,257.14$            7,330,265.62$           
H2 CLIPPER 45,675.80$                   12,969,522.76$         5,945.00$                                   1,688,067.11$            11,281,455.65$           
The implications from this analysis show that if companies invest in technologies that 
improve engine technology, fuel efficiency, maintenance, and various other factors, they can 
reduce the hourly operating costs of their products and, therefore, can provide buyers large 
cost savings. This is especially true if they can reduce the cost by $100 or more. These 
baselines can be beneficial to the future acquisition of airships, because they allow DoD 
planners to determine if an airship is the right platform to perform a certain mission.          
2. Variable Short Tons With Constant Mission Duration Time 
Under the normal circumstances encountered by the DoD and USTRANSCOM, the 
amount of cargo to be transferred will be larger than the 2,500 short tons. The previous 
sections of this analysis have shown how particular missions may have a constant amount of 
tonnage required over variable mission durations. If mission duration time is constant and 
tonnage changes, the number of operating hours required to complete a mission will increase, 
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Figure 10.   Platform Required With Variable Tonnage and a 744-Hour Mission 
Duration 
 
Figures 9 and 10 show the number of platforms required to complete a mission whose 
tonnage varies from one to 60,000 short tons of material. As depicted in Figure 9, more 
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platforms are required to complete missions that have relatively short time durations. Figure 
10 shows the opposite: Fewer platforms are needed for missions with relatively long time 
durations. As shown in Figure 10, ship platforms are available to complete missions with 
longer duration, but due to their large payload capacities, relatively few ship platforms will 
be needed to complete missions, even if the cargo tonnage to be moved increases. Although 
Figure 10 does not show it, the number of ship platforms required to complete each mission 
falls between one or three platforms.   
The effects of the mission duration times can be seen in both figures where the slope 
of the line showing number of platforms changes based on variable tonnage. With lower 
mission duration times, the line in Figure 9 shows a relatively steeper slope compared to that 
in Figure 10. This sudden increase in slope can also translate into an increase in operating 
costs for all platforms. Using the same events as Figures 9 and 10, Figures 11 and 12 depict 
the changes in operating costs for mission duration times of 168 and 744 hours, respectively.    
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Figure 12.   Platform Operating Costs With Variable Tonnage and a 744-Hour 
Mission Duration Time 
 
From Figures 11 and 12, we can conclude that as the cargo required to be moved 
increases, the total operating costs will increase at the same rate no matter what the mission 
duration time is. This is due to the fact that total operating hours will remain the same over a 
varying mission duration time as long as the cargo required to be moved is the same. Figure 
12 also shows the LMSR and FSS as options when mission duration time increases to 744 
hours. The “step” in the LMSR and FSS curves is due to the added ship required to complete 
a mission. For example, the LMSR planned payload capacity is 53,224.2 short tons, and once 
the cargo required to be moved increases beyond this tonnage, another ship is needed to 
complete the mission. The same effect can be used to explain the FSS platform; the line 
jumps from one to three when the cargo required to be moved increases to 60,000 short tons. 
D. AUTONOMOUS AIRSHIPS—MANNED VS. UNMANNED 
The following analysis shows the potential total cost benefit, cost per ton-nautical 
mile benefit, and number of platforms to complete a mission. In addition, the analysis shows 
the potential total cost benefit of autonomous airships compared to the current manned 
logistics platforms.   
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1. Manned or Unmanned Airships 
Table 67 shows the potential benefit of unmanned airships compared to manned 
airships in TAT, number of aircraft, number of crew, and number of sorties.   
Table 67.   Manned vs. Unmanned Airships 
AIRSHIPS: TAT: NO. SORTIES: NO. AIRCRAFT: NO. CREWS : TAT: NO. SORTIES: NO. AIRCRAFT: NO. CREWS :
SKYCAT 220 130.7 5 2 6 118.7 6 2 0
H2 CLIPPER 70.2 10 1 4 58.2 13 1 0
AEROSCRAFT 81.2 9 4 10 69.2 10 4 0
HAV 366 86.6 8 6 14 74.6 9 6 0
SKYHOOK 116.5 6 10 22 104.5 7 9 0
LEMV 99.7 7 35 72 87.7 8 32 0
UNMANNED AIRSHIPSMANNED AIRSHIPS
 
As Table 67 shows, the TAT of unmanned ships is 12 hours lower than for manned 
ships due to the elimination of the crew rest that pilots and crewmembers are required to take 
after flying for a certain amount of hours. The new TAT allows airships to be used more 
frequently to deliver more cargo. The smaller TAT reduces the number of airships needed to 
maintain a steady-state delivery system, but at the same time increases the number of sorties 
required to complete the mission, as seen in Table 67; as the total number of airships 
decreases, sorties increase to maintain the steady state of the aircraft. Dependent on hourly 
operating cost, total operating costs remain the same. 
The biggest change from manned to unmanned airships comes from the total overall 
costs due to the decreased number of manpower hours required to complete a mission. As 
seen in Table 67, as the total number of airships decreases, sorties increase to maintain the 
steady state of the aircraft. Table 68 shows the potential change to overall cost of a mission 
for each airship. 
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Table 68.   Savings/Losses From Manned to Unmanned Airships—2,500 Short Tons 
With a 744-Hour Duration 
Manned Overall Cost: Unmanned Overall Cost: Cost Change:
SKYCAT 220 13,054,457.63$                 12,969,522.76$                      84,934.87$                     
H2 CLIPPER 13,018,920.86$                 12,969,522.76$                      49,398.10$                     
AEROSCRAFT 13,140,927.99$                 12,969,522.76$                      171,405.23$                   
HAV 366 13,203,905.88$                 12,969,522.76$                      234,383.13$                   
SKYHOOK 13,367,022.61$                 12,969,522.76$                      397,499.86$                   
LEMV 14,318,708.35$                 12,969,522.76$                      1,349,185.59$                  
The cost change shown in Table 68 results solely from the total manning costs when 
airships are manned. As the total operating costs will remain the same with a given tonnage, 
the total manning costs will make up the difference between manned and unmanned airship 
scenarios. All six airships show a potential benefit in using unmanned variants to transport 
the 2,500 short tons within a 744-hour mission duration. If airships fly at the same rate as 
their manned counterparts, additional cost savings will be gained because there will be no 
manning costs.  
Table 69.   Cost/Ton-Nm Changes—2,500 Short Tons With a 744-Hour Duration 
Manned Cost/Ton‐NM: Unmanned Cost/Ton‐NM: Cost/Ton‐NM Change:
SKYCAT 220 0.79$                                 0.78$                                      0.01$                              
H2 CLIPPER 0.78$                                 0.78$                                      0.00$                              
AEROSCRAFT 0.79$                                 0.78$                                      0.01$                              
HAV 366 0.80$                                 0.78$                                      0.01$                              
SKYHOOK 0.81$                                 0.78$                                      0.02$                              
LEMV 0.86$                                 0.78$                                      0.08$                                
Table 69 shows the potential impact that total mission costs have on the cost per ton-
nautical mile for each airship. Five out of the six airships have decreased costs per ton-
nautical mile, while only one airship’s costs remain the same. Overall costs and cost per ton-
nautical mile are highly dependent on the mission duration and the amount of cargo to be 
moved. A change in either of these two may change the number of airships and sorties 
required to complete the mission.   
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It is important to note that with our model, as the number of sorties increases, the 
TAT decreases and the number of airships available to complete a mission increases, 
therefore reducing the total number of airships required. With the unmanned airships, total 
manning costs are not incurred and the total overall costs decrease.  
 2. Manned Platforms vs. Unmanned Airships 
Unmanned airships can provide a potential cost-savings benefit, especially when a 
mission happens quite frequently. Table 70 shows the total cost savings or losses between 
current heavy-lift platforms and unmanned airships.  
Table 70.   Total Cost Savings/Losses Between Platforms and Airships— 
2,500 Short Tons With a 744-Hour Mission Duration 
Manned AMC/MSC Overall Cost: Unmanned Airships' Total Cost: Total Cost Change:
C‐130J 17,540,129.03$                               12,969,522.76$                                     4,570,606.27$                               
C‐17 13,114,631.71$                               12,969,522.76$                                     145,108.95$                                  
C‐5M 23,476,364.79$                               12,969,522.76$                                     10,506,842.03$                            
LMSR 142,114.00$                                     12,969,522.76$                                     (12,827,408.76)$                           
FSS 628,349.23$                                     12,969,522.76$                                     (12,341,173.53)$                             
Unmanned airships can provide cost savings compared to all of the heavy-lift air 
platforms. Table 70 shows that the greatest cost savings can be obtained by using unmanned 
airships to replace the C-5M platform. All six airships provide a positive cost savings, 
ranging from $145,000 to $10.5 million, against the three AMC platforms. Due to the 
relatively small overall cost of MSC ships, unmanned airships cannot compete against them. 
All six airships provide a negative cost savings when compared to MSC ships.     
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VIII. ADDITIONAL AIRSHIP ANALYSIS 
A. BLOCK SPEED AND PAYLOAD CAPACITY 
Total operating hours and total manpower hours are the determining factors driving 
the overall costs of any given mission. Airships with high block speeds and relatively large 
payload capacities excel in keeping operating and manpower hours low. In the analysis thus 
far, we have assumed that an airship’s block speed and payload capacity characteristics are 
the best case values at which they can perform a mission. Improvements in engine 
technology, fuel efficiency, composite material structures, and lifting systems can greatly 
enhance an airship’s block speed and payload capacity, adding to the benefits that airships 
could bring to the heavy-lift logistics environment.   
In the following section, we analyze the benefits of improving each airship’s block 
speeds and payload capacity. The analysis shows that changing either one or both of these 
characteristics greatly affects total operating hours and total manpower hours. Block speeds 
and payload capacities were both subjected to increases of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% to 
show the varying benefits that each airship can potentially have on the total time required to 
complete a mission. These outputs can function as a guide that airship companies and the 
DoD can use when analyzing the characteristics that are required to meet various mission 
demands. 
1. Skycat 220 
The Skycat 220, developed by World Skycat Ltd., provides a lift payload capacity of 
220 short tons and a block speed of 84 knots. The Skycat 220 airship has a large payload 
capacity and medium block-speed range. Table 71 shows 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% 
increases in payload capacity and block speed in order to determine the effect of these 
increases on total operating hours.   
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Table 71.   Skycat 220 Total Operating Hours With Increases in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration 
SKYCAT 220 
BLOCK SPEED (KTS): 220 275 330 385 440
84 800.0 666.7 533.3 466.7 400.0
105 640.0 533.3 426.7 373.3 320.0
126 533.3 444.4 355.6 311.1 266.7
147 457.1 381.0 304.8 266.7 228.6























Table 71 shows that when payload capacity increased by 25%, from 220 short tons to 
275 shorts tons, with a constant block speed of 84 knots, total operating time decreased from 
800 hours to 666.7 hours. Further observation shows that for every 25% increase in payload 
capacity, with a constant block speed of 84 knots, total operating time decreases by a factor 
of 133.3 hours. When block speed is increased by 25% from 84 knots to 105 knots, with a 
constant payload capacity of 220 short tons, total operating hours decrease from 800 hours to 
640 hours; a decrease of 160 hours compared to the original 800 hours. Further analysis 
shows that as block speed increases to 126, 147, and 168 knots, total operating time 
decreases by 266.7, 342.9, and 400 hours, respectively. Figure 13 shows that as both payload 
capacity and block speed increase by up to 100%, 600 hours could potentially be saved from 










































Figure 13.   Skycat 220 Total Operating Hours With Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration 
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Table 72.   Skycat 220 Total Manpower Hours With Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
168-Hour Mission Duration   
SKYCAT 220
BLOCK SPEED (KTS): 220 275 330 385 440
84 1420.0 1183.3 946.7 828.3 710.0
105 1260.0 1050.0 840.0 735.0 630.0
126 1153.3 961.1 768.9 672.8 576.7
147 1077.1 897.6 718.1 628.3 538.6






















Table 72 shows the potential savings in total manpower hours involved in conducting 
a mission of 168 hours and 2,500 short tons. When payload capacity is increased from 220 
short tons to 275 shorts tons, with a constant block speed of 84 knots, the total manpower 
time decreases from 1,420 hours to 1,183.3 hours. This decrease in total manpower is due to 
the number of airships required to complete the movement of 2,500 short tons within a 168-
hour mission duration time. For every 25% increase in payload capacity for the Skycat 220, 
total manpower time decreases by a factor of 236.7 hours. As block speed increases to 105, 
126, 147, and 168 knots, total manpower time decreases by a factor of 160, 266.7, 342.9, and 
400 hours, respectively. The changes in total manpower time are equivalent to the changes in 
total operating time because operating time factors into the TAT. The TAT is used to 
determine the amount of “touch time” that personnel have on each airship. Figure 14 shows 
that as planned payload and block speed are increased by 100%, total manpower time 
decreases by 50%.    
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Figure 14.   Skycat 220 Total Manpower Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration  
2. H2 Clipper 
The H2 Clipper, developed by H2 Company, provides a lift payload capacity of 200 
short tons and a block speed of 304 knots. The H2 Clipper airship has a large payload 
capacity and a high block-speed range. Table 73 shows a 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% 
increase in payload capacity and block speed in order to determine the effect that these 
increases have on total operating hours.     
Table 73.   H2 Clipper Total Operating Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration 
H2 CLIPPER
BLOCK SPEED (KTS): 200 250 300 350 400
304 239.5 184.2 165.8 147.4 128.9
380 191.6 147.4 132.6 117.9 103.2
456 159.6 122.8 110.5 98.2 86.0
532 136.8 105.3 94.7 84.2 73.7
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Table 73 shows that as payload capacity increases by 25%, from 200 short tons to 250 
shorts tons, with a constant block speed of 304 knots, total operating time decreases from 
239.5 hours to 184.2 hours, a difference of 55.3 hours from the original total operating time 
of 239.5 hours. Further observation shows that as payload capacity is increased to 300, 350, 
and 400 short tons, total operating time decreases by a factor of 18.4 hours for each increase 
in cargo capacity. When block speed is increased by 25%, from 304 knots to 380 knots, with 
a constant payload capacity of 200 short tons, total operating hours decrease from 239.5 
hours to 191.6 hours, a decrease of 47.9 hours compared to the original 239.5 hours. Further 
analysis shows that as block speed increases to 456, 532, and 608 knots, total operating time 
decreases by 79.9, 102.7, and 119.8 hours, respectively. Figure 15 shows as both payload 
capacity and block speed increase by up to 100%, a potential time savings of 175 hours could 







































Figure 15.   H2 Clipper Total Operating Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration 
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Table 74.   H2 Clipper Total Manpower Hours With an Increase in Payload 
Capacity and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short 
Tons With a 168-Hour Mission Duration   
H2 CLIPPER
BLOCK SPEED (KTS): 200 250 300 350 400
304 911.1 700.9 630.8 560.7 490.6
380 863.2 664.0 597.6 531.2 464.8
456 831.3 639.5 575.5 511.6 447.6
532 808.5 621.9 559.7 497.5 435.4






















Table 74 shows the potential savings in total manpower hours involved in conducting 
a mission of 168 hours and 2,500 short tons. When payload capacity is increased from 200 
short tons to 250 short tons, with a constant block speed of 304 knots, the total manpower 
time decreased from 911.1 hours 700.9 hours. For every 25% increase in payload capacity 
for the H2 Clipper, total manpower time decreases by a factor of 70.1 hours. As block speed 
increases to 380, 456, 532, and 608 knots, total manpower time decreases by a factor of 47.9, 
79.8, 102.6, and 119.7 hours, respectively. The changes in total manpower time are 
equivalent to the changes in total operating time due to operating time factoring into the 
TAT. The TAT is used to determine the amount of “touch time” that personnel have on each 
airship. Figure 16 shows that as planned payload and block speed are increased by up to 

















































Figure 16.   Skycat 220 Total Manpower Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration 
3. Aeroscraft 
Aeroscraft, developed by Aeros Inc., provides a lift payload capacity of 65 short tons 
and a block speed of 120 knots. The Aeroscraft airship has a medium payload capacity and a 
medium block-speed range. Table 75 shows a 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% increase in 
payload capacity and block speed in order to determine the effect that these increases have on 
total operating hours.   
Table 75.   Aeroscraft Total Operating Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration 
AEROSCRAFT
BLOCK SPEED (KTS): 65 81.25 97.5 113.75 130
120 1820.0 1446.7 1213.3 1026.7 933.3
150 1456.0 1157.3 970.7 821.3 746.7
180 1213.3 964.4 808.9 684.4 622.2
210 1040.0 826.7 693.3 586.7 533.3
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Table 75 shows that as payload capacity is increased by 25%, from 65 short tons to 
81.25 shorts tons, with a constant block speed of 120 knots, total operating time decreases 
from 1,820 hours to 1,446.7 hours, a difference of 373.3 hours from the original total 
operating time of 1,820 hours. Further observation shows that as payload capacity is 
increased to 97.5, 113.75, and 130 short tons, total operating time decreases by a factor of 
606.7, 793.3, and 886.7 hours, respectively, for each increase in cargo capacity. When block 
speed is increased by 25%, from 120 knots to 150 knots, with a constant payload capacity of 
65 short tons, total operating hours decrease from 1,820 hours to 1,456 hours, a decrease of 
364 hours compared to the original 1,820 hours. Further analysis shows that as block speed 
increases to 180, 210, and 240 knots, total operating time decreases by 606.7, 780, and 910 
hours, respectively. Figure 17 shows that as both payload capacity and block speed increase 
by up to 100%, the potential time savings that can be achieved will be 1,353 hours from the 












































Figure 17.   Aeroscraft Total Operating Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration 
 =
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
 do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 133 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Table 76.   Aeroscraft Total Manpower Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration   
AEROSCRAFT
BLOCK SPEED (KTS): 65 81.25 97.5 113.75 130
120 3835.0 3048.3 2556.7 2163.3 1966.7
150 3471.0 2759.0 2314.0 1958.0 1780.0
180 3228.3 2566.1 2152.2 1821.1 1655.6
210 3055.0 2428.3 2036.7 1723.3 1566.7






















Table 76 shows the potential savings in total manpower hours involved in conducting 
a mission of 168 hours and 2,500 short tons. When payload capacity is increased from 65 
short tons to 81.25 short tons, with a constant block speed of 120 knots, the total manpower 
time decreases from 3,835 hours to 3,048 hours. For every 25% increase in payload capacity 
for the Aeroscraft, total manpower time decreases by 1,279; 1,672; and 1,869 hours, 
respectively. As block speed increases to 150, 180, 210, and 240 knots, total manpower time 
decreases by a factor of 364, 607, 780, and 910 hours, respectively. The changes in total 
manpower time are equivalent to the changes in total operating time due to the operating time 
factoring into the TAT. The TAT is used to determine the amount of “touch time” that 
personnel have on each airship. Figure 18 shows that as planned payload and block speed are 
increased by up to 100%, the total manpower time decreases by 2,335 hours from the original 
















































Figure 18.   Aeroscraft Total Manpower Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration  
4. HAV 366 
The HAV 366, developed by Discovery Air Innovation, provides a lift payload 
capacity of 50 short tons and a block speed of 105 knots. The Aeroscraft airship has a 
medium payload capacity and a medium block-speed range. Table 77 shows a 25%, 50%, 
75%, and 100% increase in payload capacity and block speed in order to determine the effect 
that these increases have on total operating hours.     
Table 77.   HAV 366 Total Operating Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration 
HAV 366
BLOCK SPEED (KTS): 50 62.5 75 87.5 100
105 2666.7 2133.3 1813.3 1546.7 1333.3
131.25 2133.3 1706.7 1450.7 1237.3 1066.7
157.5 1777.8 1422.2 1208.9 1031.1 888.9
183.75 1523.8 1219.0 1036.2 883.8 792.4
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Table 77 shows that as payload capacity increases by 25%, from 50 short tons to 62.5 
short tons, with a constant block speed of 105 knots, total operating time decreases from 
2,666.7 hours to 2,133.3 hours, a difference of 533.4 hours from the original total operating 
time of 2,666.7 hours. Further observation shows that as payload capacity is increased to 75, 
87.5, and 100 short tons, total operating time decreases by a factor of 853.4; 1,120; and 
1,333.4 hours, respectively, for each increase in cargo capacity. When block speed is 
increased by 25%, from 105 knots to 131.25 knots, with a constant payload capacity of 50 
short tons, total operating hours decrease from 2,666.7 hours to 2,133.3 hours, a decrease of 
533.4 hours from the original 2,666.7 hours. Further analysis shows that as block speed 
increases to 157.5, 183.75, and 210 knots, total operating time decreases by 888.9; 1,142.9; 
and 1,333.3 hours, respectively. Figure 19 shows that as both payload capacity and block 
speed increase by up to 100%, the potential time savings that can be achieved will be 1,973.4 








































Figure 19.   HAV 366 Total Operating Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration 
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Table 78.   HAV 366 Total Manpower Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration   
HAV 366
BLOCK SPEED (KTS): 50 62.5 75 87.5 100
105 5250.0 4200.0 3570.0 3045.0 2625.0
131.25 4716.7 3773.3 3207.3 2735.7 2358.3
157.5 4361.1 3488.9 2965.6 2529.4 2180.6
183.75 4107.1 3285.7 2792.9 2382.1 2135.7






















Table 78 shows the potential savings in total manpower hours involved in conducting 
a mission of 168 hours and 2,500 short tons. When payload capacity increases from 50 short 
tons to 62.5 short tons with a constant block speed of 105 knots, the total manpower time 
decreases from 5,250 hours to 4,200 hours. Further increases of payload capacity to 75, 87.5, 
and 100 short tons, provide a total manpower time decrease of 1,680; 2,205; and 2,625 hours, 
respectively. As block speed increases to 131.25, 157.5, 183.75, and 210 knots, total 
manpower time decreases by a factor of 533.3; 888.9; 1,142.9; and 1,333.3 hours, 
respectively. The changes in total manpower time are equivalent to the changes in total 
operating time due to operating time factoring into the TAT. The TAT is used to determine 
the amount of “touch time” that personnel have on each airship. Figure 20 shows that as 
planned payload and block speed are increased by up to 100%, total manpower time 













































Figure 20.   HAV 366 Total Manpower Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration  
5. Skyhook 
Skyhook, developed by Boeing and Skyhook International, provides a lift payload 
capacity of 40 short tons and a block speed of 70 knots. The Skyhook airship has a low 
payload capacity and a medium block-speed range. Table 79 shows 25%, 50%, 75%, and 
100% increases in payload capacity and block speed in order to determine the effect that 
these increases have on total operating hours.  
Table 79.   Skyhook Total Operating Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration 
SKYHOOK
BLOCK SPEED (KTS): 40 50 60 70 80
70 5040.0 4000.0 3360.0 2880.0 2560.0
87.5 4032.0 3200.0 2688.0 2304.0 2048.0
105 3360.0 2666.7 2240.0 1920.0 1706.7
122.5 2880.0 2285.7 1920.0 1645.7 1462.9
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Table 79 shows that as payload capacity is increased by 25%, from 40 short tons to 
50 short tons, with a constant block speed of 70 knots, total operating time decreases from 
5,040 hours to 4,000 hours, a difference of 1,040 hours from the original total operating time. 
Further observation shows that as payload capacity is increased to 60, 70, and 80 short tons, 
total operating time decreases by a factor of 1,680; 2,160; and 2,480 hours, respectively, for 
each increase in cargo capacity. When block speed is increased by 25%, from 70 knots to 
87.5 knots, with a constant payload capacity of 40 short tons, total operating hours decrease 
from 5,040 hours to 4,032 hours, a difference of 1,008 hours. Further analysis shows that as 
block speed increases to 105, 122.5, and 140 knots, total operating time decreases by 1,680; 
2,160; and 2,520 hours, respectively. Figure 21 shows that as both payload capacity and 
block speed increase by up to 100%, the potential time savings that can be achieved will be 








































Figure 21.   Skyhook Total Operating Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration 
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Table 80.   Skyhook Total Manpower Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration   
SKYHOOK
BLOCK SPEED (KTS): 40 50 60 70 80
70 11,387,308.69$  11,294,625.51$  11,237,589.70$  11,194,812.85$  11,166,294.95$ 
87.5 11,332,727.59$  11,251,307.18$  11,201,202.30$  11,163,623.65$  11,138,571.21$ 
105 11,296,340.19$  11,222,428.29$  11,176,944.04$  11,142,830.85$  11,120,088.72$ 
122.5 11,270,349.19$  11,201,800.51$  11,159,616.70$  11,127,978.85$  11,106,886.95$ 






















Table 80 shows the potential savings in total manpower hours involved in conducting 
a mission of 168 hours and 2,500 short tons. When payload capacity increased from 40 short 
tons to 50 short tons, with a constant block speed of 70 knots, the total manpower time 
decreased from 8,295 hours to 6,583 hours. For every 25% increase in payload capacity for 
the Skyhook, total manpower time decreases by 2,765; 3,555; and 4,082 hours, respectively. 
As block speed increases to 87.5, 105, 122.5, and 140 knots, total manpower time decreases 
by a factor of 1,008; 1,680; 2,160; and 2,520 hours, respectively. The changes in total 
manpower time are equivalent to the changes in total operating time due to operating time 
factoring into the TAT. The TAT is used to determine the amount of “touch time” that 
personnel have on each airship. Figure 22 shows that as planned payload and block speed are 
increased by up to 100%, total manpower time decreases by 5,362 hours from the original 
total manpower time of 8,295 hours.    
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Figure 22.   Skyhook 220 Total Manpower Hours With an Increase in Payload 
Capacity and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short 
Tons With a 168-Hour Mission Duration  
6. LEMV 
The LEMV, developed by Northrop Grumman, provides a lift payload capacity of 10 
short tons and a block speed of 80 knots. The LEMV airship has a low payload capacity and 
a medium block-speed range. Table 81 shows 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% increases in 
payload capacity and block speed in order to determine the effect that these increases have on 
total operating hours.     
Table 81.   LEMV Total Operating Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity and 
Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With a 
168-Hour Mission Duration 
LEMV
BLOCK SPEED (KTS): 10 12.5 15 17.5 20
80 17500.0 14000.0 11690.0 10010.0 8750.0
100 14000.0 11200.0 9352.0 8008.0 7000.0
120 11666.7 9333.3 7793.3 6673.3 5833.3
140 10000.0 8000.0 6680.0 5720.0 5000.0
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Table 81 shows that as payload capacity is increased by 25%, from 10 short tons to 
12.5 short tons, with a constant block speed of 80 knots, total operating time decreases from 
17,500 hours to 14,000 hours, a difference of 3,500 hours from the original total operating 
time. Further observation shows that as payload capacity is increased to 15, 17.5, and 20 
short tons, total operating time decreases by a factor of 5,810; 7,490; and 8,750 hours, 
respectively, for each increase in cargo capacity. When block speed increases by 25%, from 
80 knots to 100 knots, with a constant payload capacity of 10 short tons, total operating hours 
decrease with the same magnitude as the increase in payload capacity. Figure 23 shows that 
as both payload capacity and block speed increase by up to 100%, the potential time savings 












































Figure 23.   LEMV Total Operating Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity and 
Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With a 
168-Hour Mission Duration 
Table 82.   LEMV Total Manpower Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration   
LEMV
BLOCK SPEED (KTS): 10 12.5 15 17.5 20
80 30416.7 24333.3 20318.3 17398.3 15208.3
100 26916.7 21533.3 17980.3 15396.3 13458.3
120 24583.3 19666.7 16421.7 14061.7 12291.7
140 22916.7 18333.3 15308.3 13108.3 11458.3
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Table 82 shows the potential savings in total manpower hours involved in conducting 
a mission of 168 hours and 2,500 short tons. When payload capacity increases from 10 short 
tons to 12.5 short tons, with a constant block speed of 80 knots, the total manpower time 
decreases from 30,416 hours to 24,333 hours. For every 25% increase in payload capacity for 
the LEMV, total manpower time decreases by 10,098; 13,018; and 15,208 hours, 
respectively. As block speed increases to 100, 120, 140, and 160 knots, total manpower time 
decreases by a factor of 3,500; 5,833; 7,500; and 8,750 hours, respectively. The changes in 
total manpower time are equivalent to the changes in total operating time due to operating 
time factoring into the TAT. The TAT is used to determine the amount of “touch time” that 
personnel have on each airship. Figure 24 shows that as planned payload and block speed are 
increased by up to 100%, total manpower time decreases by 19,583 hours from the original 








































Figure 24.   LEMV Total Manpower Hours With an Increase in Payload Capacity 
and Block Speed of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%—2,500 Short Tons With 
a 168-Hour Mission Duration  
 
The performance measures were not based on cost effectiveness, but on the total 
operating and manpower hours required to complete a mission. If the break-even hourly 
operating costs that we calculated in Chapters VI and VII were applied to this analysis, the 
total operating costs would have been the same, even with improvements in block speed and 
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planned payload capacity, which would understate the actual cost savings that airships could 
provide. The tables provide a good range of values for both planned payload and block speed 
that can indicate the number of improvements airships can achieve before hitting a point of 
diminishing returns. Airship manufacturers can strive to work at this point in order to 
improve the efficiencies of their airships. 
 The improvement in planned payload and block speed may also increase the hourly 
operating costs associated with each airship. If hourly operating costs are to increase, the 
hourly operating cost baseline determined in Chapters VI and VII can be used by airship 
companies to determine the scope of the cost to improve planned payload and block speeds. 
Improvements in airship characteristics could continue as long as the total overall costs 
remain below the total overall costs of the C-17 for a particular mission and that airship 
design itself does not change. The USTRANSCOM could benefit from this by cutting costs 
in logistics transportation while at the same time delivering cargo in a fast and efficient 
manner.       
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 In the findings section of this analysis, we conclude that airships, based on the hourly 
operating costs established throughout this project, could provide a viable alternative for 
USTRANSCOM’s airlift and sealift capabilities. This analysis has shown the viability of 
airships in a heavy-lift environment and their ability to transport cargo cost effectively in a 
given time period. This is especially true with transportation of up to 2,500 short tons and 
when time is a critical factor.  
 The results of the operational cost and operational efficiency study show airships to 
be a viable mid-cost alternative. Simply stated, airships provide lower operational costs than 
aircraft but cannot compete cost-wise with sealift platforms. This statement assumes that the 
time span needed for a given mission is great enough to allow sealift to become an option for 
transportation. With the given scenarios, airships are the best solution to deliver 2,500 short 
tons with a distance of up to 3,320 nautical miles and with time constraints of approximately 
72–600 hours. For time constraints between 48–72 hours, aircraft have a distinct advantage 
due to their speed. Likewise, anything above 600 hours allows sealift to be the best suited 
platform for the given missions. 
 In addition to examining overall operating costs of airships, we examined the cost 
effectiveness of unmanned versus manned variants of airships. The results of our calculations 
are dependent on the total distance traveled and the amount of cargo to be transported for a 
given mission. Unmanned variants of airships could be extremely cost efficient when 
distance and the amount of cargo increase. In our model, as crew rest times are removed from 
the equations, the turn-around time decreases, freeing up more airships to conduct an 
increased number of sorties. The cost effectiveness of unmanned versus manned variants of 
airships is the total cost of manning, as total operating costs remain the same. The ability of 
airships to complete more sorties, even at the same cost as other air platforms, shows the 
promise of using unmanned variants of airships as a viable heavy-lift platform. 
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2. Way Ahead 
There is a great opportunity for the USTRANSCOM to produce cost-effective 
savings by integrating airships into their current heavy-lift transportation systems. For this to 
become a reality, the USTRANSOM will need to conduct further studies into current airship 
technology, but based on our findings, we believe airships to be a viable alternative to the 
current forms of heavy-lift transportation. As stated in our findings, airships cannot replace 
all other forms of heavy-lift transportation, but can offer cost savings for USTRANSCOM’s 
mission. In addition, airships could become viable replacements for the other heavy-lift 
platforms, but currently there are too many unknown variables with airships to recommend 
this action. 
As a way ahead, we recommend that research be conducted on which types of 
airships will be best suited to meet USTRANSCOM’s mission. Factors such as the use for 
airships, distances required, and cargo capacity must be outlined. For missions that require 
greater distances and heavier payload capacities, the Skycat 220 and H2 Clipper would be the 
airships of choice for further research. For missions that require smaller intra-theater 
distances with less payload capacity, the HAV-366 and Skyhook would likely be the airships 
requiring further research. For re-supplying forward operating bases or regional transits, 
smaller platforms, such as the LEMV, fit this mission description better than some of the 
larger airships. All of these airships could conceivably reduce transportation costs in the 
varying missions described previously.  
 The USTRANSCOM could also realize cost savings by analyzing the use of airships 
in tandem with current heavy-lift platforms. Examining the inter-modal mix of airlift, airship, 
and sealift transportation could provide additional cost savings based on the number of 
platforms required, the amount of cargo that needs to be transported, and the total time 
required to transport that cargo. From our findings, we believe airships could best fit in with 
today’s heavy-lift platforms on mission requirements between 72 hours and 600 hours with 
smaller amounts of cargo that need to be transported. 
B. FOLLOW-ON RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the following paragraphs, we outline follow-on recommendations for research that 
will need to be accomplished before airships can be considered a viable alternative to the 
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current heavy-lift platforms that the USTRANSCOM utilizes to complete its mission. 
Although we have strived to be as thorough as possible, we made many assumptions in order 
to complete this analysis. This was due in part to the lack of information regarding airships 
since these platforms have only had limited research conducted into their feasibility.   
The first recommendation for further study would include gathering the complete 
operating costs of airships. The operating costs throughout this analysis were derived from 
current heavy-lift aircraft. We concluded that this was the best estimate due to the fact that 
most airship platforms are in design or the information we sought was proprietary to the 
corporations producing the airships. Once airship design and production have matured, 
further studies will need to collect data estimating the hourly operating costs of airships. The 
collection of data with regards to airships’ true block speeds, cargo capacity, TAT, ground 
times, and other variables will then determine the operating cost of airships, and can be used 
to determine whether they, in fact, can be considered a viable alternative to the current 
heavy-lift platforms. 
Another factor that must be included along with the operational capabilities of 
airships is their lift mechanism designs. The decision to use hydrogen and helium could have 
lasting cost and availability implications for airships’ further use. As discussed earlier in this 
analysis, helium is a finite resource that does not have a high production capability. 
Hydrogen, on the other hand, is abundantly available, but can be highly unstable without the 
proper safety considerations. Cost and safety considerations will need to be examined further 
to determine which form of lifting mechanism will best be suited for a military application 
within varying operating environments. 
In this analysis, we did not consider the overall acquisition costs of airships. If 
airships can be considered a viable alternative to current heavy-lift platforms, an acquisition 
cost study will need to be conducted. Items such as research and development, technology 
development, materiel solutions, engineering and manufacturing development, and 
production and deployment will all need to be considered to establish an overall cost of 
bringing airships to an operationally capable status. In addition, it could behoove the DoD to 
consider acquiring off-the-shelf airships. Many corporations are designing airships for 
commercial use as well as for potential military use. This would reduce the time and costs 
 =
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
 do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 148 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
associated with bringing these platforms into an operational status through the current 
acquisitions process. 
Another important consideration with the cost of the procurement of airships is the 
life cycle costs associated with these platforms. The current fleet of heavy-lift platforms has 
established life cycle costs, maintenance costs, and time frames associated with each 
platform. As was noted in the analysis, some of these platforms are reaching their designated 
life cycle span; however, for airships to be considered a viable alternative to these platforms, 
their life cycle costs will need to be examined. The various levels of maintenance, including 
depot, intermediate, and organizational costs, must be examined to determine whether it is 
cost effective to replace the platforms with airships or if the current platforms should be 
modernized.  
Finally, a study that examines the infrastructure required for airships will need to be 
conducted. In our analysis, we assumed that airships could use the current infrastructure that 
is already in place. The need for larger maintenance facilities, staging areas, and additional 
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APPENDIX 1 
Acronym:  Description: 
AMC   Air Mobility Command 
AN/USD  Army/Navy Special/Combination Surveillance Equipment 
CBO   Congressional Budget Office 
C3   Command, Control, and Communication 
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency 
CRAF   Civil Reserve Air Fleet 
DAMIR  Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval 
DARPA  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DELAG  Deutsche Luftschiffahrts Aktien Gesellschaft 
DoD   Department of Defense 
EO/IR   Electro Optical/Infra-Red 
FSS   Fast Sealift Ship 
FY   Fiscal Year 
GPS   Global Positioning System 
HAV   Hybrid Air Vehicle 
HEIT   High Explosive Incendiary Tracer Rounds 
ISR   Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
LEMV   Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle 
LMSR   Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off 
MMcf   Million Cubic Feet 
MSC   Military Sealift Command 
NASA   National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
RDT&E  Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
RO/RO  Roll-on/Roll-off 
RRF   Ready Reserve Force 
S&T   Science and Technology 
SAM   Surface-to-Air Missiles 
SAR   Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SD   Surveillance Drone 
SDDCTEA  Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Transportation 
Engineering Agency 
STOL   Short Takeoff and Landing 
TAT Turn-Around Time 
U.S.   United States 
UAS   Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
UAV   Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
UCLA   University of California Los Angeles 
USA   United States Army 
USAF   United States Air Force 
USN   United States Navy 
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 
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VTOL   Vertical Takeoff and Landing 
WWI   World War I 
WWII   World War II 
 
 
Symbol:  Description:     Units: 
 
B   Block speed     Knots (Kts) 
CM   Cargo movement requirement  Short Tons (S. tons) 
CP   Payload capacity for platform   Short Tons (S. tons) 
D   Distance     Nautical Mile (NM)  
HE   Hourly enlisted wages   Dollar/hour ($/hr) 
HO   Hourly office wages    Dollar/hour ($/hr) 
HP   Hourly operating costs for platforms  Dollar/hour ($/hr) 
HP-AIRSHIP  Hourly operating costs for airships  Dollar/hour ($/hr) 
HT   Cost per 30 tons of freight transported Dollar/30 s. tons 
HV   Hourly civilian wages    Dollar/hour ($/hr) 
IAF   Number of platforms conducting  Air/sea platform  
maximum sorties/trips 
IAP   Number of platforms completing limited Air/sea platform  
sorties/trips 
IAT   Total number of platforms   Air/sea platform 
ME   Manning for enlisted    Personnel 
MO   Manning for officer    Personnel 
MV   Manning for civilians    Personnel 
NA   Overall costs for air/sealift platforms  Dollars ($) 
NC   Cost per ton-nautical mile   Dollars ($) 
NM   Total manning costs    Dollars ($) 
NO   Total operating costs    Dollars ($) 
NO-AIRCRAFT  Total operating costs for aircraft  Dollars ($) 
NT   Total trucking costs    Dollars ($) 
SAF   Maximum number of sorties/trips  Sorties/trips 
SAP   Limited number of sorties/trips  Sorties/trips 
SAT   Total number of sorties/trips   Sorties/trips 
TA   Turn-around-time per platform  Hours (hrs) 
TC   Flight pre-check time    Hours (hrs) 
TG   Ground/unload/offload time   Hours (hrs) 
TM   Mission duration time    Hours (hrs) 
TO   Total operating hours    Hours (hrs) 
TO-AIRSHIP  Total operating hours for airships  Hours (hrs) 
TP   Operating hours per platform   Hours (hrs) 
TP   Operating time per platform   Hours (hrs) 
TR   Crew rest time     Hours (hrs) 
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APPENDIX 2 
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APPENDIX 4 
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APPENDIX 5 
Aircraft Planning Data 
 
Figure 25.   Notional Cargo Capacity 
 
 
Figure 26.   Notional Block Speeds 
 
 







Figure 28.   AMC Hourly Operating Cost 
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APPENDIX 6 
Sealift Planning Data 
 
 
Figure 29.   Notional Cargo Capacity 
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Figure 33.   C-17 Globemaster III (USAF) 
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Figure 34.   C-5M Galaxy (USAF) 
 
 
Figure 35.   Large, Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-off (MSC) 
 
 
Figure 36.   Fast Sealift Ships (MSC) 
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Figure 39.   Aeroscraft (Aeros) 
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Figure 42.   Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle (Northrop Grumman) 
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Figure 43.   Scenario 1 
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